Quantification of damages for unlawful arrest and detention: South Africa, Namibia and Eswatini/Swaziland (2)

2020 ◽  
Vol 33 (3) ◽  
pp. 617-645
Author(s):  
Chuks Okpaluba
Keyword(s):  
South Africa ◽  
South African ◽  
Case Law ◽  
The Other ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Constitutional Development ◽  
Personal Liberty ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Present Part ◽  
Court Of Appeal

The discussion of the South African case law on the quantification of damages arising from wrongful arrest and detention which commenced in part (1) of this series, continues in the present part. In part (1), the Constitutional Court judgment in Zealand v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development 2008 (4) SA 458 (CC) which emphasised the respect and reverence for the constitutional guarantee of personal liberty, and De Klerk v Minister of Police 2018 (2) SACR 28 (SCA) as well as the recent Constitutional Court judgment in the same case – De Klerk v Minister of Police 2020 (1) SACR 1 (CC); [2019] ZACC 32 (22 August 2019) – were among a host of important cases discussed. The Supreme Court of Appeal cases on quantification of damages for wrongful arrest and detention also discussed include: Mashilo v Prinsloo 2013 (2) SACR 648 (SCA); Minister of Police v Zweni (842/2017) [2018] ZASCA 97 (1 June 2018); Minister of Safety and Security v Magagula (991/2016) [2017] ZASCA 103 (6 September 2017). The first section of this part continues with the discussion of the other instances not involving failure to take the detainee to court within 48 hours or consequences of the accused person’s first appearance in court whereby Hendricks v Minister of Safety and Security (CA&R/2015) [2015] ZAECGHC 61 (4 June 2015); Mrasi v Minister of Safety and Security 2015 (2) SACR 28 (ECG); and Ramphal v Minister of Safety and Security 2009 (1) SACR 211 (E) are among the cases discussed. The second limb of the discussion in this part concerns the issue of wrongful arrest and detention under the Domestic Violence Act 116 of 1998 where the law has developed side by side with the traditional law of wrongful arrest and police negligence as illustrated by the case of Naidoo v Minister of Police 2016 (1) SACR 468 (SCA).

scholarly journals Protecting Animals from Mistreatment through Private Prosecutions in South Africa: A Comment on National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development 2016 1 SACR 308 (SCA)

2017 ◽  
Vol 61 (2) ◽  
pp. 289-304
Author(s):  
Jamil Ddamulira Mujuzi
Keyword(s):  
South Africa ◽  
South African ◽  
General Rule ◽  
Public Prosecutor ◽  
National Society ◽  
Constitutional Development ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Cruelty To Animals ◽  
Court Of Appeal ◽  
Direct Infringement

AbstractThe general rule in South Africa is that, when an offence is committed, the suspect has to be prosecuted by a public prosecutor. However, there is an exception whereby a victim of crime is permitted to institute a private prosecution if the prosecutor has declined to prosecute. South African law allows natural, but not juristic, persons to institute private prosecutions. In the case examined in this note, the appellant argued that the law prohibiting juristic persons from instituting private prosecutions is discriminatory. The Supreme Court of Appeal held that private prosecutions are only permitted on grounds of direct infringement of human dignity. This note argues that section 7 of the Criminal Procedure Act is unconstitutional for excluding juristic persons from instituting private prosecutions and recommends steps the appellant could take to institute private prosecutions against those who mistreat animals.

scholarly journals Restorative justice by means of concessions on custodial sentences: The New Zealand approach and possible lessons for South Africa

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Emma Charlene Lubaale
Keyword(s):  
South Africa ◽  
New Zealand ◽  
Restorative Justice ◽  
South African ◽  
Retributive Justice ◽  
The Other ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The One ◽  
Criminal Matters ◽  
Court Of Appeal

South African courts, in at least two reported cases, have dealt with restorative justice (RJ) in sentencing offenders (i.e. State v. Thabethe (Thabethe case); State v. Seedat (Seedat case)). In both of these cases, the Supreme Court of Appeal rejected the notion of RJ in its entirety, with the presiding judges ‘[cautioning] seriously against the use of restorative justice as a sentence for serious offences.’ However, in countries such as New Zealand, courts have handed down custodial sentences in cases of serious offences while giving due regard to RJ at the same time. The purpose of this article is to highlight some of the strategies that New Zealand courts have invoked to ensure that a balance is struck between retributive justice and RJ. On the basis of this analysis, a conclusion is drawn that RJ can play a role in criminal matters by having it reflect through reduced sentences. With such a strategy, courts can strike a balance between the clear and powerful need for a denunciating sentence on the one hand and RJ on the other.

scholarly journals Sideswipes and Backhanders: Abolition of the Reasonable Chastisement Defence in South Africa

2020 ◽  
Vol 34 (2) ◽  
pp. 191-203
Author(s):  
Julia Sloth-Nielsen
Keyword(s):  
South Africa ◽  
South African ◽  
Corporal Punishment ◽  
Cultural Beliefs ◽  
Freedom Of Religion ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Correct Decision ◽  
The South ◽  
Constitutional Development ◽  
History Of

Abstract This article reviews the abolition of the defence of reasonable chastisement by the South African Constitutional Court on the grounds that it infringes the Constitution. After detailing the history of the abolition of corporal punishment in a democracy with the Constitution as supreme law, the article dissects the reasoning of the Constitutional Court. It argues that judgment in Freedom of Religion South Africa v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development (hereafter FORSA), whilst overall positive in its result, is probably a low water mark in the development of children’s rights jurisprudence in South Africa. There are a number of inadequacies and strangely deferential statements in the FORSA decision. Whilst inescapably coming to the constitutionally correct decision, the reluctance of the Court to reach this point, and its desire to accommodate the religious and cultural beliefs of the appellants, is evident. The way forward has, as a result, been left rather obscure.

scholarly journals ARRESTS WITHOUT WARRANT: THE SCA BRINGS CLARITY Minister of Safety and Security v Sekhoto 2011 1 SACR 315 (SCA); [2011] 2 All SA 157 (SCA)

Obiter ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 32 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Pieter du Toit
Keyword(s):  
Criminal Procedure ◽  
Prima Facie ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Charles V ◽  
Personal Liberty ◽  
High Courts ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Right ◽  
Peace Officer ◽  
Court Of Appeal

Section 40(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 provides for a number of different instances where a peace officer may effect an arrest without an arrest warrant. A perusal of the reported case law pertaining to the lawfulness of arrests without warrant reveals that section 40(1)(b) of the Act, in particular, has received much attention from the courts. In terms of this subsection a peace officer may arrest without warrant any person whom he reasonably suspects of having committed an offence referred to in Schedule 1, other than the offence of escaping from lawful custody. It is settled law that any deprivation of freedom is regarded as prima facie unlawful. The arrestor therefore bears the onus of proving that the arrest was justified. The following jurisdictional facts must be present for a peace officer to rely on the defence created by section 40(1)(b) of the Criminal Procedure Act in cases, where it is alleged that the arrest was unlawful: (i) the arrestor must be a peace officer; (ii) the arrestor must entertain a suspicion; (iii) the suspicion must be that the suspect committed an offence in Schedule 1; and (iv) the suspicion must rest on reasonable grounds. For a discussion of the differenttypes of jurisdictional facts provided for in section 40(1) see Watney. In Louw v Minister of Safety and Security Bertelsman J held, with reference to the right to personal liberty, that arresting officers are under a constitutional obligation to consider whether there are no less invasive options to bring the suspect to court than the drastic measure of arrest, thereby effectively requiring a further jurisdictional fact for successful reliance by a peace officer on the provisions of section 40(1). If a reasonable apprehension exists that the suspect will abscond, or fail to appear in court if a warrant is first obtained for his or her arrest, or awritten notice or summons to appear in court is obtained, then the arrest would be constitutionally untenable and unlawful. Bertelsman J relied on academic opinion and an obiter remark made by De Vos J in Ralekwa v Minister of Safety and Security and held that the approach in Tsose v Minister of Justice that there is no rule that requires the milder method of bringing a person to court if it would be as effective as arrest, could no longer be acceptable in a constitutional dispensation. This approach was followed in a number of reported High Court judgments but not approved of in Charles v Minister of Safety and Security. In Minister of Safety and Security v Van Niekerk the Constitutional Court found it not to be in the interests of justice on the facts of the case before it to pronounce on the constitutional tenability of the approach in Tsose, but nevertheless held that the constitutionality of an arrest will be dependent upon its factual circumstances. Watney succinctly discusses some of the abovementioned developments. However, on 19 November 2010 the Supreme Court of Appeal in Minister of Safety and Security v Sekhoto (2011 1 SACR 315 (SCA), also reported in [2011] 2 All SA 157 (SCA)) held that the approach of the different high courts requiring a further jurisdictional fact for the lawfulness of an arrest did nothave proper regard for the principles in terms of which statutes must be interpreted in the light of the Bill of Rights and that they have conflated the issue of jurisdictional facts with the issue of discretion. This lucid judgment brings clarity to the issue of the lawfulness of arrests without warrant. 

Developing the Jurisprudence of Constitutional Remedies for Breach of Fundamental Rights in South Africa: An Analysis of Hoffman and Related Cases

2018 ◽  
Vol 32 (1&2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Chuks Okpaluba
Keyword(s):  
South Africa ◽  
South African ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Public Law ◽  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Constitutional Rights ◽  
The Novel ◽  
Labour Law

In order to accomplish its objectives of extensively regulating rights and obligations, the 1996 Constitution of South Africa similarly provides for the enforcement of those rights by the courts. In turn, it has, in the said enforcement provisions, invested in the courts enormous discretionary powers to enable them to effectively deal with breaches of the entrenched fundamental rights as well as all constitutional rights violations. That the Constitutional Court has purposefully interpreted and made optimum use of the expressions: ‘appropriate relief’ and ‘just and equitable’ order in developing the constitutional remedies jurisprudence is crystal clear from a wealth of available case law. It is also not in doubt that the contributions of Justice Ngcobo (later Chief Justice) in this regard are intellectually gratifying. This presentation singles out for discussion and analysis the judgment of Ngcobo J in Hoffman v South African Airways 2001 (1) SA 1 (CC) which not only typifies judicial activism at its acme; it has also introduced into the South African public and labour laws, the novel remedy of ‘instatement.’ Apparently drawn from the analogy of the labour law remedy of reinstatement, ‘instatement’ is akin to the remedy of mandamus in public law, and specific performance in the law of contract. This article moves from the premise that this innovation is one of its kind in contemporary common law jurisprudence and one which courts in the common law jurisdictions world would no doubt emulate one fine day.

From the Campbell Case to a Recent Ruling of the Constitutional Court of South Africa: Is There Any Hope to Revive the Tribunal of the Southern African Development Community?

2020 ◽  
Vol 28 (Supplement) ◽  
pp. 110-137
Author(s):  
Francesca Mussi
Keyword(s):  
South Africa ◽  
International Relations ◽  
Legal Reasoning ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Present Contribution ◽  
Constitutional Development ◽  
High Court ◽  
Legal Structure ◽  
The Republic

This article provides a critical analysis of the judgments delivered by the Regional High Court of Pretoria in the case Law Society of South Africa et al. v. President of the Republic of South Africa, the Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development, the Minister of International Relations and Co-operation and the Constitutional Court of South Africa in Law Society of South Africa and Others v. President of the Republic of South Africa and Others in order to investigate to what extent they can contribute to discuss the revival of the SADC Tribunal with all its original powers. After providing an overview of the SADC Tribunal's legal structure and the judgment delivered in 2008 in the Mike Campbell v. Zimbabwe case, the present contribution will consider the legal reasoning of the Regional High Court of Pretoria and the Constitutional Court of South Africa respectively. It will also develop some considerations of the role played by civil society groups in other SADC member states.

scholarly journals A SPRING WITHOUT WATER: THE CONUNDRUM OF ANTI-DUMPING DUTIES IN SOUTH AFRICAN LAW

2016 ◽  
Vol 19 ◽  
pp. 1
Author(s):  
Clive Vinti
Keyword(s):  
South Africa ◽  
International Trade ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
South African ◽  
Case Analysis ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Court Of Appeal

The Agreement on the Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (Anti-Dumping Agreement), permits the imposition of anti-dumping duties for as long and to the extent necessary to counteract dumping which is causing injury subject to the proviso that they must be terminated after five years unless a sunset review has been initiated. Sunset review has the purpose of either permitting or terminating the continuation of an anti-dumping duty. This is significant because if the sunset review is not initiated prior to the expiry of the five year period, the anti-dumping duties will be terminated.Therefore, this places a greater emphasis on the determination of the precise date of commencement of the anti-dumping duties. This is because an incorrect determination of the date of imposition of the anti-dumping duty has obvious financial implications for the interested parties. To this end, the Supreme Court of Appeal in South Africa has delivered two salient judgments in this regard: firstly, in Progress Office Machines CC v SARS, and then more recently, in Association of Meat Importers v ITAC. These two cases hinge on the interpretation of the date of 'imposition' of definitive anti-dumping duties particularly where provisional measures are involved, which invariably determines the date of expiry of the duties as espoused by Regulations 38 and 53 of the International Trade Administration Commission Anti-Dumping Regulations.This paper contends that these two judgments are conflicting and riddled with inconsistencies. Secondly, the paper contends that the SCA has in the recent AMIE case, virtually rewritten its earlier judgment of Progress Office Machines. Lastly, the paper shows that the approach of South African courts on whether the Anti-Dumping Agreement is binding on South African law, is fraught with uncertainty and an ambivalence .The case analysis also reflects on the impact of the newly minted but yet to be implemented, Customs Duty Act, with a view to assess the impact of the new legislation on the issues currently plaguing the anti-dumping regime of South Africa. 

scholarly journals A Fresh Perspective on Historical Sexual Abuse: The Case of Hewitt v S 2017 1 SACR 309 (SCA)

2017 ◽  
Vol 20 ◽  
pp. 1-21
Author(s):  
Windell Nortje ◽  
Pieter Du Toit
Keyword(s):  
South Africa ◽  
Sexual Abuse ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Case Note ◽  
The Other ◽  
Sexual Offences ◽  
Sexual Crimes ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Fresh Perspective ◽  
Court Of Appeal

Sexual crimes continues to be a scourge in our society. It is therefore not surprising that the prevention and criminalisation of sexual crimes in South Africa has received a large amount of attention over the last few years. Contrarily, the matter of historical sexual abuse has received only occasional consideration. Cases of historical sexual abuse present numerous challenges to all parties involved. The victims of historical sexual abuse, often children at the time, are now adults. Some of these victims might not want to relive the experience or confront the offender. On the other hand, the offender might have been rehabilitated and become a respected citizen. In Hewitt v S 2017 1 SACR 309 (SCA) the Supreme Court of Appeal heard the appeal against the sentence of Bob Hewitt, a retired tennis champion. He was convicted of committing numerous sexual offences against young girls. The first of these crimes was committed more than three decades ago. This case note analyses the decision by the SCA while it also examines historical sexual abuse more generally in South Africa as well as in England and Wales, in order to establish whether any lessons can be learned from previous cases and laws as implemented in these countries.     

scholarly journals The “Revolving Door” of the Customary Marriages’ Validity Requirement in Action ‒ Mbungela v Mkabi [2019] ZASCA 134

Obiter ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 42 (1) ◽  
pp. 186-193
Author(s):  
Mpho Paulus Bapela ◽  
Phillip Lesetja Monyamane
Keyword(s):  
Case Law ◽  
Case Note ◽  
Revolving Door ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Plain Language ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Face ◽  
Specific Outcome ◽  
The Republic ◽  
Court Of Appeal

On the face of it, section 3 of the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998 (RCMA) does not look ominous. Notwithstanding the plain language of the above provision, there is abundant case law and academic articles dealing with the interpretation and/or application of section 3(1)(b) in particular. A decision of the Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) in Mbungela v Mkabi ((820/2018) [2019] ZASCA 134) adds to what is fast becoming a jurisprudence of the salient issues relating to the understanding of paragraph (b) of subsection (1). The issue of the scope of this paragraph has become more relevant in the inquiry into the transfer and/or integration of the bride into the groom’s family pursuant to the conclusion of a lobolo agreement. In his latest academic offering, Manthwa introduces this ongoing Achilles heel of customary marriages by referencing a number of cases and academic opinions; the references serve to justify the relevance of his work in the presence of so much jurisprudence on the topic. It is prudent to highlight also that Bakker provided an insightful criticism of the court a quo in Mkabe v Minister of Home Affairs ((2014/84704) [2016] ZAGPPHC 460). On the whole, it is argued here that the judgment of the SCA is incorrect in a few material respects and that the criticism by Bakker of the court a quo is legally sound and contributes meaningfully to the jurisprudence in this area.As this case note demonstrates, the SCA not only incorrectly interprets and applies the law, but the judgment also unjustifiably departs from precedents relating to the transfer and/or integration of the bride. In effect therefore, it is submitted, the SCA establishes a changeable attitude relating to the transfer and/or integration of the bride. This attitude is symptomatic of an apparent constitutional interpretation that desires a specific outcome almost at any cost. As such, this case note is relevant as it captures the latest instalment of the changing attitude towards the precepts of the transfer and/or integration of the bride. Thus, there is as much a need for continuous monitoring of this revolving door of interpretation and/or application as there is for cases dealing with this aspect. The matter is therefore considered as unsettled and merits ongoing academic discourse.This issue of unsettled law finds resonance in the pronouncements of the Constitutional Court in Bhe v Magistrate, Khayelitsha ([2004] ZACC 17 par 112).In light of the foregoing, the casuistic and often contradictory jurisdiction on the issue of transfer and/or integration of the bride is considered in the context of the constitutional injunction in terms of section 39(2) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (the Constitution) and the facts of the case in Mbungela v Mkabi (supra).

scholarly journals INTRODUCING DECONSTRUCTIVE INTERSECTIONALITY: THE GENERAL JURISPRUDENTIAL RAGE AGAINST RAINBOW THEORY

2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tamryn Gorman
Keyword(s):  
South Africa ◽  
South African ◽  
The Other ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Court Cases ◽  
Substantive Equality ◽  
Constant Tension ◽  
Formal Equality ◽  
The One ◽  
Constitutional Adjudication

Despite South Africa’s post-modern constitutional dispensation which, at first glance, seems to celebrate and entrench substantive equality — various judgements have been passed by the Constitutional Court where the Constitution was interpreted through a formal equalitarian lens. On the one hand, substantive equality recognises and celebrates our diversity and differences whereas formal equality, on the other hand, obsesses with the idea of sameness. This constant tension between substantive and formal equality is aptly portrayed by the term ‘rainbow jurisprudence’. This term was coined by Alfred Cockrell to explain a quasi-theory depicted by the newly born South African constitutional adjudication which was lacking in substantive reasoning (which I equate to substantive equality) and the absence of a rigorous jurisprudence. He goes so far as to assimilate the finding of genuine substantive reasoning within these judgements to the possibility of touching a rainbow — a mythical task which, although alluring, seems impossible. Thus, I have identified the problem that South Africa is still submerged in rainbow jurisprudence. This can be seen through various court cases that will be discussed below, ranging from cases that were clearly decided from a formal equalitarian perspective to those which depict a wolf in sheep’s clothing seemingly substantive judgements disguising the formal equality lurking beneath.

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