scholarly journals REACTOR CAVITY COOLING SYSTEM WITH PASSIVE SAFETY FEATURES ON RDE: THERMAL ANALYSIS DURING ACCIDENT

2019 ◽  
Vol 21 (2) ◽  
pp. 87
Author(s):  
Rahayu Kusumastuti ◽  
Sriyono Sriyono ◽  
Mulya Juarsa ◽  
Hendro Tjahjono ◽  
I. D. Irianto ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Thermal Analysis ◽  
Natural Convection ◽  
Cooling System ◽  
Power Level ◽  
Heat Removal ◽  
Reactor Vessel ◽  
Normal Operation ◽  
Passive Safety ◽  
Diesel Generator ◽  
Cavity Cooling

Reaktor Daya Eksperimental (RDE) is an experimental power reactor based on HTGR technology that implements inherent safety system. Its safety systems are in compliance with “defense in depth” philosophy. RDE is also equipped with reactor cavity cooling system (RCCS) used to remove the heat transferred from the reactor vessel to the containment structure. The RCCS is designed to fulfil this role by maintain the reactor vessel under the maximum allowable temperature during normal operation and protecting the containment structure in the event of failure of all passive cooling systems. The performance and reliability of the RCCS, therefore, are considered as critical factors in determining maximum design power level related to heat removal. RCCS for RDE will use a novel shape to efficiently remove the heat released from the RPV through thermal radiation and natural convection. This paper discusses the calculation of RCCS thermal analysis during accident. The RPV temperature must be maintained below 65ºC. The accident is assumed that there is no electricity from diesel generator supplied to the blower. The methodology used is based on the calculation of mathematical model of the RCCS in the passive mode. The heat is released through cavity by natural convection, in which the RCCS is capable to withdraw the heat at the rate of 50.54 kW per hour.Keywords: Passive safety, RCCS, RDE, Thermal analysis

Passive Safety Features in Sodium Cooled Super-Safe, Small and Simple Reactor

2002 ◽  
Author(s):  
N. Ueda ◽  
I. Kinoshita ◽  
Y. Nishi ◽  
A. Minato ◽  
H. Matsumiya ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Cooling System ◽  
Heat Removal ◽  
Reactor Vessel ◽  
Passive Safety ◽  
Primary Coolant ◽  
Decay Heat ◽  
The Core ◽  
Design Requirements ◽  
Safety Features ◽  
Dynamics Analyses

This paper describes the passive safety features utilized in the updated sodium cooled Super-Safe, Small and Simple fast reactor, which is the improved 4S reactor. This reactor can operate up to ten years without refueling and neutron reflector regulates the reactivity. One of the design requirements is to secure the core against all anticipated transients without reactor scram. Therefore, the reactor concept is to design to enhance the passive safety features. All temperature reactivity feedback coefficients including whole core sodium void worth are negative. Also, introducing of RVACS (Reactor Vessel Auxiliary Cooling System) can enhance the passive decay heat removal capability. Safety analyses are carried out to simulate various transient sequences, which are loss of flow events, transient overpower events and loss of heat sink events, in order to evaluate the passive safety capabilities. A calculation tool for plant dynamics analyses for fast reactors has been modified to model the 4S including the unique plant system, which are reflector control system, circulation pumps and RVACS. The analytical results predict that the designed passive features improve the safety in which temperature variation in transients are satisfied with the safety criteria for the fuel element and the structure of the primary coolant boundary.

Study on the Heat Transfer in the Water Pool Type Reactor Cavity Cooling System of the Very High Temperature Gas Cooled Reactor

2005 ◽  
Author(s):  
H. K. Cho ◽  
D. U. Seo ◽  
M. O. Kim ◽  
G. C. Park
Keyword(s):  
Heat Transfer ◽  
Forced Convection ◽  
Cooling System ◽  
Reactor Vessel ◽  
Water Pool ◽  
Cooling Pipe ◽  
Cavity Cooling ◽  
The Heat Transfer Coefficient ◽  
Pool Type ◽  
High Temperature Gas

In the HTGR (High Temperature Gas Cooled Reactor), the Reactor Cavity Cooling System (RCCS) is equipped to remove the heat transferred from the reactor vessel to the structure of the containment. The function of the RCCS is to dissipate the heat from the reactor cavity during normal operation including shutdown. The system also removes the decay heat during the loss of forced convection (LOFC) accident. A new concept of the water pool type RCCS was proposed at Seoul National University. The system mainly consists of two parts, water pool located between the containment and reactor vessel and five trains of air cooling system installed in the water pool. In normal operations, the heat loss from the reactor vessel is transferred into the water pool via cavity and it is removed by the forced convection of air flowing through the cooling pipes. During the LOFC accident, the after heat is passively removed by the water tank without the forced convection of air and the RCCS water pool is designed to provide sufficient passive cooling capacity of the after heat removal for three days. In the present study, experiments and numerical calculations using CFX5.7 for the water pool and cooling pipe were performed to investigate the heat transfer characteristics and evaluate the heat transfer coefficient model of the MARS-GCR (Multi-dimensional Analysis of Reactor Safety for Gas Cooled Reactor Analysis) which was developed for the safety analysis of the gas cooled reactor. From the results of the experiments and CFX calculations, heat transfer coefficients inside the cooling pipe were calculated and those were used for the assessment for the heat transfer coefficient model of the MARS-GCR.

AP1000 Passive Residual Heat Removal Heat Exchanger Confirmatory Analysis

2006 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard F. Wright ◽  
James R. Schwall ◽  
Creed Taylor ◽  
Naeem U. Karim ◽  
Jivan G. Thakkar ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Heat Exchanger ◽  
Cooling System ◽  
Heat Removal ◽  
Passive Safety ◽  
Tube Heat Exchanger ◽  
Removal Capacity ◽  
Safety Margins ◽  
Final Design ◽  
Safety Features ◽  
Residual Heat

The AP1000 is an 1100 MWe advanced nuclear power plant that uses passive safety features to enhance plant safety and to provide significant and measurable improvements in plant simplification, reliability, investment protection and plant costs. The AP1000 received final design approval from the US-NRC in 2004. The AP1000 design is based on the AP600 design that received final design approval in 1999. Wherever possible, the AP1000 plant configuration and layout was kept the same as AP600 to take advantage of the maturity of the design and to minimize new design efforts. As a result, the two-loop configuration was maintained for AP1000, and the containment vessel diameter was kept the same. It was determined that this significant power uprate was well within the capability of the passive safety features, and that the safety margins for AP1000 were greater than those of operating PWRs. A key feature of the passive core cooling system is the passive residual heat removal heat exchanger (PRHR HX) that provides decay heat removal for postulated LOCA and non-LOCA events. The PRHR HX is a C-tube heat exchanger located in the in-containment refueling water storage tank (IRWST) above the core promoting natural circulation heat removal between the reactor cooling system and the tank. Component testing was performed for the AP600 PRHR HX to determine the heat transfer characteristics and to develop correlations to be used for the AP1000 safety analysis codes. The data from these tests were confirmed by subsequent integral tests at three separate facilities including the ROSA facility in Japan. Owing to the importance of this component, an independent analysis has been performed using the ATHOS-based computational fluid dynamics computer code PRHRCFD. Two separate models of the PRHR HX and IRWST have been developed representing the ROSA test geometry and the AP1000 plant geometry. Confirmation of the ROSA test results were used to validate PRHRCFD, and the AP1000 plant model was used to confirm the heat removal capacity for the full-sized heat exchanger. The results of these simulations show that the heat removal capacity of the PRHR HX is conservatively represented in the AP1000 safety analyses.

Passive Safety Systems of Advanced Nuclear Power Plant: AP1000

2010 ◽  
Author(s):  
Guohua Yan ◽  
Chen Ye
Keyword(s):  
Nuclear Power ◽  
Human Error ◽  
Cooling System ◽  
Heat Removal ◽  
Injection System ◽  
Passive Safety ◽  
Human Errors ◽  
Power Sources ◽  
Passive Safety Systems ◽  
Safety Systems

In the entire history of commercial nuclear power so far, only two major accidents leading to damage of reactor core have taken place. One is Three Mile Island (TMT) accident (1979), which is caused by a series of human error, and the other is Chernobyl accident (1986), which is due to the combined reason of design defects and human errors. After TMI and Chernobyl accidents, in order to reduce manpower in operation and maintenance and influence of human errors on reactor safety, consideration is given to utilization of passive safety systems. According to the IAEA definition, passive safety systems are based on natural forces, such as convection and gravity, and stored energy, making safety functions less dependent on active systems and operators’ action. Recently, the technology of passive safety has been adopted in many reactor designs, such as AP1000, developed by Westinghouse and EP1000 developed by European vendor, and so on. AP1000 as the first so-called Generation III+ has received the final design approval from US NRC in September 2004, and now being under construction in Sanmen, China. In this paper, the major passive safety systems of AP1000, including passive safety injection system, automatic depressurization system passive residual heat removal system and passive containment cooling system, are described and their responses to a break loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA) are given. Just due to these passive systems’ adoption, the nuclear plant can be able to require no operator action and offsite or onsite AC power sources for at least 72h when one accident occurs, and the core melt and large release frequencies are significantly below the requirement of operating plants and the NRC safety goals.

A New Concept of the 4S Reactor and Thermal Hydraulic Characteristics

2004 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yoshihisa Nishi ◽  
Nobuyuki Ueda ◽  
Izumi Kinoshita ◽  
Tomonari Koga ◽  
Satoshi Nishimura ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Cooling System ◽  
Reactor Core ◽  
Heat Removal ◽  
Electric Power Industry ◽  
Reactor Vessel ◽  
Air Cooling ◽  
Central Research ◽  
Neutron Absorption ◽  
Similar System ◽  
Decay Heat

CRIEPI (Central Research Institute of Electric Power Industry) has been developing the 4S reactor (Super Safe, Small and Simple reactor) for application to dispersed energy supply and multipurpose use, with Toshiba Corporation [1,2,3,4]. Electrical output of the 4S reactor is from 10MW to 50MW, and burn-up reactivity loss is regulated by neutron reflectors. The reflector that surrounds the core is gradually lifted up to control the reactivity according to core burn-up. 30year core lifetime without refueling can be achieved with the 10MW 4S (4S-10M) reactor. All temperature feedback reactivity coefficients, including coolant void reactivity, of the 4S-10M are negative during the 30year lifetime. A neutron absorption rod is set at the center of the reactor core with the ultimate shutdown rod. The neutron absorption rod used during the former 14 years is moved to the upper part of the reactor core, and the operation is continued through the latter 16 years. The pressure loss of the reactor core is lower than 2kg/cm2 to enable effective utilization of the natural circulation force, and the average burn-up rate is 76GWD/t. To suppress the influence of the scale disadvantage, loop-type reactor design is one of the candidates for the 4S-10M. The size of the reactor vessel can be miniaturized by adopting the loop type design (4S-10ML). In the 4S-10ML design, integrated equipment which includes primary and secondary electromagnetic pumps (EMPs), an intermediate heat exchanger (IHX) and a steam generator (SG) is adopted and collocated by the reactor vessel. The decay heat removal systems of 4S-10ML consist of the reactor vessel air cooling system (RVACS) and SGACS (a similar system to the RVACS, with air cooling of the outside of the integrated equipment vessel). They are completely passive systems. To decrease the construction cost of the reactor building, a step mat structure and the horizontal aseismic structure are adopted. 4S-10ML has unique features in the cooling systems such as integrated equipment and two separate passive decay heat removal systems which operate at the same time. To evaluate the design feasibility, the transition analyses were executed by the CERES code developed by CRIEPI [5]. In this paper, the design concept of 4S-10ML, and the results of the plant transition analyses are described.

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