Busing for Racial Balance

1975 ◽  
Vol 45 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-4

It has been twenty years since the Supreme Court concluded in Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka that separate educational systems for different races were inherently unequal and therefore violated the Fourteenth Amendment. The early result of this decision was the gradual elimination of overtly dual school systems in the South. More recently, the principle of educational equality has been interpreted to forbid any school segregation by race unless it can be shown to a court's satisfaction that such segregation has no discriminatory purpose. This has led to the movement to desegregate schools even in the face of segregated residential patterns. The most recent episode in the desegregation movement was initiated in 1974 with a federal court order to desegregate the Boston Public School System. The controversy and conflict following this decision have convulsed our community. Through this editorial statement we hope to encourage serious examination of some of the issues surrounding this controversy.

2017 ◽  
Vol 43 (2) ◽  
pp. 204-217 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zebulon Vance Miletsky

Boston’s long Civil Rights Movement in the twentieth century, before the infamous busing crisis, has not received nearly as much attention as the school desegregation period that was ushered in by Federal court order in 1974. While the story of Boston’s busing crisis is well known, my goal is to place that moment within the context of a longer freedom struggle in Boston and highlight the city’s history of racial inequality and segregation. By looking at both the nineteenth-century origins of legal discrimination in Boston and the activism during the four decades before the 1970s, I reconstruct these humble but effective efforts in which activists focused mainly on issues of employment, housing, educational equality, and quality of life. The goal of this essay, then, is to contextualize the busing conversation and reconstruct the political context in which black Bostonians embarked on various campaigns to reclaim the legacy of freedom and equality established earlier, in the nineteenth century. In that sense, I argue that Boston was not simply a “southern space” ensconced in the North, but rather was the original template for segregation in the nation, as cited in Plessy v. Ferguson (1896).1The issues engaged by Boston’s freedom movement, from de facto school segregation to employment discrimination, challenge many prevailing popular assumptions about postwar black freedom struggles in other cities. This article aims to investigate the origins of that movement and what gave rise to the unique nature of civil rights organizing activities in Boston before Busing.


1969 ◽  
Vol 15 (4) ◽  
pp. 449-458
Author(s):  
William J. Brennan

In the perennial debate on whether court decisions have helped heighten the crime problem, it is essential to reiterate that criminals are not freed on "technicalaties." Not only do these cases usually result in new trials, rather than release of the defendant, but the reversals enforce constitutional guarantees that protect the common interest against oppression. Fifty-five years ago the Supreme Court ruled that evidence obtained through a violation of the Fourth Amendment could not be introduced in a federal court. When the same rule was applied to the states eight years ago, it was hardly an innovation. Rather, it represented a lag in applying the Fourteenth Amendment, which, requiring the states to apply due process of law as called for in the federal constitution, had been adopted in 1868. The evolving decisions are part of a lengthy re-examination de manded by the fact that government has become more powerful and more pervasive than in the days of our ancestors. The de cisions are essential to the preservation of the constitutional structure of government in a free society.


2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (12) ◽  
pp. 273-290
Author(s):  
Saul Tourinho Leal ◽  
Nara Pinheiro Reis Ayres de Britto

Could the object of a law declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court be reintroduced into the legal system this time through an amendment to the Constitution? And if this amendment is based on elements protected by the Constitution, such as cultural manifestations? The Federal Constitution of 1988 brings in its art. 2nd the separation of the Powers as an explicit stone clause. Could an amendment that admits a constitutionally based exception subscribe to a practice considered by the Supreme Court as capable of subjecting animals to cruelty? The evolution of the times and social and cultural advances are part of the transformation of society itself and this transformation can take place in accordance with the Constitution, and the Supreme Federal Court, in the exercise of its duty to guard the Constitution, preserve the stone clauses notably in the face of political initiatives that try to overcome the transformative effect inherent to the effects of the full exercise of the not majority character of constitutional jurisdiction. Thus, the present work aims to make a constitutional analysis, through bibliographic, legislative and jurisprudential review methodology of the practice of the so-called “vaquejadas” in Brazil and its consequences from a decision taken by the Federal Supreme Court that gave rise to an immediate political reaction through the approval of a constitutional amendment by the National Congress.


2007 ◽  
Vol 39 (1) ◽  
pp. 60-74 ◽  
Author(s):  
Danielle Goldman

On the morning of May 4, 1961, a brave and motley group of travelers—seven black males, three white males, and three white females, varying in age and professional standing but all trained in nonviolence—embarked on what they called the “Freedom Ride.” Designed by the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE), the bus ride was meant to commemorate and further the organization's 1947 Journey of Reconciliation, a non-violent test of desegregation on interstate buses that quickly disintegrated in the face of staunch resistance. This time, riders would test the 1960 Supreme Court decision Boynton v. Virginia, which prohibited segregation in the waiting rooms and restaurants of bus terminals (Branch 1989, 390). Departing from Washington, D.C., the Freedom Ride aimed to arrive in New Orleans on May 17, the seventh anniversary of Brown v. Board of Education. Explaining that they were merely exercising rights granted by the Supreme Court but that they knew the dangers, CORE director James Farmer said, “We were prepared for the possibility of death” (Cozzens 1997). Riding the momentum of the student sit-ins, the civil rights movement had become for many a matter of “putting your body on the line” (Branch 1989, 392).


2005 ◽  
Vol 23 (3) ◽  
pp. 505-516
Author(s):  
Denis Lemieux

In this paper, the author deals with the legal foundations of judicial control over errors of law allegedly committed by administrative authorities. The paper also considers the scope of error of law on the face of the record as a ground of review. More specifically, the author has examined all the decisions rendered by the Quebec Court of Appeal, the Federal Court, and the Supreme Court of Canada in 1980 and 1981 where there was an allegation of error of law. From this statistical analysis, the author describes and explains the different, and seemingly contradictory, results achieved by these different jurisdictions. The author adds some comments on the constitutionality of privative clauses excluding judicial review of non-jurisdictional errors of law.


1998 ◽  
Vol 22 (2) ◽  
pp. 159-200 ◽  
Author(s):  
Micah Altman

One person, one vote. With this principle, the Court permanently changed representation in the United States. Equal population requirements changed the face of legislative redistricting in the 1960s, when the Supreme Court applied it to congressional districts in Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964), and to state legislatures in Reynolds v. Sims, 84 S. Ct. 1362 (1964). Equality in district population was valued not only as instrumental to other goals but also for itself, as Justice Black explained in Wesberry: “As nearly as practicable one man’s vote in a congressional election is to be worth as much as another’s. . . . To say that a vote is worth more in one district than another would . . . run counter to our fundamental ideas of democratic government.”As Justice Brennan made clear, the Court based its decision in large part on a particular understanding of the historical meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment and of article 1, section 2, of the Constitution. And as widely accepted as this principle has come to be, it has been subject to severe historical criticism, criticism that has never been resolved. For example, Berger (1977) claims that malapportionment was historically present and accepted before and during the creation of the Fourteenth Amendment and hence that the equal protection clause could not have implied the equal population principle (from chapter 5): “Certainly there was no disclosure that such intrusion [on apportionment] was contemplated; there is in fact striking evidence that malapportionment was an accepted practice.”


1998 ◽  
Vol 92 (1) ◽  
pp. 41-43
Author(s):  
Andreas F. Lowenfeld

In the April 1997 issue of the Journal, I reported on three cases in which the response to an action brought in the court of one country led not to an answer, but to a countersuit in another country—for an antisuit injunction, a declaration of nonliability or both. One of the cases I discussed arose out of a controversy between an asbestos manufacturer, CSR, and a group of insurance companies, the Cigna Group, that may or may not have been obligated to defend and indemnify the manufacturer in respect of claims in the United States for product liability. The manufacturer brought suit in federal court in New Jersey, raising both contract and antitrust claims. The insurers, as I reported, succeeded in securing an antisuit injunction in the Supreme Court of New South Wales (a court of first instance), and thereafter in defeating a motion by the manufacturer to stay or dismiss, on grounds of forum non conveniens, the insurers’ action seeking a declaration of nonliability. I thought that outcome was wrong: in my view, the Australian court should not have stepped into the controversy, and the insurers should have brought their challenge to the jurisdiction and suitable venue of the New Jersey court in that court.


1979 ◽  
Vol 4 (4) ◽  
pp. 29-32
Author(s):  
Brian Lucas

In its Second Main Report, Law and Poverty in Australia, the Commission of Inquiry into Poverty expressed the view that “legal representation for children appearing before the children's court, whether in the criminal or protective jurisdiction, is necessary if justice is to be done.”This view coincides with the opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States of America in In re Gault. It has been said that this decision “unleashed a frontal assault on the juvenile court system.” It confirmed that juveniles were entitled to “due process” and the same protection which the Fourteenth Amendment and the Bill of Rights afforded to adults.


2018 ◽  
Vol 43 (2) ◽  
pp. 194-213
Author(s):  
Nicholas S. Paliewicz

This essay analyzes how a rhetorical culture emerged in which the Supreme Court of the United States assumed corporations were constitutional persons under the Fourteenth Amendment. Approaching rhetorical culture from a networked standpoint, I argue that corporate personhood emerged from Southern Pacific Railroad Co.’s networks and alliances with environmental preservationists, politicians, publics, lawyers, judges, and immigrants in the late 19th century. Contributing to literatures on rhetorical culture and agency, this study shows how Southern Pacific Railroad Co., through networks of influence and force, was a rhetorical subject that shaped a networked rhetorical culture that expanded the boundaries of the Fourteenth Amendment even though the Supreme Court of the United States had not worked out the philosophical underpinnings of corporate personhood. Corporate personhood remains theoretically restrained by legal discourses that reduce subjectivity to a singular, speaking, human subject.


1983 ◽  
Vol 49 (6) ◽  
pp. 517-522 ◽  
Author(s):  
Martha M. McCarthy

The Supreme Court recently delivered two significant decisions interpreting the federal rights of the handicapped. In Pennhurst v. Halderman (1981), the Court ruled that the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act contains a statement of national goals for the developmentally disabled, but does not create substantive rights to adequate treatment. In Board of Education v. Rowley (1982), the Court interpreted the Education for All Handicapped Children Act as assuring handicapped children procedural safeguards and an individualized educational program, but not placing an obligation on states to provide a particular level of education or equal educational opportunities for such children. Both decisions suggest a reduced federal role in determining what constitutes appropriate programs and services for the handicapped.


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