Exact Truthmakers, Modality, and Essence

2020 ◽  
pp. 124-140
Author(s):  
Bob Hale
Keyword(s):  
Special Interest ◽  
Truthmaker Semantics ◽  
The Right ◽  
In Virtue Of

Non-reductive essentialist explanations of necessities and possibilities in general locate their source in a special, basic or fundamental kind of necessities—those directly arising from the essences of things. All remaining necessities and possibilities can be seen as grounded, more or less indirectly, in these basic necessities. If this idea is on the right lines, it ought to be possible to distinguish clearly between those necessities which are directly grounded in the natures of things, and those which are indirectly so grounded. Special interest is shown in this question, treated within the framework of Fine’s version of truthmaker semantics. We might expect that within this framework, it would be possible to capture the distinction between what is directly true in virtue of essence, and what is only indirectly true.

Kantian Perspectives on Private Law

2020 ◽  
pp. 68-84
Author(s):  
Arthur Ripstein
Keyword(s):  
Immanuel Kant ◽  
Natural Law ◽  
Private Law ◽  
Legal Institutions ◽  
Naive Theory ◽  
Private Rights ◽  
Kantian View ◽  
Moral Structure ◽  
The Right ◽  
In Virtue Of

This chapter articulates the Kantian approach to private law. It begins by explaining the aims and ambitions of Kantian legal philosophy more generally and, in particular, introducing the Kantian idea that a particular form of thought is appropriate to a particular domain of inquiry or conduct. The chapter situates the Kantian view within a broad natural law tradition. For the part of that tradition that Immanuel Kant develops, the moral structure of natural law is animated by a conception of personal interaction that is so familiar as to be almost invisible. Despite its centrality to both morality and law, in the absence of legal institutions, this natural law is inadequate to its own principles. It requires legal institutions to render it fully determinate in its application consistent with everyone’s independence. It also requires public institutions of adjudication. The chapter further looks at Kant’s “division” of private rights, distinguishing first between the innate right that everyone has simply in virtue of being human and acquired rights that require an affirmative act to establish them. It then goes through the Kantian division of the titles of private right, situating them in relation to the distinction between persons and things. Finally, the chapter articulates the Kantian account of what might be called the naïve theory of remedies—that is, that the remedy is an imperfect continuation of the right that was violated.

scholarly journals The Charters of Ivan IV (the Terrible) to the Hilandar and Rila monasteries

2020 ◽  
pp. 106-110
Author(s):  
Anastasia S. Dobychina ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Special Interest ◽  
17Th Century ◽  
Russian Territory ◽  
The Right ◽  
Over Time

The paper examines letters patent and edict charters granted by the Russian Tsar Ivan IV (the Terrible) to the Serbian Hilandar community of monks at Athos and Rila monastery in Bulgaria. The majority of the sources were lost over time and they are available only in copies from the so-called Ambassadorial book of 1517–71 or in copies from the 17th century. The letters patent of Ivan IV (original and the so-called “word-for-word copy”) to Hilandar monastery are unique. They confirm its right to have its own metochion in Kitai-gorod near the Kremlin. The edict charters to the community of monks are of special interest, as they allowed the right of tax-free and unchecked passage through Russian territory together with the privilege of collecting donations.

Why Means MatterLegally Relevant Differences Between Direct and Indirect Interventions into Other Minds

2020 ◽  
pp. 49-88
Author(s):  
Jan Christoph Bublitz
Keyword(s):  
Legal Regulation ◽  
Prima Facie ◽  
Other Minds ◽  
Causal Pathways ◽  
The Law ◽  
The Right ◽  
And Control ◽  
In Virtue Of ◽  
The Brain

Whether there are intrinsic differences between different means to intervene into brains and minds is a key question of neuroethics, which any future legal regulation of mind-interventions has to face. This chapter affirms such differences by a twofold argument:. First, it present differences between direct (biological, physiological) and indirect (psychological) interventions that are not based on crude mind–brain dualisms or dubious properties such as naturalness of interventions. Second, it shows why these differences (should) matter for the law. In a nutshell, this chapter suggests that indirect interventions should be understood as stimuli that persons perceive through their external senses whereas direct interventions reach brains and minds on different, nonperceptual routes. Interventions primarily differ in virtue of their causal pathways. Because of them, persons have different kinds and amounts of control over interventions; direct interventions regularly bypass resistance and control of recipients. Direct interventions also differ from indirect ones because they misappropriate mechanisms of the brain. These differences bear normative relevance in light of the right to mental self-determination, which should be the guiding normative principle with respect to mind-interventions. As a consequence, the law should adopt by and large a normative—not ontological—dualism between interventions into other minds: nonconsensual direct interventions into other minds should be prohibited by law, with few exceptions. By contrast, indirect interventions should be prima facie permissible, primarily those that qualify as exercises of free speech. The chapter also addresses a range of recent objections, especially by Levy (in the previous chapter).

Applying the VPI and the 16PF in a Case of Mismatched Occupations

1998 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 8-11
Author(s):  
Rachel Abramson
Keyword(s):  
Special Interest ◽  
Career Counselling ◽  
Background Information ◽  
Personality Factor ◽  
Occupational Interests ◽  
Personality Factor Questionnaire ◽  
The One ◽  
The Right ◽  
Vocational Preference

Career counsellors have long known that occupational interests are often linked with abilities. We also know that if one has the ability, but not the interest, that ability will not be used. What happens, however, when one has an interest but not the right temperament or personality? I recently had the pleasure of seeing someone for career counselling who fell in this latter category. This individual (let us call her Ms S) came to my rooms with one burning question on her lips: “What's wrong with me? Why can't I keep a job? I was in my past job for 4 weeks and the one before that for 3 weeks. How do I hang on to a job?” Ms S had a secretarial background. She had been fired from her previous positions and was concerned whether she had the capacity to continue working in this field or whether she had somehow become too slow. After obtaining some background information, I asked Ms S to complete a battery of career counselling tests. Of special interest to this case was the results from both the Vocational Preference Indicator (VPI) and the 16 Personality Factor Questionnaire (16PF), which I shall discuss below.

“The Mute Who Can Sing”: a cortical stimulation study on singing

2009 ◽  
Vol 110 (2) ◽  
pp. 282-288 ◽  
Author(s):  
Franck-Emmanuel Roux ◽  
Stefano Borsa ◽  
Jean-François Démonet
Keyword(s):  
Brain Tumors ◽  
Special Interest ◽  
Clear Distinction ◽  
Awake Surgery ◽  
Cortical Mapping ◽  
Cortical Areas ◽  
Left Handed ◽  
Surgical Data ◽  
The Right ◽  
Language Areas

Object In an attempt to identify cortical areas involved in singing in addition to language areas, the authors used a singing task during direct cortical mapping in 5 patients who were amateur singers and had undergone surgery for brain tumors. The organization of the cortical areas involved in language and singing was analyzed in relation with these surgical data. Methods One left-handed and 4 right-handed patients with brain tumors in left (2 cases) and right (3 cases) hemispheres and no significant language or singing deficits underwent surgery with the “awake surgery” technique. All patients had a special interest in singing and were involved in amateur singing activities. They were tested using naming, reading, and singing tasks. Results Outside primary sensorimotor areas, singing interferences were rare and were exclusively localized in small cortical areas (< 1 cm2). A clear distinction was found between speech and singing in the Broca region. In the Broca region, no singing interference was found in areas in which interference in naming and reading tasks were detected. Conversely, a specific singing interference was found in nondominant middle frontal gyri in one patient. This interference consisted of abrupt singing arrest without apparent face, mouth, and tongue contraction. Finally, nonspecific singing interferences were found in the right and left precentral gyri in all patients (probably by interference in final articulatory mechanisms of singing). Conclusions Dissociations between speech and singing found outside primary sensorimotor areas showed that these 2 functions use, in some cortical stages, different cerebral pathways.

The Nature of Ususfructus

1946 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 159-170
Author(s):  
Kopel Kagan
Keyword(s):  
Great Difficulty ◽  
Roman Law ◽  
Present Position ◽  
Modern Times ◽  
The Subject ◽  
The One ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
The Right ◽  
Opening Statements ◽  
In Virtue Of

No satisfactory definition of Dominium in Roman Law has yet been achieved. Amongst English writers Austin many years ago found great difficulty in this question while in modern times Professor Buckland has written ‘it is thus difficult to define Dominium precisely.’ Again, Poste, dealing with Gaius' discussion of dominium, says that his opening statements are ‘deplorably confused.’ These examples are enough to indicate the condition, of uncertainty which prevails. In my submission this uncertainty exists mainly because the conception of ususfructus has never yet been explained adequately. Of Possessio it has been said ‘the definition of Possessio to give the results outlined is a matter of great difficulty. No perfectly correct solution may be possible,’ and this statement is generally accepted as a correct assessment of the present position in juristic literature. But here, too, in my opinion, the reason is again connected with usufruct, for the possessio of the usufructuary has not yet been adequately determined. Gaius (2.93) tells us ‘usufructuarius vero usucapere non potest; primuum quod non possidet, sed habet ius utendi et fruendi.’ Ulpian holds that he had possessio in fact (‘Naturaliter videtur possidere is qui usum fructum habet’ D.41.2.12). On this subject Roby says ‘the fructuary was not strictly a possessor and therefore if he was deprived from enjoying he had not a claim to the original interdict de vi but in virtue of his quasi-possessio a special interdict was granted him.’ Austin saw difficulty in the whole problem of possessio. He wrote ‘by Savigny in his treatise on possessio it is remarked that the possessio of a right of usufruct … resembles the possessio of a thing, by the proprietor, or by an adverse possessor exercising rights of property over the thing. And that a disturbance of the one possession resembles the disturbance of the other. Now this must happen for the reason I have already stated:—namely, that the right of usufruct or user, like that of property, is indefinite in point of user. For what is possession (meaning legal possession not mere physical handling of the subject) but the exercise of a right ?’

Difficult decisions: Choosing a practice

2017 ◽  
Vol 10 (8) ◽  
pp. 448-451
Author(s):  
Kathryn Harrison
Keyword(s):  
Professional Development ◽  
Clinical Practice ◽  
Special Interest ◽  
Clinical Skills ◽  
Academic Research ◽  
The Other ◽  
Skills Assessment ◽  
Clinical Skills Assessment ◽  
Overseas Teaching ◽  
The Right

With the Clinical Skills Assessment successfully completed, focus shifts to the completion of training and starting work as an independent GP; it is both an exciting and unnerving time. The myriad of opportunities open to newly qualified GPs is one of the specialty’s strengths, offering scope for personal and professional development. Opportunities can be diverse and include working overseas, teaching, developing a special interest, pursuing academic research, media roles, working with the RCGP, and many more. Most of these roles can be undertaken alongside clinical practice as part of a portfolio career, each complementing and enhancing the other. Whether pursuing wider opportunities, or gaining more experience in clinical practice, choosing the right practice with like-minded colleagues in the early stages of your career can be a difficult, daunting prospect. This article aims to offer guidance for those searching for the right practice.

scholarly journals Rational Requirements and the Primacy of Pressure

Mind ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 129 (516) ◽  
pp. 1033-1070 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Fogal
Keyword(s):  
Mental States ◽  
Alternative Account ◽  
Standard View ◽  
Rational Requirements ◽  
Substantive Rationality ◽  
Structural Relations ◽  
Distinct Kind ◽  
The Right ◽  
In Virtue Of ◽  
Rational Evaluation

Abstract There are at least two threads in our thought and talk about rationality, both practical and theoretical. In one sense, to be rational is to respond correctly to the reasons one has. Call this substantive rationality. In another sense, to be rational is to be coherent, or to have the right structural relations hold between one's attitudinal mental states, independently of whether those states are justified. Call this structural rationality. According to the standard view, structural rationality is associated with a distinctive set of requirements that mandate or prohibit certain combinations of attitudes, and it's in virtue of violating these requirements that incoherent agents are irrational. I think the standard view is mistaken. The goal of this paper is to explain why, and to motivate an alternative account: rather than corresponding to a set of law-like requirements, structural rationality should be seen as corresponding to a distinctive kind of pro tanto rational pressure—that is, something that comes in degrees, having both magnitude and direction. Something similar is standardly assumed to be true of substantive rationality. On the resulting picture, each dimension of rational evaluation is associated with a distinct kind of rational pressure—substantive rationality with (what I call) justificatory pressure and structural rationality with attitudinal pressure. The former is generated by one's reasons while the latter is generated by one's attitudes. Requirements turn out to be at best a footnote in the theory of rationality.

‘The Government Should Be Ashamed’: On the Possibility of Organisations’ Emotional Duties

2017 ◽  
Vol 66 (4) ◽  
pp. 813-829 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephanie Collins
Keyword(s):  
Public Policy ◽  
International Politics ◽  
Electoral Politics ◽  
Moral Value ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Right ◽  
Functional Components ◽  
In Virtue Of

When we say that ‘the government should be ashamed’, can we be taken literally? I argue that we can: organisations have duties over their emotions. Emotions have both functional and felt components. Often, emotions’ moral value derives from their functional components: from what they cause and what causes them. In these cases, organisations can have emotional duties in the same way that they can have duties to act. However, emotions’ value partly derives from their felt components. Organisations lack feelings, but can have duties to increase the likelihood that their members have relevant emotions (with the right felt components), in virtue of and in accordance with their role in the organisation. To systematise these conclusions, I provide a taxonomy of organisations’ – and individuals’ organisationally situated – emotional duties. This taxonomy will enable scholars of electoral politics, international politics and public policy to systematically integrate emotions into the study of organisations.

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