scholarly journals Towards a Logic of Value and Disagreement via Imprecise Measures

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Federico L. G. Faroldi
Keyword(s):  
Truthmaker Semantics

After putting forward a formal account of value disagreement via imprecise measures, I develop a logic of value attribution and of (dis)agreement based on (exact) truthmaker semantics.

scholarly journals AN OBJECT-BASED TRUTHMAKER SEMANTICS FOR MODALS

2018 ◽  
Vol 28 (1) ◽  
pp. 255-288 ◽  
Author(s):  
Friederike Moltmann
Keyword(s):  
Object Based ◽  
Truthmaker Semantics

scholarly journals Disagreement lost

Synthese ◽  
2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Martín Abreu Zavaleta
Keyword(s):  
The Other ◽  
Truthmaker Semantics

AbstractThis paper develops a puzzle about non-merely-verbal disputes. At first sight, it would seem that a dispute over the truth of an utterance is not merely verbal only if there is a proposition that the parties to the dispute take the utterance under dispute to express, which one of the parties accepts and the other rejects. Yet, as I argue, it is extremely rare for ordinary disputes over an utterance’s truth to satisfy this condition, in which case non-merely verbal disputes are extremely rare. After examining various responses to the puzzle, I outline a solution using the framework of truthmaker semantics.

Truthmakers and Consequence

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Neil Tennant
Keyword(s):  
Winning Strategy ◽  
Logical Consequence ◽  
Game Plan ◽  
Soundness And Completeness ◽  
Truthmaker Semantics ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Point Of Departure

We compare Tarski’s notion of logical consequence (preservation of truth) with that of Prawitz (transformability of warrants for assertion). The latter is our point of departure for a definition of consequence in terms of the transformability of truthmakers (verifications) relative to all models. A sentence’s Tarskian truth-in-M coincides with its having an M-relative truthmaker. An M-relative truthmaker serves as a winning strategy or game plan for player T in the ‘material game’ played on that sentence against the background of the model M. We enter conjectures about soundness and completeness of Classical Core Logic with respect to the notion of consequence that results when the domain is required to be decidable. We consider whether the truthmaker semantics threatens a slide to realism. We work with examples of core proofs whose premises are given M-relative truthmakers; and show how these can be systematically transformed into a truthmaker for the proof’s conclusion.

scholarly journals Truthmaker semantics for natural language: Attitude verbs, modals, and intensional transitive verbs

2020 ◽  
Vol 46 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 159-200
Author(s):  
Friederike Moltmann
Keyword(s):  
Natural Language ◽  
Possible Worlds ◽  
Possible Worlds Semantics ◽  
Object Based ◽  
Attitude Reports ◽  
Transitive Verbs ◽  
Language Attitude ◽  
Attitude Verbs ◽  
Truthmaker Semantics ◽  
Further Development

Abstract This paper gives an outline of truthmaker semantics for natural language against the background of standard possible-worlds semantics. It develops a truthmaker semantics for attitude reports and deontic modals based on an ontology of attitudinal and modal objects and on a semantic function of clauses as predicates of such objects. The semantics is applied to factive verbs and response-stance verbs as well as to cases of modal concord. The paper also presents new motivations for ‘object-based truthmaker semantics’ from intensional transitive verbs such as need, look for, own, and buy and gives an outline of their semantics based on a further development of truthmaker semantics.

Exact Truthmakers, Modality, and Essence

2020 ◽  
pp. 124-140
Author(s):  
Bob Hale
Keyword(s):  
Special Interest ◽  
Truthmaker Semantics ◽  
The Right ◽  
In Virtue Of

Non-reductive essentialist explanations of necessities and possibilities in general locate their source in a special, basic or fundamental kind of necessities—those directly arising from the essences of things. All remaining necessities and possibilities can be seen as grounded, more or less indirectly, in these basic necessities. If this idea is on the right lines, it ought to be possible to distinguish clearly between those necessities which are directly grounded in the natures of things, and those which are indirectly so grounded. Special interest is shown in this question, treated within the framework of Fine’s version of truthmaker semantics. We might expect that within this framework, it would be possible to capture the distinction between what is directly true in virtue of essence, and what is only indirectly true.

What Makes True Universal Statements True?

2020 ◽  
pp. 104-123
Author(s):  
Bob Hale
Keyword(s):  
Alternative Account ◽  
Standard Account ◽  
Kit Fine ◽  
Truthmaker Semantics

What makes true universal statements true? For example, what makes the statement that all aardvarks are insectivorous true? In addressing this question, this chapter focuses especially on how it is to be answered within the framework of what Kit Fine calls exact truthmaker semantics. The main aim is to promote an alternative account of the truthmakers for quantified propositions. This chapter also gives some attention to two closely-related questions: first, when, and why, we should favour an alternative to the standard account, and second, whether the alternative account proposed can be accommodated within the framework of exact truthmaker semantics, in Fine’s sense.

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