scholarly journals RELIANCE, FORMALITIES AND THE MODE OF ACCEPTANCE OF AN OFFER Pillay v Shaik 2009 4 SA 74 (SCA)

Obiter ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 32 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
C-J Pretorius ◽  
R Ismail
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Private Company ◽  
Legal Question ◽  
Opposite Conclusion ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Law ◽  
Law Reports ◽  
Court Of Appeal ◽  
Close Corporation

In Pillay v Shaik (2009 4 SA 74 (SCA)), the Supreme Court of Appeal was confronted with a situation which tends to feature in the law reports more frequently than one would expect, and that is where a party to a transaction involving the sale of immovable property reneges on an apparent agreement by invoking some form of technicality (in casu the lack of a signature on a contractual document) as a bar to the proper conclusion of the contract. Usually, where immovable property is sold directly to a purchaser, section 2(1) of theAlienation of Land Act 68 of 1981 applies and provides that no alienation of land will be of any force or effect unless contained in a deed of alienation signed by the parties, or by their agents acting on their written authority. Failure to comply with this provision renders an alienation of land void. Where, however, immovable property is held in the name of a close corporation or private company merely the members’ interests or shares are transferred to the purchaser, but the purchaser still indirectly gains control over the property owned by the juridical entity. The present matter dealt with the latter type of situation and the legal question was whether the sellers had accepted a signed, written offer made by the purchasers despite the fact that the sellers had not in turn signed the contractual documents. The Natal Provincial Division (Shaik v Pillay 2008 3 SA 59 (N)) found that contractual liability did not lie for want of compliance with a party-imposed signature formality, whereas the Supreme Court of Appeal applied the reliance theory to reach the opposite conclusion in the circumstances. The respective approaches of these two courts are diametrically opposed giving rise to some interesting issues on doctrinal as well as policy levels. 

scholarly journals MISTAKE AND SURETYSHIP: AVOIDING THE SPECTRE OF BRINK V HUMPHRIES & JEWELL (PTY) LTD

Obiter ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 30 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
C-J Pretorius
Keyword(s):  
Private Company ◽  
Application Form ◽  
Subtle Change ◽  
Business Context ◽  
General Law ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Law ◽  
Law Reports ◽  
Formal Requirements ◽  
Close Corporation

The nettlesome matter of operative mistake and suretyships tucked away in credit applications tends to find its way into the law reports on a rather frequent basis. This phenomenon is hardly surprising because in the cut and thrust of modern commerce, and even more so in lean times, individuals are keen to apply for credit on behalf of the corporate entities which they represent, but less eager to stand in for these debts when they cannot be serviced. From the contractual perspective of mistake, these cases tend tofollow a familiar pattern. Commonly, a member of a close corporation or director of a private company applies on behalf of the close corporation or company, as the case may be, for some or other form of credit from another party. Usually, within a business context, credit will not be granted without some form of security, and in these instances more often than not the representative is required to agree to a personal suretyship in favour of the creditor, which is often embodied in the credit application form itself. Oncethe representative has appended him or her signature to the application form, he or she inexorably finds himself or herself simultaneously bound as surety and co-principal debtor, the formal requirements for a suretyship agreement having been complied with (as prescribed by s 6 of the General Law Amendment Act 50 of 1956). On the whole older case law displays a reluctancy on the part of the judiciary to excuse a surety on the basis of material mistake in such circumstances, but in Brink v Humphries & Jewell (Pty) Ltd (2005 2 SA 419 (SCA)) the Supreme Court of Appeal adopted a far more lenient approach in favour of the surety, and perhaps heralded a not too subtle change in the law. This note examines the way in which the courts have adjudicated similar cases, and specifically whether more recently they have reinforced the generally stricter approach of old or been prepared to follow the path which Brink seemed to have cleared. 

Transforming the Law on Psychiatric Lesions

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 (2) ◽  
pp. 253-271
Author(s):  
Emile Zitzke
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Expert Witnesses ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Psychological Harm ◽  
The Law ◽  
Constitutional Right ◽  
Law Of Delict ◽  
Court Of Appeal ◽  
Made In

In this article, I trace the development in the law of delict of recognising general damages claims on account of psychiatric lesions with the aim of making suggestions on how to transform it. Using the tragic case of Michael Komape as a springboard for the discussion, I argue that even though the Supreme Court of Appeal has recently brought clarity on the law on psychiatric lesions, more transformative work still needs to be done. More specifically, this article contends that the constitutional right to bodily and psychological integrity might require us to rethink the high evidentiary threshold that courts have set for proving the element of harm in cases related to psychiatric lesions. I argue that this can be done in at least three ways: First, by very cautiously bringing about a development that would involve protecting victims of psychological harm whose expert witnesses are shown to be inadequate despite all other facts indicating the existence of a psychiatric lesion. Secondly, by lowering the requirement of “recognised psychiatric lesion” to “grievous mental injury”, in line with similar arguments made in England. Thirdly, and most controversially, by acknowledging that perhaps the time has come for our law to recognise claims for so-called “grief in the air”.

scholarly journals The Law Regarding Pension Interest in South Africa has been settled! Or has it? With Reference to Ndaba v Ndaba (600/2015) [2016] ZASCA 162

2017 ◽  
Vol 20 ◽  
pp. 1
Author(s):  
Motseotsile Clement Marumoagae
Keyword(s):  
South Africa ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
High Court ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Golden Opportunity ◽  
The Law ◽  
Court Of Appeal

This article reflects on the law relating to pension interest in South Africa. In particular, it assesses whether the Supreme Court of Appeal in Ndaba v Ndaba had adequately clarified how this area of law should be understood. In light of the inconsistent approaches from various divisions of the High Court, it has not always been clear how the courts should interpret the law relating to pension interest in South Africa. In this paper, aspects of this area of law which have been clarified by the Supreme Court of Appeal are highlighted. This paper further demonstrates aspects of this area of law which the Supreme Court of Appeal did not settle and would potentially be subject to future litigation. This paper is based on the premise that while Ndaba v Ndaba is welcomed, the Supreme Court of Appeal nonetheless, missed a golden opportunity to authoritatively provide a basis upon which the law relating to pension interest in South Africa should be understood. 

The Origins of the Re Hastings-Bass Rule

2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Ashdown
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Present State ◽  
Practical Importance ◽  
Future Application ◽  
Precise Nature ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Future ◽  
The Law ◽  
The Many ◽  
Court Of Appeal

The present state of the law must now be treated as authoritatively set out by Lord Walker in Pitt v Holt, and to a lesser but still important extent by the earlier judgment of Lloyd LJ in the Court of Appeal in the same case. This chapter, however, is concerned with the earlier development of the Re Hastings-Bass doctrine. Its purpose is to establish the doctrinal legitimacy of the rule in Re Hastings-Bass as an aspect of the English law of trusts. Whilst this is primarily of academic and theoretical concern, in view of the Supreme Court’s reformulation of the law into its present shape, it is also of practical importance. In particular, the future application of the doctrine to novel situations will depend upon understanding the precise nature and scope of the rule propounded by the Supreme Court. That decision cannot simply be divorced from the many decided cases which preceded it, and from its place in the wider compass of the law of trusts.

Surprisingly, there are no official authoritative series of law reports in England to equate with the Queen’s Printers copy of an Act of Parliament. The Stationery Office is responsible for publishing revenue, immigration and social security law cases. However, traditionally, law reports remain in the hands of private publishers. Today, there are numerous, often competitive, private publishers. Although there are no official series of law reports, the courts do respect some reports more than others. A long established, conventional rule is that a law report, if it is to be accepted by the relevant court as an authority, must be prepared by and published under the name of a fully qualified barrister. The greater accuracy of modern reporting, and the vetting by judges, necessitates longer delays before the cases are published. Also, the Law Reports only cover 7% of the cases in the higher courts in any given year. Interesting issues are: (a) who selects which cases to report? (b) how are they selected? Editors select the cases for inclusion in the series of law reports. These are highly trained lawyers, well acquainted with precedent and the likely importance of cases. During the past 150 years publishers of law reports have been generalists or specialists. Some law reports are annotated, particularly for the use of practitioners, others left without annotations, introductions, etc. In addition to reported cases, the Supreme Court Library contains thousands of files of unreported cases. In 1940, the Lord Chancellor’s Department prepared a report: The Report of the Law Reporting Committee. The Committee considered that, after editors had made their choices, ‘What remains is less likely to be a treasure house than a rubbish heap in which a jewel will rarely, if ever, be discovered’ (p 20). (Note the poetic language that forcefully carries the point.) Of course, today, there is a vast range of electronic retrieval systems for accessing details of thousands of unreported cases. This has caused its own problems and there was a legitimate concern that courts would be inundated with cases that did not really contain any new law, but which had been retrieved from electronic sources. In the case of Roberts Petroleum Ltd v Bernard Kenny Ltd [1983] 2 AC 192, the House of Lords took the step of forbidding the citation of unreported cases of the civil division of the Court of Appeal without special leave. The rule remains, however, that to be an accepted version that can be quoted in court the report must have been prepared and published by a barrister. When law students read law reports they must ask: (a) is this report the most authoritative version available? (b) are there fuller versions? (c) if unreported, does this case add to the law? Figure 4.2, below, sets out the types of reports available for the law student to consult.

2012 ◽  
pp. 78-79
Keyword(s):  
Law Students ◽  
Retrieval Systems ◽  
House Of Lords ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Legitimate Concern ◽  
The Law ◽  
Law Student ◽  
Law Reports ◽  
Court Of Appeal ◽  
Vast Range

12. Theft

2020 ◽  
pp. 356-406
Author(s):  
David Ormerod ◽  
Karl Laird
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Criminal Law ◽  
Civil Law ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Law ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Court Of Appeal

This chapter examines the law governing theft. It considers the extent to which the criminal law of theft conflicts with civil law concepts of property; whether it is possible to steal property that belongs to oneself; the types of property that may be stolen; and the extent to which it is possible to provide a definition of ‘dishonesty’. The test for dishonesty has been fundamentally altered by the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeal, developments which are analysed in this chapter.

The Nature of the Re Hastings-Bass Duty

2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Ashdown
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Future Development ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Future ◽  
The Law ◽  
Matters Of Concern ◽  
Court Of Appeal ◽  
Relevant Consideration ◽  
Two Alternatives

Lord Walker’s analysis in Pitt v Holt in the Supreme Court accords in all essential respects with the reasons put forward in Chapter 3 to prefer a duty (‘weak’) rather than results-oriented (‘strong’) account of the Re Hastings-Bass rule, as does the approach adopted by Lloyd LJ in the Court of Appeal, which Lord Walker expressly endorses. Yet Lord Walker’s judgment does not yet provide a wholly comprehensive basis for the future development of the law. There remain a number of loose ends, arising predominantly from issues not specifically before the court in Pitt, but which have been matters of concern in earlier Re Hastings-Bass cases, including: how a ‘relevant consideration’ is defined; the significance of establishing that the trustees ‘would’ or ‘might’ have acted differently, in view of Lord Walker’s refusal to choose between these two alternatives; the specific problems arising from the use of professional advisers, and in cases concerning tax liability and pension trusts. These matters are addressed in detail in chapters 5 to 8. But in order to do this it is first necessary to clarify the juridical nature of the ‘duty of consideration’ upon which Lord Walker’s analysis depends.

scholarly journals Alberta's Court of Next-to-Last Resort: Appeals from the Alberta Court of Appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada, 1970-1990

1969 ◽  
pp. 861
Author(s):  
Peter McCormick
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Supreme Court Of Canada ◽  
Success Rates ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Law ◽  
Statistical Survey ◽  
Court Of Appeal

This paper reports the results of a statistical survey of the success rates of appeals to the Supreme Court of Canada. Appeals from all provinces were examined, but in his analysis Professor McCormick focuses on the Alberta Court of Appeal. The variables he discusses include the geographic and political composition of the Supreme Court, the mix of cases from different areas of the law, the length of experience of Court of Appeal judges, and the presence or absence of dissenting opinions.

scholarly journals Be careful what you promise: Proprietary estoppel in Cowper-Smith v Morgan

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jason Chin
Keyword(s):  
British Columbia ◽  
Property Rights ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Supreme Court Of Canada ◽  
Canadian Experience ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Law ◽  
Court Of Appeal

Proprietary estoppel provides one of equity’s most powerful remedies. Estoppel is an equitable doctrine which arises when one party acts on the reliance of the promise of another. The promise and corresponding reliance creates a quasi-contract with reliance acting as an alternative to the consideration usually required in contracts. Proprietary estoppel is distinct from other equitable estoppels in that a proprietary estoppel can act as a ‘sword’ and form the basis of a cause of action. If all of the parts of proprietary estoppel are made out, a court can modify or create property rights to satisfy the equity.With regard to the Canadian experience, the Court of Appeal for Ontario recently noted that proprietary estoppel has received “somewhat uneven treatment in Canada.” It is within this context that the Court of Appeal for British Columbia split on the proper scope for the Supreme Court of Canada. In Cowper-Smith v Morgan, the Supreme Court of Canada has both clarified the test for — and arguably expanded the scope of — proprietary estoppel in the context of promises exchanged between children over their mother’s care during her lifetime. The fact that a party lacks an interest in the disputed property at the time of the promise does not negate the obligation of fulfilling the promise. Instead, when the party responsible for the expectation has or acquires sufficient interest in the property, proprietary estoppel will attach to that interest and protect the equity. This article will discuss the law of proprietary estoppel in other jurisdictions and how the Supreme Court of Canada has infused this remedy with greater flexibility to satisfy the equity.

The Present Law

2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Ashdown
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Present State ◽  
Active Role ◽  
Starting Point ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Law ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Court Of Appeal

The starting point for any consideration of the Re Hastings-Bass rule must now be the Pitt v Holt and Futter v Futter litigation, which culminated in the 2013 decision of the Supreme Court in both cases. The judgment of Lord Walker is the leading exposition of the rule, and is likely to remain so for some time. However, it is not helpful to read Lord Walker’s judgment in isolation. At first instance both Pitt v Holt and Futter v Futter were decided on the basis of law which seemed then to be well settled and entirely orthodox. However, unlike in any of the Re Hastings-Bass rule cases which preceded them, Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs played an active role in the proceedings, and after the taxpayer succeeded at first instance in each case, obtained permission to appeal to the Court of Appeal. The present state of the law owes its shape largely to the judgment in that court of Lloyd LJ, in the first appellate decision on the Re Hastings-Bass rule, which reformulated the rule so as to accord with important principles of English equity and trusts concerning the relationship between trustees and beneficiaries, and the supervision of the court.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document