scholarly journals Freedom, responsibility and the past: A consideration of the new consequence argument (Proceedings of the CAPE International Workshops, 2013. Part II: The CAPE International Conference “A Frontier of Philosophy of Time”)

2014 ◽  
Vol 2 ◽  
pp. 181-197
English Today ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 30 (1) ◽  
pp. 13-20 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tvrtko Prćić

The concept of English as the nativized foreign language – or ENFL, for short – was first proposed in 2003, at the 13th International Conference on British and American Studies, in Timişoara, Romania, in a presentation entitled ‘Rethinking the status of English today: is it still a purely foreign language?’, and subsequently published as Prćić, 2003 and 2004. Identified and described in these papers are new, additional properties of English, which have developed over the past few decades, concurrently with the establishment of English as the first language of world communication and as today's global lingua franca (for accounts of this phenomenon, see Jenkins, 2007; Mauranen & Ranta, 2010; Seidlhofer, 2011). Viewed from the perspective of the Expanding Circle (Kachru, 1985), English can no longer be considered a purely, or prototypically, foreign language, usually characterized by three defining properties: not the first language of a country, not the official language of a country and taught as a subject in schools (cf. Richards & Schmidt, 2002). Three newly emerged defining properties of English, over and above the three customary ones, set it uniquely apart from all other purely foreign languages and they will be briefly summarized below (for more extensive discussions, see Prćić, 2003, 2004, 2011a: Chapter 2, 2011b, 2014).


Kant-Studien ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 110 (3) ◽  
pp. 413-436
Author(s):  
Hope C. Sample

Abstract When interpreters orient Kant’s philosophy of time in relation to McTaggart’s distinction among different ways of characterizing a temporal order, they claim that he is best described as endorsing an A series position according to which there is a metaphysically privileged present that determines the past and the future. Whether Kant might also be understood as a proponent of the B series - according to which there is no privileged present, but rather time is comprised of relations of earlier than, later than, and simultaneity - has not been discussed in the literature. I argue that, for Kant, the appearances can be described as an A series, while the phenomena are to be understood as a B series, neither of which is more fundamental than the other. Contra a common approach in the literature that neglects a metaphysical difference between appearances and phenomena, I argue Kant’s transcendental idealism about time is best understood in relation to his account of appearances and phenomena.


2016 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 148-165 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rudolf Boutet

This paper confronts two conceptions of the past that one can find alternately in Ricœur’s thought. The first, encountered in Time and Narrative and elsewhere, apprehends the past as a soil of possibilities able to guide expectations directed towards the future; the second, taken back from Freud’s psychoanalysis, defines it as a charge that haunts the present as a compulsive repetition. There are two issues to this confrontation between a past that opens up a future and one that closes it. On the one hand, we want to show what effects Ricœur’s lectures of Freud have had on his own philosophy of time; on the other hand we want to reveal, in the light of the problem that rises from a haunting past, the practical scope of the idea of an indeterminate past


The Oxford Handbook of Free Will provides a guide to current scholarship on the perennial problem of free will—perhaps the most hotly and voluminously debated of all philosophical problems. While reference is made throughout to the contributions of major thinkers of the past, the emphasis is on recent research. The articles combine the work of established scholars with younger thinkers who are beginning to make significant contributions. The book is divided into eight parts: Part I (Theology and Fatalism), Part II (Physics, Determinism, and Indeterminism), Part III (The Modal or Consequence Argument for Incompatibilism). Part IV (Compatibilist Perspectives on Freedom and Responsibility), Part V (Moral Responsibility, Alternative Possibilities, and Frankfurt-Style), Part VI (Libertarian Perspectives on Free Agency and Free Will), Part VII (Nonstandard Views: Successor Views to Hard Determinism and Others), and Part VIII (Neuroscience and Free Will). Taken as a whole, the book provides a roadmap to the state of the art thinking on this enduring topic.


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