63/39. Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure Non-Nuclear-Weapon states against the use or threat of use of Nuclear Weapons

2010 ◽  
pp. 12-16
Keyword(s):  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
Nuclear Weapon

Iraq's Chemical Weapons Legacy: What Others Might Learn from Saddam

2005 ◽  
Vol 59 (2) ◽  
pp. 187-208
Author(s):  
Richard L. Russell
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
Nuclear Weapon ◽  
The United States ◽  
Chemical Weapons ◽  
Nation States

Iraq's experience with chemical weapons provides ample lessons for nation-states looking to redress their conventional military shortcomings. Nation-states are likely to learn from Saddam that chemical weapons are useful for waging war against nation-states ill-prepared to fight on a chemical battlefield as well as against internal insurgents and rebellious civilians. Most significantly, nation-states studying Iraq's experience are likely to conclude that chemical weapons are not a “poor man's nuclear weapon” and that only nuclear weapons can deter potential adversaries including the United States.

scholarly journals Nuclear Disarmament without the Nuclear-Weapon States: The Nuclear Weapon Ban Treaty

Daedalus ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 149 (2) ◽  
pp. 171-189 ◽  
Author(s):  
Harald Müller ◽  
Carmen Wunderlich
Keyword(s):  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
Nuclear Weapon ◽  
Nuclear Disarmament ◽  
The Road ◽  
Common Basis ◽  
Global Zero ◽  
Nuclear Arms

The 2017 Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (tpnw) represents a daring act of self-empowerment: nuclear have-nots produced an international disarmament treaty without the involvement of the nuclear-weapon states or their allies. In this essay, we assess how the new treaty relates to the existing nuclear order and its four central norms: constraints on use, political restraint, non-proliferation, and disarmament. We discuss the tpnw's origin in and impact on this contested order. At the heart of contestation are two security concepts: deterrence versus the immediate ban of nuclear arms, which result in fundamentally different ideas on how to pursue the road to “global zero.” Whether or not the tpnw and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons are compatible depends on how the opponents handle their controversies. The key is to overcome the emotionalized polarization and rediscover a common basis in order to prevent damage to the existing nuclear order and bring forward nuclear disarmament in practice.

User Requirements and Criteria for Proliferation Resistance in INPRO

2004 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kun-Mo Choi ◽  
Robert D. Hurt ◽  
Thomas E. Shea ◽  
Richard Nishimura
Keyword(s):  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
Nuclear Weapon ◽  
Nuclear Energy ◽  
Energy Systems ◽  
Nuclear Material ◽  
User Requirements ◽  
Fissile Material ◽  
Nuclear Weapon Program ◽  
The Cost ◽  
Weapon Program

In designing future nuclear energy systems, it is important to consider the potential that such systems could be misused for the purpose of producing nuclear weapons. INPRO set out to provide guidance on incorporating proliferation resistance into innovative nuclear energy systems (INS). Generally two types of proliferation resistance measures are distinguished: intrinsic and extrinsic. Intrinsic features consist of technical design features that reduce the attractiveness of nuclear material for nuclear weapon program, or prevent the diversion of nuclear material or production of undeclared nuclear material for nuclear weapons. Extrinsic measures include commitments, obligations and policies of states such as the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and IAEA safeguards agreements. INPRO has produced five basic principles and five user requirements for INS. It emphasizes that INS must continue to be an unattractive means to acquire fissile material for a nuclear weapon program. It also addresses as user requirements: 1) a balanced and optimised combination of intrinsic features and extrinsic measures, 2) the development and implementation of intrinsic features, 3) an early consideration of proliferation resistance in the development of INS and 4) the utilization of intrinsic features to increase the efficiency of extrinsic measures. INPRO has also developed criteria, consisting of indicators and acceptance limits, which would be used by a state to assess how an INS satisfies those user requirements. For the first user requirement, the most important but complex one, INPRO provides a 3-layer hierarchy of indicators to assess how unattractive a specific INS would be as part of a nuclear weapon program. Attributes of nuclear material and facilities are used as indicators to assess intrinsic features. Extrinsic measures imposed on the system are also assessed. Indicators to assess defence in depth for proliferation resistance include the number and robustness of barriers, and the redundancy or complementarity of barriers. The cost of incorporating proliferation resistant features is used to assess the cost-effectiveness of any particular INS in providing proliferation resistance. The stages in the development of an INS at which proliferation resistance is considered in the process are assessed. Awareness of extrinsic measures by designers and use of intrinsic features for verification illustrate how intrinsic features facilitate extrinsic measures. An INPRO-consistent methodology to assess the proliferation resistance of an INS is still under development, with feedback expected from the case studies undertaken by Argentina, India, Russia and the Republic of Korea.

scholarly journals The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons: a Promise, a Threat or a Flop?

2018 ◽  
Vol 27 (1) ◽  
pp. 215-234 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marco Pedrazzi
Keyword(s):  
New York ◽  
Civil Society ◽  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
Nuclear Weapon ◽  
General Assembly ◽  
Nuclear Disarmament ◽  
The Stability ◽  
Ultimate Purpose

On 7 July 2017 a UN Conference, convened in New York by the General Assembly, adopted a Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, providing for the first total ban on these weapons intended to be global in scale. The Treaty was opened for signature on 20 September 2017. The process and its outcome, were, however, firmly opposed by nuclear-weapon States and by NATO countries, including Italy: they refused to take part in the effort, fearing that it could definitively undermine the stability of the non-proliferation architecture built upon the 1967 Non-Proliferation Treaty. In reality, the Treaty is consistent with the ultimate purpose of the NPT regime, and the obligations assumed by States under the NPT remain untouched. Its main deficiencies relate to its verification apparatus, and it would be advisable to remedy them through future negotiations. Whether this instrument will enter into force is not clear, although it has the potential to acquire, and surpass, the fifty ratifications necessary. However, the absence of support from nuclear-weapon States risks rendering it irrelevant. Nevertheless, it seems plausible that broad support for this new regime, from non-nuclear-weapons States, as well as from civil society, could contribute to exerting pressure towards the adoption of concrete steps in the nuclear disarmament agenda.

Justice and Injustice in the Fissile Material (Cutoff) Treaty

2014 ◽  
Vol 19 (3) ◽  
pp. 570-598
Author(s):  
Annette Schaper
Keyword(s):  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
Nuclear Weapon ◽  
Nuclear Disarmament ◽  
Fissile Material

The Fissile Material (Cutoff) Treaty (fm(c)t) has been on the negotiation agenda since 1996, but has seen little progress. This is due to a fundamental disagreement over whether emphasis should be placed on nuclear disarmament or nuclear non-proliferation. Several delegations perceive the fm(c)t as a tool to draw in states from outside the non-proliferation regime, while others understand it to be a disarmament measure that reduces quantities of fissile materials for nuclear weapons. They however, regard the unwillingness of nuclear weapon states to engage toward this end as deeply unjust. Additional disagreements also concern justice: Should there be different standards of verification? May some states continue to produce unverified military fuel? As long as the nuclear weapon states only push their interests through pure power instead of respecting the notion of justice, no progress can be expected and the non-proliferation regime will further erode.

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