scholarly journals The Right of Access to Non-State Dispute Resolution in the Legal Order of Larger Europe: A Yardstick to Harmonise Approaches to State and Non-State Dispute Settlement in Ukraine

2021 ◽  
Vol 7 ◽  
pp. 33-43
Author(s):  
Vasyl Marmazov ◽  
Pavlo Pushkar

The Ukrainian legal thought has traditionally regarded the right of access to justice as a right of access to the State court, or to State managed or controlled procedures for dispute settlement. One of the main reasons for that was that the non-state, or uncontrolled by the State dispute settlement was not formally permitted, prohibition being imposed by the Soviet system and even to a certain extent during the period of domination on parts of the territory of the modern Ukraine, of the various externally imposed requirements of various legal systems in force at the material time. Non-state dispute settlement in its traditional forms, mainly based on the custom, was also left outside the attention in the pre-Soviet times and could not find its dignified place between accessible schemes and instruments for dispute settlement. Moreover, the understanding that justice delivery for the parties to the dispute should remain within State monopoly, became commonly accepted as from 1996. The adoption of the Constitution of Ukraine to a certain extent perverted approach to settlement of conflicts, focusing on the main role for the State courts, to these ends. In particular, the courts are having “direct jurisdiction” over any dispute, this led to perception of pre-trial settlements as unnecessary, even as regards those that remained in force, notably, the commissions on labour disputes that were recognized in the case-law of the European Court as equating in legal force to binding and enforceable legal instruments. Thus, the traditional historical approach to seeing judicial examination of disputes as an exceptional step in dispute settlement, in the absence of agreement or settlement by the parties, notably through mediation, arbitration or conciliation, variousforms of third party involvement, steadily disappeared. However, alternative examination of disputes is returning back to its original standing. It is gaining its place in the discussions on the judicial reform and reform of the system for settlement of disputes. This reform is far from being finalised and possibly has not even started in practice. The new approach to settlement of disputes, aimed at breaking the principle of State monopoly on examination of disputes and seeing State dispute settlement by court as an exception, is still not firmly entrenched into the mentality of lawyers, public servants, judges, law enforcement employees and politicians in Ukraine. Thus, the article suggests and points out to importance of taking into account with these changes of a wider European perspective. Such a perspective should relate not only to theoretical and practical advantages of the non-state dispute settlement, but also provides that the privatisation of the dispute settlement procedures and breaking the state monopoly on it, is a part of wider international obligations, also being a part of the supranational legal order of the European Union. This obligation of Ukraine is also seen as part of the requirements stemming from the Council of Europe law. Both the EU law and the Council of Europe provide for extensive soft law recommendations, legal principles, which are formed by the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights. Such an approach provides that alternative means of dispute settlement, including arbitration, do not run contrary to the principles of human rights with regard to fair judicial proceedings. On the contrary, they could be seen as a highly relevant actual means of dispute settlement for any modern European society, built on the principles of respect to rule of law and human rights.

2019 ◽  
Vol 10 (4) ◽  
pp. 342-362
Author(s):  
Ergul Celiksoy

In November 2018, the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights delivered its judgment in the case of Beuze v Belgium. Relying on Ibrahim and Others v the United Kingdom, the Grand Chamber held that the Salduz principles require a two-stage test of analysis, and hence, ruled out that systematic statutory restriction of a general and mandatory nature would in itself constitute an automatic violation of Article 6 § 3(c) of the European Convention on Human Rights. However, the Beuze judgment appears to be very controversial, since the Grand Chamber failed to put forward any convincing reason why it departed from previous case law, particularly Dayanan v Turkey and other judgments against Turkey. In their separate opinion, the concurring Judges in Beuze were concerned that the Beuze judgment overruled ‘ Salduz itself and all other cases that have applied the Salduz test’, and thus, ‘actually distorts and changes the Salduz principle and devalues the right that the Court established previously’. This article analyses the Beuze judgment in the light of the Court’s recent jurisprudence in order to examine whether it contradicts and dilutes the principles previously set out. Further, it discusses the implications of the new standards established in Ibrahim and Others and in subsequent cases, particularly Beuze. Particular attention is paid to the questions of how ‘fair’ is the application of overall fairness assessment in every case, how may the Court’s changing direction of approach concerning the right to access to a lawyer affect the increasing trend of recognition thereof, as a rule, by the contracting states, and finally, to what extent the new principles, especially those established in Beuze, comply with Directive 2013/48/EU on the right of access to a lawyer.


2014 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 464-504
Author(s):  
Eric De Brabandere

The functional underpinning of institutional immunity remains crucial today in order to guarantee the independent fulfilment by the organization of its mandate. Despite this relatively firmly established principle, domestic courts and tribunals have shown in recent cases that they are very critical of the idea of the absolute character of international organization immunity, not the least in relation to the right of access to court, guaranteed inter alia by Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights. Belgium is host to between 50 and 100 international organizations or liaison offices of international organizations, most of which are located in Brussels. For that reason, the number of potential disputes involving an international organization in Belgium is important. This paper gives an overview of the official Belgian policy in respect of international organization immunity, and analyses relevant Belgian case-law that considers the rationale behind the grant of privileges and immunities to international organizations. It then considers the source of an international organization’s immunity, the scope of that immunity, and the obligation to provide for alternative means of dispute settlement and the individual’s right of access to court.


2012 ◽  
Vol 14 ◽  
pp. 381-418 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dean Spielmann

AbstractThe doctrine of the national margin of appreciation is well established in the case law of the European Court of Human Rights. In applying this essentially judge-made doctrine, the Court imposes self-restraint on its power of review, accepting that domestic authorities are best placed to settle a dispute. The areas in which the doctrine has most often been applied will be presented here, looking at various examples from case law. After a brief overview of the doctrine’s origin, the analysis will focus on the situations in which the margin has been allowed or denied. Does it relate merely to factual and domestic-law aspects of a case? What is the scope of the margin of appreciation when it comes to interpreting provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights? What impact does an interference (whether disproportionate or not) with a guaranteed right have on the margin allowed? Is there a second-degree or ‘reverse’ margin of appreciation, whereby discretionary powers can be distributed between executive and judicial authorities at domestic level? Lastly it is noteworthy that Protocol No 14, now ratified by all Council of Europe Member States, enshrines in Article 12—at least to some extent—an obligation to apply a margin of appreciation. One essential question remains: by allowing any margin of a certain width, is the European Court simply waiving its power of review or is it attributing responsibility to the domestic courts in the interest of a healthy subsidiarity?


Lex Russica ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 56-67 ◽  
Author(s):  
T. Yu. Vilkova

The article is devoted to the analysis of the stances developed in the case law of the European Court of Human Rights regarding the content, scope, general principles of ensuring the right of access to justice, and permissible limits applied to restrict the right in question. The author has substantiated the conclusion that the European Court of Human Rights associates access to justice with Paragraph 1 of Article 6 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Thus, the concept of access to justice includes a number of elements: the right to have recourse to court; the right to have a case heard and resolved in compliance with the requirements of a fair trial; the right to have the judgment enforced; the set of safeguards that allow the person to exercise the rights under consideration effectively. According to the European Court of Human Rights, access to justice should be ensured at all stages including pre-trial (criminal) proceedings and reviewing of court decisions by higher courts. However, the right of access to justice is not absolute. The restrictions imposed must have a legitimate purpose and reasonable proportionality must be obtained between the means used and the goal determined. In view of the requirement mentioned above, the national legislation may provide for the particularities of application of Paragraph 1 of Article 6 of the Convention to proceedings in different types of courts and at different stages, for example, by establishing a certain procedure for the court to grant individuals the right to appeal to a higher court. The author has demonstrated the main directions of applying the legal stances of the European Court of Human Rights regarding access to justice to improve the Russian criminal procedural legislation and law enforcement practices, as well as for further scientific research.


2020 ◽  
Vol 41 (1) ◽  
pp. 113-132
Author(s):  
Gabrijela Mihelčić ◽  
Maša Marochini Zrinski ◽  
Renata Šantek

The authors discuss and analyse case law of the European Court of Human Rights regarding the right to respect for home under Article 8 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and with respect the issue of proportionality. In the paper, the proportionality category was viewed as a criterion for securing protection and as a material precondition for deciding whether the State party's interference with the right to respect for home was proportionate. The cases in which the applicant's eviction occurred after national proceedings for the enforcement of mortgages were addressed. In this context, the genesis of the proportionality category was analysed, from the cases where the Court found it necessary to examine the proportionality to the cases where the Court did not consider the proportionality test necessary.


Author(s):  
Jane Reichel

This chapter explores the impact of the pan-European general principles on Swedish administrative law. The chapter claims that the European Convention on Human Rights and the case law of the European Court of Human Rights have had a great impact on important sectors thereof, such as areas connected to the right of access to courts, procedural safeguarding of administrative sanctions, and state liability. At the same time other standards of good administration developed within the framework of the Council of Europe seem to slip under the radar in the Swedish legal system and are not usually relied on by Swedish administrative courts or the Swedish ombudsman. An explanation for this lack of reliance may lie in the fact that Swedish law already has long-standing traditions with well-defined concepts and procedures in this field.


2016 ◽  
Vol 23 (3) ◽  
pp. 279-304 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lisa Waddington ◽  
Bernadette McSherry

This article examines the relevant international law relating to informed consent to treatment for individuals with psychosocial disabilities and reflects on the protection offered in this respect by the European Convention on Human Rights (echr) and the Council of Europe Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine. The article argues that while the un Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities is beginning to influence case law of the European Court of Human Rights, only ‘weak’ protection has been afforded to people with psychosocial disabilities by the echr and the Court in relation to informed consent for medical treatment.


2020 ◽  
pp. 429-447
Author(s):  
Christopher Campbell-Duruflé

In the Case of Nadege Dorzema et al v Dominican Republic, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights declined to make a finding of violation of Article 3 of the American Convention on Human Rights, the right to juridical personality. The author provides an analysis of this aspect of the judgment and argues that future cases of arbitrary detention of migrants, when these are not duly identified, provide strong bases for concluding in a violation of this right. The author shows that such circumstances correspond to the cases previously decided under article 3 of the American Convention, namely where the State puts individuals in a position where they are prevented from enjoying their civil rights, and were the State refuses to emit formal recognition of individuals or peoples. The author further shows how this conclusion is supported by the case law of the European Court of Human Rights regarding collective expulsions of migrants, because of this court’s special emphasis on their right to be duly identified and to an individualised evaluation of their case. The author concludes that finding a violation of Article 3 of the American Convention in future similar cases is necessary to give full meaning to this treaty and full effect to its regional specificity.


2020 ◽  
Vol 3 ◽  
pp. 41-55
Author(s):  
Pavlo Pushkar ◽  
Oleksii Ivanets

This article suggests a review of the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights and the practices of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe as sources of evaluation of the material and procedural requirements as to the right to freedom of expression. These practices, being synchronised and coherent, are aimed at ensuring implementation of the requirements of the Convention. The right to freedom of expression reflects several aspects of realisation of this right – its realisation as an individual and its collective dimension – together with other persons, or even refusal to exercise a right to freedom of religion. Also, most importantly, the article deals with the requirements of the procedural protection of this right, supplemented guarantees of preventive nature and procedural nature aimed at ensuring effective protection of the right domestically. Such measures include domestic administrative or judicial action. The right to freedom of religion is a right, which integrates some aspects of its subsidiary implementation. In particular, in determining existence of legitimate aim and proportionality of interference with the right to freedom of religion. The article also discusses the relevance of “margin of appreciation” and “proportionality” as elements that influence academic discussions and public criticism of some of the approaches taken by the European Court of Human Rights in assessing compliance of measures taken by the states to limit exercise of freedom of religion.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document