scholarly journals Yet Another Call for a Greater Role for Good Faith in the South African Law of Contract: Can we banish the Law of the Jungle, while avoiding the Elephant in the Room?

2017 ◽  
Vol 16 (5) ◽  
pp. 43
Author(s):  
Andre M Louw
Keyword(s):  
South African ◽  
Current Approach ◽  
Good Faith ◽  
Law Reform ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
The South ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Republic ◽  
Near Future ◽  
Court Of Appeal

 This article examines the current approach of the South African courts to the role of good faith or bona fides in contracts, as well as the courts’ stated reasons for this approach. The article specifically examines how arguments based on good faith have fared in the Constitutional Court to date, and the prospects for law reform to emanate from that court in the near future. The author suggests an understanding of good faith which he believes is in line with the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 and argues that in terms of such an understanding of a robust good faith doctrine the legal fraternity or the courts can avoid some of the dangers that the judges of the Supreme Court of Appeal have warned about in this context in recent years. The author shares some concluding thoughts on the pressing need for law reform with respect to the role and presence of good faith in contracts. 

Some views from the South African Constitutional Court on patent revocation and infringement matters: Ascendis Animal Health (Pty) Ltd v Merck Sharp Dohme Corporation and Others 2020 (1) SA 327 (CC)

2021 ◽  
Vol 9 ◽  
pp. 1-17
Author(s):  
Mikhalien Du Bois
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
South African ◽  
Animal Health ◽  
Main Issue ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
The South ◽  
Res Judicata ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Court Of Appeal ◽  
The Way

In South African law, the substantive requirements for a patent may be scrutinised during infringement proceedings or revocation proceedings. Lack of novelty (or anticipation) is a ground for revocation of a patent but can also serve as a defense in an infringement matter. After a series of decisions by the Commissioner of Patents and the Supreme Court of Appeal on infringement and revocation matters relating to Merck’s Patent 98/10975 and its alleged infringement by Cipla (now Ascendis), the Constitutional Court was asked to deliberate the matter in Ascendis Animal Health (Pty) Limited v Merck Sharp Dohme Corporation and Others 2020 (1) SA 327 (CC). The main issue related to the principle of res judicata, and whether invalidity of a patent may be considered as a defense during infringement matters after the validity of the patent was already determined during revocation proceedings between the same parties. The decisions also considered whether each revocation ground constituted a separate issue or whether revocation is the issue for purposes of determining whether a matter is res judicata. A review of all the preceding decisions also indicate that the Supreme Court of Appeal may have developed the way in which lack of novelty is determined in South African law, but without explicitly acknowledging that the approach is different. The Constitutional Court’s evenly split decisions (per Khampepe J and Cameron J) indicate different approaches to reaching just and fair outcomes in patent matters. While Khampepe J’s decision focuses more on the need to remove invalid patents from the register, Cameron J’s decision focuses on preventing harm from piecemeal litigation.

scholarly journals The Role of Traditional Authorities in Developing Customary Laws in Accordance with the Constitution: Shilubana and Others v Nwamitwa 2008 (9) BCLR 914 (CC)

2017 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 135
Author(s):  
B Mmusinyane
Keyword(s):  
South African ◽  
Cultural Practices ◽  
Customary Law ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
South Africans ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Customary Laws ◽  
The Republic ◽  
Traditional Authorities ◽  
Court Of Appeal

South African customary law is a body of law by which many South Africans regulate their lives in a multicultural society. South Africa's constitutional dispensation is based on the premise that all existing laws are subject to the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996, including African customary law, and that all laws are limited only by the Constitution. Customary law existed long before the adoption of the Constitution which, among other things, aims at harmonising the different cultural practices that exist in the country. It is apparent that some traditional cultural practices that still exist are in conflict with the Constitution but, until they are challenged before a court of law, they will remain enforceable in our communities. This contribution investigates customary systems of succession that are guided by the principle of male primogeniture: a deceased's heir is his eldest son, failing which, the eldest son's oldest male descendant is his heir. The discussion focuses in particular on the case of Shilubana v Nwamitwa 2008 (9) BCLR 914 (CC). This case concerns an application to the Constitutional Court for a leave to appeal against a decision of the Supreme Court of Appeal substantially confirming a decision of the Pretoria High Court that prevented a woman from being a Hosi (traditional leader) of her own community

The United States Supreme Court’s case selection: A primer for the South African Constitutional Court in hearing matters of general public importance

2021 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 149-174
Author(s):  
Paul Nkoane
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
South African ◽  
General Public ◽  
The United States ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
United States Supreme ◽  
The South ◽  
Case Selection ◽  
The Supreme Court

The jurisdiction of the South African Constitutional Court has been extended for the court to administer ‘matters of general public importance’ in addition to administering constitutional matters. There is no South African court that accepted appeals on the grounds that the matter raised an arguable point of law of general public importance. This novelty in the South African law requires an inspection of other jurisdictions to determine which matters the Constitutional Court should accept for appeals. In this respect, the article inspects the Supreme Court of the United States case docket to determine the kinds of cases the court accepts for appeals.

scholarly journals THE ROLE OF REMORSE IN SENTENCING

Obiter ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 34 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Pieter du Toit
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
South African ◽  
Deterrent Effect ◽  
The South ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Mitigating Factor ◽  
Court Of Appeal

It has become an established feature of the South African sentencing practice to consider the level of remorse displayed by the accused. Genuine contrition or remorse is generally regarded as a mitigating factor whilst the absence thereof is considered to be an aggravating factor. Our courts link the presence of remorse with the prospect of the rehabilitation of the offender. In S v Seegers (1970 (2) SA 506 (A) 512G–H) Rumpff JA held that remorse, as an indication that the offence will not be committed again, is an important consideration, in suitable cases, when the deterrent effect of a sentence on the accused is considered. This note considers the meaning of “remorse” in the eyes of our courts, the approach of South African courts (in particular the Supreme Court of Appeal) to the role of remorse in sentencing, as well as the question whether the presence or absence of remorse can truly be determined by a court.

scholarly journals The South African constitutional Court and the Rule of Law: The Masethla Judgment, A Cause for Concern

2017 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 467
Author(s):  
Rósaan Krüger
Keyword(s):  
South Africa ◽  
South African ◽  
Rule Of Law ◽  
Procedural Fairness ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
The South ◽  
Public Power ◽  
The Rule Of Law ◽  
The Republic

The rule of law as a foundational constitutional value constrains the exercise of public power but the precise limits of the constraints it sets are not well defined. In Masethla v President of the Republic of South Africa,[1] the majority of the Constitutional Court opted for an interpretation of this value that frees the President from adherence to the demands of procedural fairness when exercising certain constitutional powers. This note will investigate the soundness of that interpretation against the background of theoretical expositions of the rule of law and earlier Constitutional Court judgments.[1]      2008 1 BCLR 1 (CC).

scholarly journals THE STATE OF PARLIAMENTARY FREE SPEECH Democratic Alliance v Speaker of the National Assembly 2016 (3) SA 487 (CC)

Obiter ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 38 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Joanna Botha
Keyword(s):  
South African ◽  
Specific Reference ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
National Council ◽  
The South ◽  
National Assembly ◽  
Rules And Principles ◽  
The Republic ◽  
The One ◽  
South African Constitution

The last two years have been challenging for the South African Parliament (comprising the National Assembly and the National Council of Provinces). Some of the issues experienced include: wide-ranging disruptions during the President’s 2015 State of the Nation Address; the forceful removal of Members of Parliament (members) from the parliamentary Chamber by the police; cell-phone signal jamming in the Chamber; a failure by the Assembly to fulfil its constitutional obligations in terms of sections 55(2) and 181(3) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 by not holding the President accountable to the Public Protector’s findings in the Nkandla saga ; members ignoring the rulings of the Speaker and the Chairperson of the NCOP; a challenge to the legitimacy of Parliament’s broadcasting policy and rules (Primedia) and the use of various forms of “unparliamentary” language by members in Parliament (Chairperson of NCOP). Whilst confrontation and robust debate in Parliament are not uncommon and to be expected, incidents such as these are becoming more frequent and have required the repeated intervention of the Courts.The Constitutional Court judgment in Democratic Alliance v Speaker of the National Assembly raises important questions concerning the nature and scope of the parliamentary privilege in section 58(1)(b) of the Constitution. It also demonstrates the difficulty of maintaining a balance between the importance of upholding the guarantee of freedom of speech in Parliament, on the one hand, and the need to ensure internal order and discipline during parliamentary sittings, on the other. There have been a number of recent judgments concerning the internal functioning of Parliament. These judgments illustrate that the South African Constitution is a work in progress and that our constitutional jurisprudence is maturing. As recently observed by retired Constitutional Court Justice, Sandile Ngcobo, “This is not a bad thing … Our Constitution is still a young one and through constitutional adjudication it will generate constitutional rules and principles that will form the core of our constitutional law”. The purpose of this note is to explore the constitutional principles underlying parliamentary privilege, with specific reference to the decision in Democratic Alliance.

scholarly journals The “Revolving Door” of the Customary Marriages’ Validity Requirement in Action ‒ Mbungela v Mkabi [2019] ZASCA 134

Obiter ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 42 (1) ◽  
pp. 186-193
Author(s):  
Mpho Paulus Bapela ◽  
Phillip Lesetja Monyamane
Keyword(s):  
Case Law ◽  
Case Note ◽  
Revolving Door ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Plain Language ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Face ◽  
Specific Outcome ◽  
The Republic ◽  
Court Of Appeal

On the face of it, section 3 of the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998 (RCMA) does not look ominous. Notwithstanding the plain language of the above provision, there is abundant case law and academic articles dealing with the interpretation and/or application of section 3(1)(b) in particular. A decision of the Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) in Mbungela v Mkabi ((820/2018) [2019] ZASCA 134) adds to what is fast becoming a jurisprudence of the salient issues relating to the understanding of paragraph (b) of subsection (1). The issue of the scope of this paragraph has become more relevant in the inquiry into the transfer and/or integration of the bride into the groom’s family pursuant to the conclusion of a lobolo agreement. In his latest academic offering, Manthwa introduces this ongoing Achilles heel of customary marriages by referencing a number of cases and academic opinions; the references serve to justify the relevance of his work in the presence of so much jurisprudence on the topic. It is prudent to highlight also that Bakker provided an insightful criticism of the court a quo in Mkabe v Minister of Home Affairs ((2014/84704) [2016] ZAGPPHC 460). On the whole, it is argued here that the judgment of the SCA is incorrect in a few material respects and that the criticism by Bakker of the court a quo is legally sound and contributes meaningfully to the jurisprudence in this area.As this case note demonstrates, the SCA not only incorrectly interprets and applies the law, but the judgment also unjustifiably departs from precedents relating to the transfer and/or integration of the bride. In effect therefore, it is submitted, the SCA establishes a changeable attitude relating to the transfer and/or integration of the bride. This attitude is symptomatic of an apparent constitutional interpretation that desires a specific outcome almost at any cost. As such, this case note is relevant as it captures the latest instalment of the changing attitude towards the precepts of the transfer and/or integration of the bride. Thus, there is as much a need for continuous monitoring of this revolving door of interpretation and/or application as there is for cases dealing with this aspect. The matter is therefore considered as unsettled and merits ongoing academic discourse.This issue of unsettled law finds resonance in the pronouncements of the Constitutional Court in Bhe v Magistrate, Khayelitsha ([2004] ZACC 17 par 112).In light of the foregoing, the casuistic and often contradictory jurisdiction on the issue of transfer and/or integration of the bride is considered in the context of the constitutional injunction in terms of section 39(2) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (the Constitution) and the facts of the case in Mbungela v Mkabi (supra).

Quantification of damages for unlawful arrest and detention: South Africa, Namibia and Eswatini/Swaziland (2)

2020 ◽  
Vol 33 (3) ◽  
pp. 617-645
Author(s):  
Chuks Okpaluba
Keyword(s):  
South Africa ◽  
South African ◽  
Case Law ◽  
The Other ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Constitutional Development ◽  
Personal Liberty ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Present Part ◽  
Court Of Appeal

The discussion of the South African case law on the quantification of damages arising from wrongful arrest and detention which commenced in part (1) of this series, continues in the present part. In part (1), the Constitutional Court judgment in Zealand v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development 2008 (4) SA 458 (CC) which emphasised the respect and reverence for the constitutional guarantee of personal liberty, and De Klerk v Minister of Police 2018 (2) SACR 28 (SCA) as well as the recent Constitutional Court judgment in the same case – De Klerk v Minister of Police 2020 (1) SACR 1 (CC); [2019] ZACC 32 (22 August 2019) – were among a host of important cases discussed. The Supreme Court of Appeal cases on quantification of damages for wrongful arrest and detention also discussed include: Mashilo v Prinsloo 2013 (2) SACR 648 (SCA); Minister of Police v Zweni (842/2017) [2018] ZASCA 97 (1 June 2018); Minister of Safety and Security v Magagula (991/2016) [2017] ZASCA 103 (6 September 2017). The first section of this part continues with the discussion of the other instances not involving failure to take the detainee to court within 48 hours or consequences of the accused person’s first appearance in court whereby Hendricks v Minister of Safety and Security (CA&R/2015) [2015] ZAECGHC 61 (4 June 2015); Mrasi v Minister of Safety and Security 2015 (2) SACR 28 (ECG); and Ramphal v Minister of Safety and Security 2009 (1) SACR 211 (E) are among the cases discussed. The second limb of the discussion in this part concerns the issue of wrongful arrest and detention under the Domestic Violence Act 116 of 1998 where the law has developed side by side with the traditional law of wrongful arrest and police negligence as illustrated by the case of Naidoo v Minister of Police 2016 (1) SACR 468 (SCA).

Contractual fairness: Conflict resolved?

Acta Juridica ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 321-342
Author(s):  
A Price
Keyword(s):  
South African ◽  
Contract Law ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Constitutional Rights ◽  
Preparatory School ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Fresh Impetus ◽  
Court Of Appeal ◽  
Apparent Conflict ◽  
Do So

In 2019 Dale Hutchison called upon the Constitutional Court to resolve the apparent conflict between certain of its judgments and those of the Supreme Court of Appeal relating to the most burning issue in South African contract law, namely, the extent to which a judge can refuse to enforce an otherwise valid contract on the grounds that it would be unduly harsh, unfair or unreasonable to do so. Two of the Constitutional Court’s judgments handed down simultaneously in 2020 – Beadica 231 CC v Oregon Trust and AB v Pridwin Preparatory School – answered Dale’s call. In Beadica, the notion that abstract values such as fairness, reasonableness and good faith serve as directly applicable standards that courts may use to control contractual content and enforcement was rejected. The established Barkhuizen test for public policy should be employed instead, ‘it was held’. Nonetheless Pridwin provides fresh impetus to the horizontal application of constitutional rights to contracting parties in terms of s 8(2) of the Constitution. The courts will have to use the latter tool carefully and incrementally, particularly in the context of commercial contracting, if the careful balance between contractual fairness and certainty achieved in Beadica is to be preserved.

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