Truthmakers and Consequence

Author(s):  
Neil Tennant

We compare Tarski’s notion of logical consequence (preservation of truth) with that of Prawitz (transformability of warrants for assertion). The latter is our point of departure for a definition of consequence in terms of the transformability of truthmakers (verifications) relative to all models. A sentence’s Tarskian truth-in-M coincides with its having an M-relative truthmaker. An M-relative truthmaker serves as a winning strategy or game plan for player T in the ‘material game’ played on that sentence against the background of the model M. We enter conjectures about soundness and completeness of Classical Core Logic with respect to the notion of consequence that results when the domain is required to be decidable. We consider whether the truthmaker semantics threatens a slide to realism. We work with examples of core proofs whose premises are given M-relative truthmakers; and show how these can be systematically transformed into a truthmaker for the proof’s conclusion.

Author(s):  
Katarzyna Czeczot

The article deals with the love of Zygmunt Krasiński to Delfina Potocka. The point of departure is the poet's definition of love as looking and reads Krasiński's relationship with his beloved in the context of two phenomena that fascinated him at the time: daguerreotype and magnetism. The invention of the daguerreotype in which the history of photography and spiritism comes together becomes a pretext for the formulation of a new concept of love and the loving subject. In the era of painting the woman was treated as a passive object of the male gaze; photography reverses this scheme of power. Love ceases to be a static relationship of the subject in love and the passive object – the beloved. The philosophy of developing photographs (and invoking phantoms) allows Krasiński - the writing subject to become like a light-sensitive material that reveals the image of the beloved.


2020 ◽  
Vol 37 (1) ◽  
pp. 138-158
Author(s):  
James A. Harris

AbstractMy point of departure in this essay is Smith’s definition of government. “Civil government,” he writes, “so far as it is instituted for the security of property, is in reality instituted for the defence of the rich against the poor, or of those who have some property against those who have none at all.” First I unpack Smith’s definition of government as the protection of the rich against the poor. I argue that, on Smith’s view, this is always part of what government is for. I then turn to the question of what, according to Smith, our governors can do to protect the wealth of the rich from the resentment of the poor. I consider, and reject, the idea that Smith might conceive of education as a means of alleviating the resentment of the poor at their poverty. I then describe how, in his lectures on jurisprudence, Smith refines and develops Hume’s taxonomy of the opinions upon which all government rests. The sense of allegiance to government, according to Smith, is shaped by instinctive deference to natural forms of authority as well as by rational, Whiggish considerations of utility. I argue that it is the principle of authority that provides the feelings of loyalty upon which government chiefly rests. It follows, I suggest, that to the extent that Smith looked to government to protect the property of the rich against the poor, and thereby to maintain the peace and stability of society at large, he cannot have sought to lessen the hold on ordinary people of natural sentiments of deference. In addition, I consider the implications of Smith’s theory of government for the question of his general attitude toward poverty. I argue against the view that Smith has recognizably “liberal,” progressive views of how the poor should be treated. Instead, I locate Smith in the political culture of the Whiggism of his day.


Author(s):  
Anne Knudsen

Anne Knudsen: The Century of Zoophilia Taking as her point of departure the protests against a dying child having his last wish fulfilled because his wish was to kill a bear, the author argues that animals have achieved a higher moral status than that of humans during the 20th century. The status of animals (and of “nature”) is seen as a consequence of their muteness which on the one hånd makes it impossible for animals to lie, and which on the other hånd allows humans to imagine what animals would say, if they spoke. The development toward zoophilia is explained as a a logical consequence of the cultural naturalisation of humans, and the author draws the conclusion that we may end up entirely without animals as a category. This hypothetical situation will lead to juridical as well as philosophical complications.


Author(s):  
Mark Colyvan ◽  
Kenny Easwaran

There is general agreement in mathematics about what continuity is. In this paper we examine how well the mathematical definition lines up with common sense notions. We use a recent paper by Hud Hudson as a point of departure. Hudson argues that two objects moving continuously can coincide for all but the last moment of their histories and yet be separated in space at the end of this last moment. It turns out that Hudson’s construction does not deliver mathematically continuous motion, but the natural question then is whether there is any merit in the alternative definition of continuity that he implicitly invokes.


Author(s):  
Hussein Ali Abdulsater

This chapter investigates the position of human beings in this theological system. Its point of departure is a definition of the human being, from which it develops an understanding of human agency in relation to God and the world. Divine assistance (luṭf) is highlighted as the bridge between human autonomy and divine sovereignty. Following is an elaborate description of religious experience: its origins, justification, relevant parties, responsibilities and characteristics. The concept of moral obligation (taklīf) is shown to be the cornerstone of Murtaḍā’s theory on religion. The chapter is divided into three sub-headings: The Human Being; Justification of Moral Obligation; Characteristics of Moral Obligation.


2020 ◽  
Vol 57 (2) ◽  
pp. 79-95
Author(s):  
Elena G. Dragalina-Chernaya ◽  

According to Alfred Tarski’s classical definition, logical consequence is necessary and formal. This paper focuses on the question: In what sense (if any) is material consequence a logical relation? For Tarski, material consequence has no modal force. Treating all terms (of a language with a fixed domain) as logical, he reduces logical consequence to material consequence. Thus, Tarskian material consequence seems to be a logical oxymoron designed to emphasize the importance of the distinction between logical and extra-logical terms for the definition of logical consequence. Historically, however, there have been different approaches to material consequences. This paper attempts to provide an investigation into the parallels between Tarski’s dichotomy of formal and material consequence and the modern


2019 ◽  
Vol 45 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hannelie Du Preez ◽  
Werner De Klerk

Orientation: When researchers’ understanding and application of ‘conceptualisation’ can allude to nearly anything, it loses its philosophical purpose and stature. Negating the philosophical meaning of the term ‘conceptualisation’, because it appears obvious, will result in research inquiries becoming ambiguous and ideologically diminished. Paradigms and theoretical frameworks are rooted in philosophical principles, yet researchers often ‘conceptualise’ and conduct inquiries without understanding the foundation of their applied scientific methods.Research purpose: The historicity of psychological measurement development depicts a fusion of transdisciplinary knowledge systems and the stature of scientific methods is comprehensive. Yet the philosophical lenses through which researchers ‘conceptualise’ their measure to understand psychological behaviour are not as clear.Motivation for the study: Contemporary psychometric literature postulates the ‘conceptualisation phase’ as a mere point of departure to develop a psychological measure, whereas philosophical literature depicts ‘conceptualisation’ as the mainstay of any research inquiry.Research approach/design and method: A qualitative design was used with the conceptual analysis of terminology as approach. Textual or typographical psychometric and psychological literature was purposively sampled and inductively and deductively analysed, using the philosophical framework of Van der Walt and Potgieter.Main findings: The definition of the ‘conceptualisation phase’ is principally characterised as the scientific method to measure the scientific reality, while the integral human component, represented by the measure developer, is overlooked.Practical/managerial implications: Insights derived can enthuse future dialogues on the purpose and importance of the conceptualisation phase in the development of psychological measures.Contribution/value-add: A potential delineation of what the ‘conceptualisation phase’ should encapsulate is proposed.


2015 ◽  
Vol 49 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Jakobus M. Vorster

In die huweliksetiek van die postmoderne era pleit verskeie christelike teoloë vir ’n eietydse inkleding van die huwelikskonsep. As beginpunt word die standpunt oorweeg dat daar nie sprake van ’n sogenaamde ‘bybelse huwelik’ kan wees nie omdat die huwelik as instelling ’n sosiale konstruk is wat kultureel en tradisioneel bepaal word. So kan alternatiewe saamblyverhoudings deur christene in die huidige postmoderne era as geldig aanvaar word. Na die bespreking van sommige van die outeurs wat hierdie mening huldig se standpunte, pleit hierdie artikel vir die siening dat die huwelik verbondsgegewe en ’n instelling van God is. As sodanig is dit ’n instelling waar man, vrou en God verbind word in ’n interdimensionele spirituele verhouding wat uitstyg bo die patriargalisme en androsentrisme wat tradisioneelaan ’n christelike huwelik toegeskryf is. Deur te let op die skeppingsaard van die huwelik (imago dei en verbond) en die christologiese en pneumatologiese perspektief op hierdie instelling, word betoog dat dit nie maar net ’n sosiale konstruk is nie, maar dat dit ’n goddelike instelling is wat deur hoër beginsels, ontgin uit bybelse openbaring, ingerig behoort te word. As kerke die gedagte van die huwelik as ’n verbondsgegewe bedien, kan hulle bydra tot die vestiging van huwelike wat deur menswaardigheid, liefde, getrouheid en die ontwikkeling van die geestesgawes van man sowel as vrou gekenmerk word.The Christian marriage – a social construct or a covenantal relation. In the postmodern ethics of marriage several christian theologians plead for a contemporary definition of the concept of marriage. They choose as a point of departure that the concept biblical marriage cannot be accepted as valid, because marriage is a social construct determined only by tradition and culture. Alternative forms of cohabitation should also be accepted by christians as valid in the contemporary postmodern environment. Following a discussion of the works of some of these authors who hold this opinion, this article attempts to make a case for the view that marriage should regarded as an institution of God and a covenantal reality, where husband, wife and God are bonded in an interdimensional relationship that overarches the patriarchalism and androcentrism that is usually ascribed to a christian marriage. By paying attention to the creational character of marriage (imago dei and covenant) and the christological and pneumatological perspectives on this institution, the article argues that marriage cannot be seen merely as a social construct, but that it is a divine institution that should be constructed according to the higher moral principles derived from the unfolding biblical revelation. If churches minister the idea of marriage as a covenantal relation, they can contribute to the establishment of christian marriages qualified by human dignity, love, faithfulness and the development of the spiritual gifts of both husband and wife.


2006 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-42 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ignacio Jané

AbstractIn 1936 Tarski sketched a rigorous definition of the concept of logical consequence which, he claimed, agreed quite well with common usage—or, as he also said, with the common concept of consequence. Commentators of Tarski's paper have usually been elusive as to what this common concept is. However, being clear on this issue is important to decide whether Tarski's definition failed (as Etchemendy has contended) or succeeded (as most commentators maintain). I argue that the common concept of consequence that Tarski tried to characterize is not some general, all-purpose notion of consequence, but a rather precise one, namely the concept of consequence at play in axiomatics. I identify this concept and show that Tarski's definition is fully adequate to it.


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