Disagreement lost
AbstractThis paper develops a puzzle about non-merely-verbal disputes. At first sight, it would seem that a dispute over the truth of an utterance is not merely verbal only if there is a proposition that the parties to the dispute take the utterance under dispute to express, which one of the parties accepts and the other rejects. Yet, as I argue, it is extremely rare for ordinary disputes over an utterance’s truth to satisfy this condition, in which case non-merely verbal disputes are extremely rare. After examining various responses to the puzzle, I outline a solution using the framework of truthmaker semantics.
1988 ◽
Vol 62
(03)
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pp. 411-419
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1967 ◽
Vol 28
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pp. 207-244
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1967 ◽
Vol 28
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pp. 177-206
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1999 ◽
Vol 173
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pp. 249-254
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1976 ◽
Vol 32
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pp. 577-588
1971 ◽
Vol 29
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pp. 244-245
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