If Psychology Refuses to Police Itself, Then It May Be the Courts That Force an Overhaul of Clinical Psychology

2010 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 99-110
Author(s):  
David B. Stein ◽  
Robert Foltz
Keyword(s):  
Clinical Psychology ◽  
Treatment Efficacy ◽  
Strong Influence ◽  
Psychological Tests ◽  
Federal Courts ◽  
State Courts ◽  
Poor Treatment ◽  
The Mind ◽  
Junk Science ◽  
Psychological Testimony

From its inception, psychology has sought recognition as a science, but, unfortunately, this is not happening, especially in the clinical arena. It is all too often referred to as “junk science.” Eloquent arguments are constantly made defending psychology as different because it is dealing with unknowns, such as the mind and the soul. However, the fact remains that psychology is not progressing well, with extremely poor treatment efficacy rates and with its tenacious clinging to psychological tests that are repeatedly shown to be unreliable and invalid. Thus, psychology is not policing itself. However, change and reformation may be forced on it because the federal courts and 33 state courts have based new laws for more rigorous standards for trial testimony, and it appears that the new laws are aimed at cleansing the courts of “junk science,” namely, psychological testimony. This article reviews the changes that thus far few psychologists, lawyers, or even judges know about. However, slowly the new laws will permeate the courts and perhaps exert a strong influence for psychology to adapt.

Clinical Psychology in Court: House of Junk Science?

1998 ◽  
Vol 43 (5) ◽  
pp. 321-324 ◽  
Author(s):  
Saul M. Kassin
Keyword(s):  
Clinical Psychology ◽  
Junk Science

From Rogers to Rivers: The Rights of the Mentally Ill to Refuse Medication

1987 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 7-52
Author(s):  
Ellen Wright Clayton
Keyword(s):  
Mental Illness ◽  
Psychotropic Drugs ◽  
Mentally Ill ◽  
United States Supreme Court ◽  
Federal Courts ◽  
State Courts ◽  
Court Decisions ◽  
Marked Contrast ◽  
Patients Rights ◽  
Treatment Refusals

AbstractMany individuals with mental illness wish to avoid psychotropic drugs, a type of treatment that may relieve their symptoms only at the risk of unpleasant, even permanent, side effects. In marked contrast to the widely-held view that most patients may refuse any treatment and that even patients with mental illness may reject other psychoactive interventions such as electroconvulsive therapy and psychosurgery, the courts and legislatures have been slow to recognize any right to refuse psychotropic drugs. This Article demonstrates that many of the justifications offered for forcing patients to take unwanted medications are inadequate and that unless treatment refusals are reviewed outside mental institutions, patients’ rights will rarely receive appropriate deference. The author analyzes the federal and state litigation to determine whether the courts have fashioned meaningful relief for the mentally ill. The Article concludes that two recent United States Supreme Court decisions have made it impossible for the federal courts to provide adequate protection. By contrast, several state courts have responded to the needs and rights of patients with mental illness.

scholarly journals Debunking Millar v. Taylor: The History of the Prohibition of Legislative History

2018 ◽  
Vol 41 (1) ◽  
pp. 32-58
Author(s):  
John J Magyar
Keyword(s):  
The United States ◽  
Federal Courts ◽  
State Courts ◽  
Careful Examination ◽  
House Of Commons ◽  
Legislative History ◽  
Secondary Literature ◽  
The Us ◽  
History Of ◽  
The 19Th Century

Abstract The generally accepted belief about the rule prohibiting recourse to legislative history as an aid to statutory interpretation is that it began in the case of Millar v.Taylor in 1769, and it was followed thereafter in England and throughout the United States through to the 20th century. However, all four judges on the panel in Millar v.Taylor considered evidence from the Journal of the House of Commons and changes made to the relevant bill in their opinions. Meanwhile, the case was widely cited for several substantive and procedural matters throughout the 19th century, but it was not cited by a judge as a precedent for the rule against legislative history until 1887. A careful examination of the relevant cases and secondary literature from the 18th and 19th centuries reveals a much more nuanced and complex history to the rule. Its emergence becomes less clear because it is shrouded in judicial silence. Its beginnings must be inferred from a general and often unarticulated principle that lawyers felt free to disregard. Furthermore, the development, refinement, and decline of the rule followed a different timeline in England, the US federal courts and the state courts.

United States Supreme Court Rules on Expert Testimony

PEDIATRICS ◽  
1995 ◽  
Vol 95 (6) ◽  
pp. 934-936 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gary N. McAbee
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Expert Testimony ◽  
Scientific Evidence ◽  
United States Supreme Court ◽  
The United States ◽  
Federal Courts ◽  
State Courts ◽  
Expert Witnesses ◽  
Us Supreme Court

Many medical and legal commentators have expressed concern about the validity of scientific evidence that is proffered by expert witnesses at depositions and in courts of law.1,2 The sparse research that is available on the testimony of medical expert witnesses suggests that it is frequently flawed and erroneous.3 On June 28, 1993, the United States (US) Supreme Court ruled on the proper standard for admissibility of scientific evidence in the courtroom.4 Although the ruling establishes guidelines that are binding only in federal courts, it is expected that many state courts will follow the Court's ruling. This commentary reviews the Court's guidelines for admissibility of expert testimony, and expresses concern about their applicability in future cases involving scientific testimony.

How Courts Structure State-Level Representation

2018 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 27-60 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonathan P. Kastellec
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Public Opinion ◽  
Median Voter ◽  
State Level ◽  
The United States ◽  
Federal Courts ◽  
State Courts ◽  
Judicial Decisions ◽  
Structure State ◽  
The Relationship

I examine how courts condition the relationship between state-level public opinion and policy. The system of federalism in the United States allows federal and state courts to establish the types of policies that states are constitutionally allowed to implement. In particular, federal courts can set “federal floors” for policy, below which no states can go. State courts, in turn, can raise the level of this floor. Thus, both federal and state courts shape whether state policy can match the preferences of the median voter in a given state. Analyzing data on public opinion, judicial decisions, and state-level policy on the issue of abortion, from 1973 to 2012, I show that changes in the set of allowable abortion restrictions, according to the combined decisions of state and federal courts, significantly affect whether states implement majority-preferred policies. I also show that ignoring the influence of courts on the policymaking environment significantly affects the estimated level of policy congruence and thus conclusions about the scope of representation. These results demonstrate the importance of placing courts in the larger study of state-level representation.

Pendent Jurisdiction in Australia—Section 32 of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976

1979 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 211-237 ◽  
Author(s):  
W. M. C. Gummow
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Federal Court ◽  
The United States ◽  
Federal Courts ◽  
State Courts ◽  
Statutory Law ◽  
The Future

The Federal Court of Australia has only the jurisdiction conferred on it by statute. However, many disputes falling within that jurisdiction, particularly in trade practices matters, will also involve elements of common law or other State or federal statutory law. Section 32 invests in the Federal Court additional jurisdiction in some such cases in respect of “associated matters”. This may be compared with “pendent jurisdiction” developed by the federal courts in the United States. The object of this article is to analyse the meaning of the term “associated matters” and to consider the bearing it has upon the future relationship between the Federal Court and the various State courts.

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