From 1953 to 1955, The Mutual Security Program of Eisenhower Administration and the Resumption of Peacetime Military Assistance in Korea

2020 ◽  
Vol 74 ◽  
pp. 37-71
Author(s):  
Dongwon Lee
Author(s):  
Tom Scott

Verdicts on the Swiss War now agree that it was a local conflict which spun out of control. In its aftermath the Confederation reached its final composition, with the admission of Basel and Schaffhausen as full members in 1501 and Appenzell in 1513. Were existing treaties to apply to the new members? Yet the status of Konstanz was still not resolved. Only when Konstanz was stripped of its effective independence in 1510 was Maximilian prepared to sign the Hereditary Agreement with the Swiss the following year. While continuing the provisions of the Perpetual Accord of 1474, the agreement forswore any military assistance, but contained a non-aggression clause and a prohibition on accepting each other’s subjects into a protective alliance (Burgrecht).


Author(s):  
Bipin K. Tiwary ◽  
Anubhav Roy

Having fought its third war and staring at food shortages, independent India needed to get its act together both militarily and economically by the mid-1960s. With the United States revoking its military assistance and delaying its food aid despite New Delhi’s devaluation of the rupee, India’s newly elected Indira Gandhi government turned to deepen its ties with the Soviet Union in 1966 with the aim of balancing the United States internally through a rearmament campaign and externally through a formal alliance with Moscow. The US formation of a triumvirate with Pakistan and China in India’s neighbourhood only bolstered its intent. Yet India consciously limited the extent of both its balancing strategies and allowed adequate space to simultaneously adopt the contradictory sustenance of its complex interdependence with the United States economically. Did this contrasting choice of strategies constitute India’s recourse to hedging after 1966 until 1971, when it liberated Bangladesh by militarily defeating a US-aligned Pakistan? Utilising a historical-evaluative study of archival data and the contents of a few Bollywood films from the period, this paper seeks to address the question by empirically establishing the extents of India’s balancing of, and complex interdependence with, the United States.


1985 ◽  
Vol 51 (4) ◽  
pp. 655
Author(s):  
James C. Duram ◽  
Robert Frederick Burk

1972 ◽  
Vol 59 (2) ◽  
pp. 479
Author(s):  
Susan Hartmann ◽  
Robert L. Branyan ◽  
Lawrence H. Larsen

1971 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 165-187 ◽  
Author(s):  
Abel Jacob

DURING the late 1950S and early 19605, Israel mounted an active campaign of aid to Africa, which took three main forms: technical help in agriculture, joint commercial ventures, and military assistance. Of the three, the military and quasi-military programmes made the most considerable mark in Africa;1 they were also an important part of Israel's overall foreign policy, in an attempt to gain political influence through military aid, and thus to help overcome her isolation in the Middle East. Israel's military assistance to Africa illustrates several important aspects of foreign aid. This article deals mainly with the political motives of the donor country, and the various ways in which it may be concerned to influence the actions of the recipient government. Later, there is some discussion of the social and cultural barriers to the transfer of military and para-military organisations from one culture to another.


2005 ◽  
Vol 7 (3) ◽  
pp. 79-123 ◽  
Author(s):  
Steve Marsh

It has long been argued that the Eisenhower administration pursued a more assertive policy toward Iran than the Truman administration did.This interpretative consensus, though, has recently come under challenge.In the Journal of Cold War Studies in 1999, Francis Gavin argued that U.S.policy toward Iran in 1950–1953 became progressively more assertive in response to a gradual shift in the global U.S. -USSR balance of power.This article shares, and develops further, Gavin's revisionist theme of policy continuity, but it explains the continuity by showing that Truman and Eisenhower had the same principal objectives and made the same basic assumptions when devising policy. The more assertive policy was primarily the result of the failure of U.S. policy by early 1952. The Truman administration subsequently adopted a more forceful policy, which Eisenhower simply continued until all perceived options for saving Iran from Communism were foreclosed other than that of instigating a coup to bring about a more pliable government.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document