scholarly journals INDIVIDUAL AND COLLECTIVE INTENT IN THE CRIME OF GENOCIDE (ON THE EXAMPLE OF THE HOLODOMOR-GENOCIDE AGAINST THE UKRAINIAN NATION)

Author(s):  
M. Antonovych

The article deals with the definition of the concept of intent to commit genocide in the Statute of the International Criminal Court, in the document “Elements of Crimes” adopted by the International Criminal Court, as well as in decisions of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, International Criminal Court and in practice of the International Court of Justice. The author reveals constitutive elements of the concept of intent to commit genocide: intent to be engaged in the conduct which would cause destructive consequences for a national, ethnic, religious or racial group as such; intent to reach these consequences; or awareness that they will occur as a result of this conduct in the ordinary course of events. The author indicates slightly different approaches of the international criminal tribunals and courts to knowledge of the consequences as a result of destruction of a group. It is stated that the intent should not necessarily be fixed in documents or formulated in public oral speeches, but may also be certified by facts and circumstances of a crime. The author analyzes different circumstances which may evidence the intent to commit genocide. Special attention is paid to differentiation between individual and collective intent to commit genocide. The author examines the intent to commit genocide in the Holodomor organized against the Ukrainian national and ethnic group.

2020 ◽  
Vol 59 (4) ◽  
pp. 616-693
Author(s):  
Alessandra Spadaro

For the first time, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the International Criminal Court (ICC) are dealing concurrently with the same set of events, which concern the violence to which those in the group that self-identifies as the Rohingya have been subjected in Myanmar, and that has prompted their mass exodus to Bangladesh. Before both courts, proceedings are at a preliminary stage.


2008 ◽  
Vol 21 (2) ◽  
pp. 513-528 ◽  
Author(s):  
WILLIAM A. SCHABAS

AbstractThe Special Tribunal for Lebanon is the latest international criminal tribunal to be established by the United Nations. Similar in many respects to the earlier institutions – for the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and Sierra Leone – it stands alone in the fact that its subject-matter jurisdiction does not contain any international crimes. It is thus international in some respects, but it is arguably not an international criminal tribunal in the sense that was intended by the International Court of Justice in the Yerodia case. The drafting history of the Statute of the Special Tribunal is examined with a view to determining whether the new court should treat sovereign immunity in the same manner as the other three UN criminal tribunals.


2019 ◽  
Vol 78 (3) ◽  
pp. 596-611
Author(s):  
Sarah M.H. Nouwen

AbstractThis article argues that it is important for the International Court of Justice to be given an opportunity, for instance through a request for an Advisory Opinion, to explain what exactly it meant when it suggested that the ordinarily applicable international law on immunities need not be an obstacle “before certain international criminal courts, where they have jurisdiction”. Two international criminal courts have built a structure of case law on this one obiter comment, which it seems unable to support.


2002 ◽  
Vol 15 (4) ◽  
pp. 859-890 ◽  
Author(s):  
Roger S. Clark

The crime of aggression will be included within the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court once agreement is reached on its definition and the conditions for exercising jurisdiction. The author discusses the ultimately unsuccessful efforts of the now concluded Preparatory Commission for the Court to complete the drafting. He suggests how the mental and material elements of the offense might be structured consistently with other offenses in the Statute of the Court. Probably the biggest intellectual hurdle is that of “conditions.” A number of states, notably the Permanent Members of the Security Council, insist that there must be a predetermination of an act of aggression by a state made by the Security Council. Others believe that the predetermination can be made by the General Assembly or the International Court of Justice. Yet others claim that all decisions must be made by the International Criminal Court. The political choice between these positions has still to be made.


Temida ◽  
2007 ◽  
Vol 10 (4) ◽  
pp. 33-42
Author(s):  
Mirjana Tejic

On February 26th 2007, International Court of Justice claimed Serbia responsible for failing to prevent genocide and punish perpetrators underlining its' responsibility to cooperate with International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia. Although it was confirmed genocide has been committed in Srebrenica 1995, Serbia is not obliged to pay financial reparations. Judgment makes distinction between individual and three-fold state responsibility for genocide, based on Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide and other sources of international law. There are evident disagreements among judges on jurisdiction, interpretation rules, even on meritum of the case. Many questions still remain open especially what precedent effects will have on establishment of state's dolus specialis and how it will influence the reconciliation process in the region.


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