A Discourse for Educability of Non-propositional Knowledge - Ryle’s Knowing-how and Polanyi’s Tacit Knowing -

2018 ◽  
Vol 40 (3) ◽  
pp. 1-20
Author(s):  
Jeong-nae Kim
Keyword(s):  
Propositional Knowledge ◽  
Tacit Knowing ◽  
Knowing How

Is all knowledge prepositional?

2005 ◽  
Vol 48 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 7-19
Author(s):  
Miroslava Andjelkovic
Keyword(s):  
Propositional Knowledge ◽  
The Other ◽  
Infinite Regress ◽  
Important Distinction ◽  
Knowing How ◽  
The Asymmetry ◽  
Contemporary Epistemology

This paper deals with a criticism of Ryle's claim that the so called Intellectualist legend leads to an infinite regress. Critics have attempted to show that Ryle's argument cannot even get off the ground since its two basic premises cannot be true at the same time. In the paper I argue that this objection is based on a misinterpretation of Ryle's argumentation, which is complex and consists of two arguments, not of a single one as it is claimed. One of Ryle's argument attacks the thesis that an intelligent act is an indirect result of propositional knowledge, while the other, which I call the Asymmetry argument, claims that not every manifestation of knowledge that is accompanied with the manifestation of knowing how. In the paper I argue that both Ryle's arguments are valid and resistant to recent critique so it can be said that Ryle's distinction between knowledge that and knowing how is still an important distinction within contemporary epistemology.

scholarly journals Ryle on the Explanatory Role of Knowledge How

2017 ◽  
Vol 5 (5) ◽  
Author(s):  
Will Small
Keyword(s):  
Propositional Knowledge ◽  
Primary Interest ◽  
Explanatory Role ◽  
Positive View ◽  
Knowing How

Contemporary discussions of knowledge how typically focus on the question whether or not knowing how to do ϕ consists in propositional knowledge, and divide the field between intellectualists (who think that it does) and anti-intellectualists (who think that it does not, and that it consists instead in the possession of the ability to ϕ). This way of framing the issue is said to derive from Gilbert Ryle. I argue that this is a misreading of Ryle, whose primary interest in discussing knowledge how was not epistemological but rather action-theoretical, whose argument against intellectualism has for this reason been misunderstood and underestimated (by Jason Stanley, among others), and whose positive view aims to chart a middle course between intellectualism and anti-intellectualism.

scholarly journals Knowing How One Knows

2019 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 195-205
Author(s):  
Giovanni Rolla ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Actual World ◽  
Possible Worlds ◽  
Practical Knowledge ◽  
Propositional Knowledge ◽  
Knowing How ◽  
Know How ◽  
First Order ◽  
Kk Principle

In this paper, I argue that knowledge is dimly luminous. That is: if a person knows that p, she knows how she knows that p. The argument depends on a safety-based account of propositional knowledge, which is salient in Williamson’s critique of the ‘KK’ principle. I combine that account with non-intellectualism about knowledge-how – according to which, if a person knows how to φ, then in nearly all (if not all) nearby possible worlds in which she φes in the same way as in the actual world, she only φes successfully. Thus, the possession of first-order propositional knowledge implies secondorder practical knowledge, and this can be iterated. Because of the assumed nonintellectualism about know-how, dim luminosity does not imply bright luminosity about knowledge, which is expressed by the traditional KK principle. I conclude by considering some potential counterexamples to the view that knowledge is dimly luminous.

The varieties of knowing

2020 ◽  
pp. 77-95
Author(s):  
Gregory Currie
Keyword(s):  
Recent Work ◽  
Propositional Knowledge ◽  
Knowing How ◽  
The Difference

This chapter reviews recent work in epistemology and draws a number of distinctions that will be of use in later chapters: between knowledge and learning, between knowledge and understanding, between knowledge and wisdom. It emphasizes the difference between propositional knowledge and the much narrower category of knowledge fully expressible in language. It emphasizes the importance of pathways to learning that are reliable. Most importantly it distinguishes propositional knowledge, knowledge of how to do things, and knowledge of what experiences are like (acquaintance); all these, I argue, are forms of knowing which may be made available by exposure to fiction. Relations of reducibility between these kinds are considered, as is the relation between knowing-how and abilities.

scholarly journals Expertise as a domain in interaction

2021 ◽  
pp. 146144562110167
Author(s):  
Ilkka Arminen ◽  
Mika Simonen
Keyword(s):  
Procedural Knowledge ◽  
Propositional Knowledge ◽  
Methodological Issues ◽  
Knowing How ◽  
Know How ◽  
Knowing That ◽  
New Research

We start this article from Gilbert Ryle’s distinction between propositional knowledge, ‘knowing-that’, and procedural knowledge, ‘knowing-how’, and investigate how participants in interaction display orientation to the latter in various settings. As the knowledge of how things are done, know-how can be analyzed in terms of its relevance and consequentiality for parties in interaction. Similarly, as participants adjust their actions and understandings according to their sense of what they know and assume others to know, their know-how and its distribution may form the basis for adjusting and reshaping their actions, forms of participation and identities. In this sense, we aim at opening an investigation of know-how, and its conventionalized form, expertise, in interaction. In as much as it forms a distinct domain, a new research object – expertise in interaction – is formulated. Methodological issues of how to study expertise in interaction are discussed. The data are in English and Finnish.

Hayek on tacit knowledge

2010 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 145-165 ◽  
Author(s):  
FUAT OĞUZ
Keyword(s):  
Tacit Knowledge ◽  
Tacit Knowing ◽  
Knowing How

Abstract:This paper discusses the place of ‘tacit knowledge’ in Hayek's writings. How did Hayek understand tacit knowledge? How did his understanding change through time? I address these questions and follow the change in Hayek's works from skills and techniques of thought in the 1930s to the use of ‘tacit knowledge’ in the1960s. Hayek uses Polanyi's concept in many writings, but remains short of approving its implications. The paper emphasizes that while Hayek was quite aware of the differences between tacit knowing and knowing-how, he was not keen to stress the divergence. In the end, I offer some potential explanations for this preference.

scholarly journals KNOWING HOW TO PUT KNOWLEDGE FIRST IN THE THEORY OF JUSTIFICATION

Episteme ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 14 (4) ◽  
pp. 393-412 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul Silva
Keyword(s):  
Practical Knowledge ◽  
Propositional Knowledge ◽  
Knowing How ◽  
Know How

AbstractIn what follows I offer a novel knowledge-first account of justification that avoids the pitfalls of existing accounts while preserving the underlying insight of knowledge-first epistemologies: that knowledge comes first. The view is, roughly, this: justification is grounded in our practical knowledge (know-how) concerning the acquisition of propositional knowledge (knowledge-that). The upshot is a virtue-theoretic, knowledge-first view of justification that is internalist-friendly and able to explain more facts about justification than any other available view.

Know-How, Performance Enhancement, and Guidance Control

2021 ◽  
pp. 83-116
Author(s):  
J. Adam Carter
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Virtue Epistemology ◽  
Performance Enhancement ◽  
Propositional Knowledge ◽  
Guidance Control ◽  
Knowing How ◽  
Know How ◽  
Apt Belief ◽  
The Devil ◽  
Performance Enhancing

If intellectualism about knowledge-how is true (and so, if knowledge-how is a species of knowledge-that), then to the extent that we need an autonomy condition on know-how, it will be (simply) an autonomy condition on know-that: a condition on propositional knowledge-apt belief. However, the anti-intellectualist—according to whom know-how is fundamentally dispositional rather than propositional—would need an entirely different story here––one that places an autonomy-related restriction not on propositional-knowledge-apt belief but, instead, on know-how-apt dispositions. Chapter 4 develops exactly this kind of restriction, by cobbling together some ideas about know-how and virtue epistemology with recent thinking in the moral responsibility literature about freedom, responsibility, and manipulation. The proposal is that one is in a state of knowing how to do something, φ‎, only if one has the skill to φ‎ successfully with guidance control, and one’s φ‎-ing exhibits guidance control (and furthermore, manifests know-how) only if one’s φ‎-ing is caused by a reasons-responsive mechanism that one owns. Unsurprisingly, the devil is in these details—and this chapter aims to spell them out in a way that rules out certain kinds of radical performance enhancing cases while not ruling out that, say, one knows how to do a maths problem when one’s performance is just mildly boosted by Adderall.

Knowing how to

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Edward Craig
Keyword(s):  
Practical Knowledge ◽  
Propositional Knowledge ◽  
Distinctive Features ◽  
Knowing How ◽  
Crucial Question ◽  
Knowing That ◽  
Epistemic Relation ◽  
New Space

It is sometimes said that when philosophers have thought about knowledge they have attended exclusively to knowing that p (or ‘propositional knowledge’, since p stands here for a proposition), scarcely at all to knowing how to A (or ‘practical knowledge’, since A stands here for a type of action, as in ‘knows how to play the violin’). Gilbert Ryle drew attention to this distinction, but his account of it remained imprecise, his thought about it overshadowed by his interest in other, related but different, questions. Whether the antithesis is as sharp as some, including Ryle, have apparently believed, might well be thought a crucial question for epistemology to answer. And if we think that ‘knows how to’ designates a relation between a subject and an action, whereas ‘knows that’ designates a relation between a subject and a proposition, this may well encourage the hope that there is a largely uninvestigated epistemic relation out there waiting to be explored – for since action-types and propositions are such very different objects, probably their epistemic relations with subjects are very different too. But this line of thought will look less promising if, as some maintain, knowing how to is a subspecies of knowing that, involving propositional knowledge about methods of doing things. Still, those who are hoping for a new space for epistemology need not give up; even if knowing how to is a form of knowing that, it might still have its own distinctive features. This possibility does not at the time of writing (2004) seem to have attracted much research.

On Intellectualism in the Theory of Action

2017 ◽  
Vol 3 (3) ◽  
pp. 284-300 ◽  
Author(s):  
ROBERT AUDI
Keyword(s):  
Practical Reason ◽  
Practical Reasoning ◽  
Practical Knowledge ◽  
Human Action ◽  
Propositional Knowledge ◽  
Theory Of Action ◽  
Theoretical Knowledge ◽  
Reasons For Action ◽  
Distinctive Character ◽  
Knowing How

ABSTRACT:This paper examines intellectualism in the theory of action. Philosophers use ‘intellectualism’ variously, but few question its application to views on which knowledge of facts—expressible in that-clauses—is basic for understanding other kinds of knowledge, reasons for action, and practical reasoning. More broadly, for intellectualists, theoretical knowledge is more basic than practical knowledge; action, at least if rational, is knowledge-guided, and just as beliefs based on reasoning constitute knowledge only if its essential premises constitute knowledge, actions based on practical reasoning are rational only if any essential premise in it is known. Two major intellectualist claims are that practical knowledge, as knowing how, is reducible to propositional knowledge, a kind of knowing that, and that reasons for action must be (propositionally) known by the agent. This paper critically explores both claims by offering a broad though partial conception of practical knowledge and a pluralistic view of reasons for action. The aim is to sketch conceptions of knowing how and knowing that, and of the relation between knowledge and action, that avoid intellectualism but also do justice to both the importance of the intellect for human action and the distinctive character of practical reason.

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