scholarly journals MISTAKE AND SURETYSHIP: AVOIDING THE SPECTRE OF BRINK V HUMPHRIES & JEWELL (PTY) LTD

Obiter ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 30 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
C-J Pretorius
Keyword(s):  
Private Company ◽  
Application Form ◽  
Subtle Change ◽  
Business Context ◽  
General Law ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Law ◽  
Law Reports ◽  
Formal Requirements ◽  
Close Corporation

The nettlesome matter of operative mistake and suretyships tucked away in credit applications tends to find its way into the law reports on a rather frequent basis. This phenomenon is hardly surprising because in the cut and thrust of modern commerce, and even more so in lean times, individuals are keen to apply for credit on behalf of the corporate entities which they represent, but less eager to stand in for these debts when they cannot be serviced. From the contractual perspective of mistake, these cases tend tofollow a familiar pattern. Commonly, a member of a close corporation or director of a private company applies on behalf of the close corporation or company, as the case may be, for some or other form of credit from another party. Usually, within a business context, credit will not be granted without some form of security, and in these instances more often than not the representative is required to agree to a personal suretyship in favour of the creditor, which is often embodied in the credit application form itself. Oncethe representative has appended him or her signature to the application form, he or she inexorably finds himself or herself simultaneously bound as surety and co-principal debtor, the formal requirements for a suretyship agreement having been complied with (as prescribed by s 6 of the General Law Amendment Act 50 of 1956). On the whole older case law displays a reluctancy on the part of the judiciary to excuse a surety on the basis of material mistake in such circumstances, but in Brink v Humphries & Jewell (Pty) Ltd (2005 2 SA 419 (SCA)) the Supreme Court of Appeal adopted a far more lenient approach in favour of the surety, and perhaps heralded a not too subtle change in the law. This note examines the way in which the courts have adjudicated similar cases, and specifically whether more recently they have reinforced the generally stricter approach of old or been prepared to follow the path which Brink seemed to have cleared. 

scholarly journals RELIANCE, FORMALITIES AND THE MODE OF ACCEPTANCE OF AN OFFER Pillay v Shaik 2009 4 SA 74 (SCA)

Obiter ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 32 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
C-J Pretorius ◽  
R Ismail
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Private Company ◽  
Legal Question ◽  
Opposite Conclusion ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Law ◽  
Law Reports ◽  
Court Of Appeal ◽  
Close Corporation

In Pillay v Shaik (2009 4 SA 74 (SCA)), the Supreme Court of Appeal was confronted with a situation which tends to feature in the law reports more frequently than one would expect, and that is where a party to a transaction involving the sale of immovable property reneges on an apparent agreement by invoking some form of technicality (in casu the lack of a signature on a contractual document) as a bar to the proper conclusion of the contract. Usually, where immovable property is sold directly to a purchaser, section 2(1) of theAlienation of Land Act 68 of 1981 applies and provides that no alienation of land will be of any force or effect unless contained in a deed of alienation signed by the parties, or by their agents acting on their written authority. Failure to comply with this provision renders an alienation of land void. Where, however, immovable property is held in the name of a close corporation or private company merely the members’ interests or shares are transferred to the purchaser, but the purchaser still indirectly gains control over the property owned by the juridical entity. The present matter dealt with the latter type of situation and the legal question was whether the sellers had accepted a signed, written offer made by the purchasers despite the fact that the sellers had not in turn signed the contractual documents. The Natal Provincial Division (Shaik v Pillay 2008 3 SA 59 (N)) found that contractual liability did not lie for want of compliance with a party-imposed signature formality, whereas the Supreme Court of Appeal applied the reliance theory to reach the opposite conclusion in the circumstances. The respective approaches of these two courts are diametrically opposed giving rise to some interesting issues on doctrinal as well as policy levels. 

Surprisingly, there are no official authoritative series of law reports in England to equate with the Queen’s Printers copy of an Act of Parliament. The Stationery Office is responsible for publishing revenue, immigration and social security law cases. However, traditionally, law reports remain in the hands of private publishers. Today, there are numerous, often competitive, private publishers. Although there are no official series of law reports, the courts do respect some reports more than others. A long established, conventional rule is that a law report, if it is to be accepted by the relevant court as an authority, must be prepared by and published under the name of a fully qualified barrister. The greater accuracy of modern reporting, and the vetting by judges, necessitates longer delays before the cases are published. Also, the Law Reports only cover 7% of the cases in the higher courts in any given year. Interesting issues are: (a) who selects which cases to report? (b) how are they selected? Editors select the cases for inclusion in the series of law reports. These are highly trained lawyers, well acquainted with precedent and the likely importance of cases. During the past 150 years publishers of law reports have been generalists or specialists. Some law reports are annotated, particularly for the use of practitioners, others left without annotations, introductions, etc. In addition to reported cases, the Supreme Court Library contains thousands of files of unreported cases. In 1940, the Lord Chancellor’s Department prepared a report: The Report of the Law Reporting Committee. The Committee considered that, after editors had made their choices, ‘What remains is less likely to be a treasure house than a rubbish heap in which a jewel will rarely, if ever, be discovered’ (p 20). (Note the poetic language that forcefully carries the point.) Of course, today, there is a vast range of electronic retrieval systems for accessing details of thousands of unreported cases. This has caused its own problems and there was a legitimate concern that courts would be inundated with cases that did not really contain any new law, but which had been retrieved from electronic sources. In the case of Roberts Petroleum Ltd v Bernard Kenny Ltd [1983] 2 AC 192, the House of Lords took the step of forbidding the citation of unreported cases of the civil division of the Court of Appeal without special leave. The rule remains, however, that to be an accepted version that can be quoted in court the report must have been prepared and published by a barrister. When law students read law reports they must ask: (a) is this report the most authoritative version available? (b) are there fuller versions? (c) if unreported, does this case add to the law? Figure 4.2, below, sets out the types of reports available for the law student to consult.

2012 ◽  
pp. 78-79
Keyword(s):  
Law Students ◽  
Retrieval Systems ◽  
House Of Lords ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Legitimate Concern ◽  
The Law ◽  
Law Student ◽  
Law Reports ◽  
Court Of Appeal ◽  
Vast Range

scholarly journals A gloss to the Supreme Court Judgment of 5 March 2019, IV KK 484/17

2020 ◽  
Vol 17 (4) ◽  
pp. 129-140
Author(s):  
Marta Kubica
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Criminal Procedure ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Law ◽  
Formal Requirements

This gloss discusses the issue of the prosecutor’s supervision over preparatory proceedings carried out by a financial authority of preparatory proceedings and the procedural consequences of the prosecutor undertaking supervision of such proceedings. The author is of the opinion that a procedural act performed by the prosecutor consisting in extending the period of enquiry carried out by the financial authority of preparatory proceedings for more than 6 months, does not constitute a decision which is accidental in nature and may not be deemed to be a technical act. Such an act is supervisory in nature. Consequently, if it is assumed that the prosecutor’s decision on the extension under Article 153 § 1 sentence 3 of the Penal and Fiscal Code for the period of more than 6 months of the enquiry concerning a fiscal offence, conducted by a financial authority of preparatory proceedings, means that the said prosecutor undertakes supervision over the said enquiry, then Article 155 § 1 and 2 of the Penal and Fiscal Code must be applied for the purpose of preparing and filing an indictment with the court. In accordance with the law applicable as of 1 July 2015, the financial authority of preparatory proceedings which conducted the investigation as well as the enquiry under the prosecutor’s supervision must prepare an indictment taking into consideration its formal requirements as set out in Article 119 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, Article 332 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, Article 333 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in connection with Article 113 § 1 of the Penal and Fiscal Code, and it must subsequently transfer it to the prosecutor, who approves it and files it with the court. The act of filing an indictment with the court by the Customs Office, where the enquiry was under the prosecutor’s supervision, and where such indictment was filed without the prosecutor’s approval, must be deemed to have been undertaken by an unauthorized body, which constitutes a negative procedural premise which is the absence of indictment by an authorised prosecuting organ (Article 17 § 1 point 9 of the Code of Criminal Procedure).

PERSINGGUNGAN KEWENANGAN MENGADILI PENYALAHGUNAAN DISKRESI ANTARA PENGADILAN TUN DAN PENGADILAN TIPIKOR / INTERCEPTION OF JUSTICE AUTHORITY OF DISCRETION ABUSE BETWEEN ADMINISTRATION COURT AND CORRUPTION COURTS

2018 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 213
Author(s):  
Budi Suhariyanto
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Criminal Law ◽  
Administrative Law ◽  
The State ◽  
Government Officials ◽  
Criminal Process ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
State Finance ◽  
The Law ◽  
To Receive

Diskresi sebagai wewenang bebas, keberadaannya rentan akan disalahgunakan. Penyalahgunaan diskresi yang berimplikasi merugikan keuangan negara dapat dituntutkan pertanggungjawabannya secara hukum administrasi maupun hukum pidana. Mengingat selama ini peraturan perundang-undangan tentang pemberantasan tindak pidana korupsi tidak merumuskan secara rinci yang dimaksudkan unsur menyalahgunakan kewenangan maka para hakim menggunakan konsep penyalahgunaan wewenang dari hukum administrasi. Problema muncul saat diberlakukannya Undang-Undang Nomor 30 Tahun 2014 dimana telah memicu persinggungan dalam hal kewenangan mengadili penyalahgunaan wewenang (termasuk diskresi) antara Pengadilan Tata Usaha Negara dengan Pengadilan Tindak Pidana Korupsi. Pada perkembangannya, persinggungan kewenangan mengadili tersebut ditegaskan oleh Peraturan Mahkamah Agung Nomor 4 Tahun 2015 bahwa PTUN berwenang menerima, memeriksa, dan memutus permohonan penilaian ada atau tidak ada penyalahgunaan wewenang (termasuk diskresi) dalam Keputusan dan/atau Tindakan Pejabat Pemerintahan sebelum adanya proses pidana. Sehubungan tidak dijelaskan tentang definisi dan batasan proses pidana yang dimaksud, maka timbul penafsiran yang berbeda. Perlu diadakan kesepakatan bersama dan dituangkan dalam regulasi tentang tapal batas persinggungan yang jelas tanpa meniadakan kewenangan pengujian penyalahgunaan wewenang diskresi pada Pengadilan TUN.Discretion as free authority is vulnerable to being misused. The abuse of discretion implicating the state finance may be prosecuted by both administrative and criminal law. In view of the fact that the law on corruption eradication does not formulate in detail the intended element of authority abuse, the judges use the concept of authority abuse from administrative law. Problems arise when the enactment of Law No. 30 of 2014 triggered an interception in terms of justice/ adjudicate authority on authority abuse (including discretion) between the Administrative Court and Corruption Court. In its development, the interception of justice authority is affirmed by Regulation of the Supreme Court Number 4 of 2015 that the Administrative Court has the authority to receive, examine and decide upon the appeal there is or there is no misuse of authority in the Decision and / or Action of Government Officials prior to the criminal process. That is, shortly before the commencement of the criminal process then that's when the authority of PTUN decides to judge the misuse of authority over the case. In this context, Perma No. 4 of 2015 has imposed restrictions on the authority of the TUN Court in prosecuting the abuse of discretionary authority.

STUDI KASUS PENETAPAN KEMBALI TARIF DAN/ATAU NILAI PABEAN (SPKTNP) OLEH DIREKTUR JENDERAL BEA DAN CUKAI: TINJAUAN PUTUSAN PENINJAUAN KEMBALI MAHKAMAH AGUNG RI

2018 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Akhmad Firdiansyah ◽  
Wachid Hasyim ◽  
Yonathan Agung Pahlevi
Keyword(s):  
Qualitative Analysis ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Director General ◽  
Import Duty ◽  
Legal Norms ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Law

ABSTRACT In accordance with the mandate of Article 23A of the 1945 Constitution, all tax stipulations must be based on the law. To carry out the mandate in accordance with Article 17 of the Customs Law Number 17 of 2006, the Director General of Customs and Excise is given the attributive authority to issue reassignment letter on Customs Tariff and / or Value for the calculation of import duty within two years starting from the date of customs notification carried out through a mechanism of audit or re-research. To examine the application of these legal norms, there are currently Supreme Court (MA) Judgment (PK) decisions that accept PK applications from PK applicants and question the legality of issuing SPKTNP by the Director General of BC. This study uses explosive qualitative analysis to analyze the issuance of SPKTNP by the Director General of BC. The results of this study indicate that the Supreme Court is of the view that the issuance of SPKTNP by the Director General of BC is a legal defect, while DGCE considers the issuance of SPKTNP by the Director General of BC according to the provisions.Key words: official decision, reassignment letter, DCGE  ABSTRAKSesuai amanah Pasal 23A Undang-Undang Dasar 1945 Segala penetapan pajak harus berdasar undang-undang. Untuk menjalankan amanah tersebut sesuai Pasal 17 Undang-Undang Kepabeanan Nomor 17 Tahun 2006 Direktur Jenderal Bea dan Cukai (Dirjen BC) diberikan kewenangan atributif untuk menerbitkan Surat Penetapan Kembali Tarif dan/atau Nilai Pabean (SPKTNP) guna penghitungan bea masuk dalam jangka waktu dua tahun terhitung sejak tanggal pemberitahuan pabean yang dilakukan melalui mekanisme audit atau penelitian ulang. Untuk meneliti penerapan norma hukum tersebut dewasa ini terdapat putusan Peninjauan Kembali (PK) Mahkamah Agung (MA) yang menerima permohonan PK dari pemohon PK dan mempermasalahkan legalitas penerbitan SPKTNP oleh Dirjen BC. Penelitian ini mengunakan analisis kualitatif eksplotarif untuk menganalisis penerbitan SPKTNP oleh Dirjen BC. Hasil penelitian ini menunjukkan bahwa MA berpandangan penerbitan SPKTNP oleh Dirjen BC adalah cacat hukum, sedangkan DJBC beranggapan penerbitan SPKTNP oleh Dirjen BC telah sesuai ketentuan.Kata Kunci: penetapan pejabat, SPKTNP, Direktur Jenderal Bea dan Cukai.

Formation of Contract and Third Parties in Cambodia

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ly Tayseng
Keyword(s):  
Academic Writing ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Civil Code ◽  
Third Parties ◽  
Third Party ◽  
The Third ◽  
Contract Formation ◽  
The Law ◽  
The Right ◽  
Formal Requirements

This chapter gives an overview of the law on contract formation and third party beneficiaries in Cambodia. Much of the discussion is tentative since the new Cambodian Civil Code only entered into force from 21 December 2011 and there is little case law and academic writing fleshing out its provisions. The Code owes much to the Japanese Civil Code of 1898 and, like the latter, does not have a requirement of consideration and seldom imposes formal requirements but there are a few statutory exceptions from the principle of freedom from form. For a binding contract, the agreement of the parties is required and the offer must be made with the intention to create a legally binding obligation and becomes effective once it reaches the offeree. The new Code explicitly provides that the parties to the contract may agree to confer a right arising under the contract upon a third party. This right accrues directly from their agreement; it is not required that the third party declare its intention to accept the right.

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