scholarly journals Of Mice and Men Gaze at Evil

Author(s):  
Amir Abbas Moslemi

Ezra Pound’s Shi-Shu: Rats is read Foucauldianly to instantiate an interaction between Confucianism and Western schools of thought in response to the problem of evil. There is a review of Leibniz’s theodicy to clear up confusion, and also to pave the way for a succession of readings of a number of philosophers like Hume and James — foregrounding epistemic inclination of poets like Pope, Wordsworth and Burns. ‘Accidentality’ and ‘essentiality’ are key philosophic terms, without which this problem cannot hold its logical structure, especially in terms of an answer. Epistemo-political ‘docility’ and literal ‘decency’ are employed together for the first time to be reintroducing ancient relationship between cruel politicians and carceral system. Utopia is taken as a mere dream so that ‘the problem’ would tend to keep its identity. What is new in this paper is a ‘gaze’-wise trace of mice in literature supporting the problem of evil in philosophy, based on an actual political background, within a broad sociological realm.

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Martineau

In Book I of Paradise Lost, John Milton (1608-1674) asserts his intent to “justifie the wayes of God to men” (Paradise Lost1 I 26), paving the way for a revolutionary discussion of human nature, divinity, and the problem of evil, all couched in an epic retelling of Satan’s fall from grace, his temptation of Adam and Eve, and their expulsion from the Garden of Eden, as recounted in the Book of Genesis. In his treatment of the biblical account, Milton necessarily broaches a variety of subjects which were both relevant during his time and remain relevant in ours. Among these topics, and certainly one of the most compelling, is the matter of human free will.


Author(s):  
Beverley Clack

Rather than offering another ‘solution’ to the problem of evil, in the form of, say, a theodicy, the discussion of this chapter is situated within an ethical framework concerned with unmasking the enactment and perpetuation of ‘structural evils’ on the political and social levels. Indebted to the insights of feminist philosophers such as Michèle Le Doeuff, but also Hannah Arendt’s analysis of evil, the novelist Muriel Spark, and Pierre Bourdieu’s work on social suffering, the chapter seeks, not to justify the ways of God, but to critique and transform unjust structures, and to pave the way for alternatives that might best support human flourishing. This necessitates attempting to identify and understand the sources of human wickedness—social and individual—while contending that, ultimately, the only appropriate response to evil and suffering is to commit to a reorientation of the self towards others and the world.


One of those rare questions in philosophy that is not only technically recalcitrant but also engages the hearts and minds of the broad community is the so-called ‘problem of evil’: how can the existence of an absolutely perfect God be reconciled with the existence of suffering and evil? This problem has exercised the finest minds across the centuries, from ancient to modern times. In contemporary philosophy, however, the debate has petrified into a select number of entrenched and defensive strategies. This volume opens the way for a wholesale reconsideration of the problem of evil. Eight prominent philosophers of religion have been invited to engage in critical but friendly dialogue, and to develop and contest both traditional and relatively unorthodox approaches. What emerges from these exchanges is a diversity of fruitful and innovative ways of thinking about God and evil, proving that the problem of evil is far from exhausted.


2019 ◽  
pp. 1-14
Author(s):  
Han-luen Kantzer Komline

This chapter introduces the most significant debates surrounding Augustine’s understanding of the will (uoluntas), the hybrid methodology employed in this work, and the thesis that Augustine articulates a theologically differentiated notion of will. Is Augustine’s notion of will original in the history of Western philosophy? Can his affirmation of free will be sustained given his approach to the problem of evil, foreknowledge, predestination, and grace? How does the concept of free will fit, or fail to fit, within the larger scope of Augustine’s thought? Traditional questions in the literature are adumbrated along the way to show the fruitfulness of a theological account.


2008 ◽  
Vol 44 (2) ◽  
pp. 185-202 ◽  
Author(s):  
ERIC SNIDER

AbstractDavid Silver has argued that there is an illegitimate circularity in Plantinga's account of how a Christian theist can defend herself against the potential defeater presented by Paul Draper's formulation of the problem of evil. The way out of the circle for the theist, thinks Silver, would be by adopting a kind of evidentialism: she needs to make an appeal to evidence that is independent of the reasons she has for holding theistic belief in the first place. I shall argue that Silver's argument is unsuccessful, mainly because he does not get Plantinga's thought right. Silver's confusion is in taking causes of belief as reasons for belief, and in failing to account for the impact of belief holism and our web of beliefs on the very hope for independent reasons.


Author(s):  
Paul Rateau

This chapter questions two common interpretations of Leibniz's theodicy. The first interpretation maintains that, all considered, most of the arguments Leibniz uses are traditional. The second interpretation maintains that Leibniz's conception of evil and his justification of God are roughly fixed since the Confessio Philosophi (1672-3). The chapter argues that Leibniz regards injustice as the real evil. It also examines significant revisions in the conception of God and of his relationship (moral and physical concourse) to the action of his creatures, as well as revisions in Leibniz’s understanding of the nature of evil, its origin, and the reason of its permission. Furthermore, it focuses on the way Leibniz deals with difficulties concerning the "conduct of God" and his participation in evil; how he gives a rational justification of God that conciliates his omnipotence, his holiness, the existence of evil, and the freedom of man; and his early necessitarianism.


ELH ◽  
1988 ◽  
Vol 55 (1) ◽  
pp. 125 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stuart Peterfreund

2004 ◽  
Vol 40 (3) ◽  
pp. 307-321 ◽  
Author(s):  
IAN WILKS

This paper concerns the attempt to formulate an empirical version of the problem of evil, and the attempt to counter this version by what is known as ‘sceptical theism’. My concern is to assess what is actually achieved in these attempts. To this end I consider the debate between them against the backdrop of William Rowe's distinction between expanded standard theism and restricted standard theism (which I label E and R respectively). My claim is that the empirical version significantly fails to challenge E in the way that a workable logical version would; and that sceptical theism significantly fails to defend R in the way that a workable theodicy would. My conclusion is that sceptical theism and the empirical argument play a significantly more limited role in the debate over evil than the arguments they are supposed to replace.


2008 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ashok Nagpal ◽  
Ankur Prahlad Betageri

2020 ◽  
Vol 3 ◽  
pp. 81-84
Author(s):  
Karen Chan

For me, rhythm means having consistency. The piece highlights my own experience with the disruption of my daily rhythm due to COVID-19. The first half shows my routine and interactions prior to COVID-19 while the second half shows my experiences in the present day. Prior to the virus, I had a day to day routine that was filled with noise. Everyday moved quickly and I established a daily rhythm. However, when COVID-19 spread, it changed everything. I felt like I didn’t have a routine anymore because I wasn’t allowed to go anywhere. Time was moving much slower and worst of all, xenophobia was growing at a significant rate. As a Chinese Canadian, this was the first time I truly felt the weight of the color of my skin. COVID-19 changed the way that I consistently assumed that the color of my skin wasn’t something that strangers would significantly care about. However, as I got on a bus, I unintentionally scared a woman simply because of my skin color. From that point, I knew that xenophobia would affect the way people perceived me everyday. The woman was scared of the virus— which in turn was scared of me—and I was scared that she would thwart her anger towards me because I am Chinese. If looks could kill, then the woman and I ironically both feared each other. Now, due to COVID-19, I am adapting to a new routine. A routine where the color of skin rings louder than any other sound.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document