scholarly journals GAGASAN PENGADUAN KONSTITUSIONAL DAN PENERAPANNYA DALAM SISTEM KETATANEGARAAN INDONESIA

Yuridika ◽  
2011 ◽  
Vol 26 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Ari Asmono

Constitutional complaint has an important role in a democratic state of law. constitutional complaint serves as a mechanism for the protection of citizen’s constitutional rights are violated by the authorities. with protected constitutional rights of a citizen, then a democratic state of law will be realized very well.Keywords : constitutional complaint, citizen’s constitutional rights, constitutional court.

2019 ◽  
Vol 15 (4) ◽  
pp. 688
Author(s):  
Josua Satria Collins

Penyempurnaan sistem hukum dan konstitusi merupakan prasyarat untuk membangun negara demokrasi konstitusional di Indonesia. Dalam cabang kekuasan kehakiman, salah satu upaya untuk mencapai hal tersebut terkait dengan adanya gagasan pembentukan mekanisme pertanyaan konstitusional (constitusional question). Istilah constitutional question merujuk pada suatu mekanisme pengujian konstitusionalitas di Mahkamah Konstitusi yang diajukan oleh seorang hakim di pengadilan umum yang merasa ragu-ragu terhadap konstitusionalitas suatu undang-undang yang digunakan dalam perkara yang sedang ditanganinya. Artikel ini membahas mengenai kemungkinan dibangunnya mekanisme constitutional question di Indonesia dengan alternatif implementasinya. Metodologi yang digunakan dalam penelitian ini berupa yuridis normatif dengan pendekatan kualitatif dan menggunakan bahan kepustakaan. Dari hasil penelitian ini disimpulkan bahwa terdapat urgensi untuk menambahkan kewenangan constitutional question kepada Mahkamah Konstitusi. Dengan adanya mekanisme tersebut, putusan hakim di pengadilan umum yang dinilai bertentangan dengan konstitusi dan dianggap melanggar hak konstitusional warga negara dapat dihindari. Kemudian, objek dan ruang pengujian terhadap peraturan perundangundangan menjadi semakin luas dan pelanggaran hak konstitusional terhadap warga negara dapat dipulihkan. Apabila constitutional question akan diterapkan di Indonesia, maka dasar kewenangan constitutional question sebaiknya diatur melalui perubahan konstitusi. Namun, hal tersebut dapat juga dilakukan dengan merevisi Undang-Undang Mahkamah Konstitusi, penafsiran konstitusi yang dituangkan di dalam putusan Mahkamah Konstitusi, ataupun perluasan legal standing untuk lembaga pengadilan sebagai salah satu pemohon constitutional review. Selain itu, perlu juga diatur mengenai kualifikasi pemohon constitutional question dan pembatasan waktu penanganan perkaranya oleh Mahkamah Konstitusi.Improving the legal and constitutional system is a prerequisite for building a constitutional democratic state in Indonesia. In a constitutional adjudication system, one of the efforts to achieve that goal is related to an idea to establish a constitutional question mechanism. The term of constitutional question refers to a mechanism for examining the constitutionality of a law in the Constitutional Court lodged by an ordinary judge who has a doubt regarding the constitutionality of the law applied in the case that is being handled by him/her. This article discusses the possibility of establishing a constitutional question mechanism in Indonesia with its alternative implementations. The methodology used in this research was normative juridical writing with qualitative approach and library research. The research results found the urgency for expanding the authority of constitutional question to the Constitutional Court. With the existence of such mechanism, ordinary court decisions that are contrary to the constitution and violate the constitutional rights of the citizens can be avoided. Moreover, the scope of constitutional review of the legislation becomes expansive and constitutional rights violations can be recovered. If the constitutional question will be applied in Indonesia, the basis of the authority of constitutional question should be regulated through a constitutional amendment. However, it can be applied also by revising the Constitutional Court Law, the constitutional interpretation set forth in the Constitutional Court decision or the extension of legal standing for ordinary courts as one of the applicants for constitutional review. In addition, it is necessary to regulate the applicant’s qualification of constitutional question and time limitation for handling constitutional question cases by the Constitutional Court.


2003 ◽  
Vol 4 (3) ◽  
pp. 277-280 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elena Barnert ◽  
Natascha Doll

On January 15th 1958, the German Bundesverfassungsgericht (Federal Constitutional Court - FCC) pronounced a judgement deemed to be a prime example for the Court's early jurisprudence concerning the scope of fundamental rights in Germany: The Court's famous “Lüth”-decision resulted from a constitutional complaint brought by Erich Lüth, former member of the Hamburg senate.* In the early 1950s, Lüth had called upon film distributors and the public to boycott Veit Harlan's tearjerker movie Unsterbliche Geliebte (Immortal Beloved). Cause for his appeal was Harlan's prominent role in the Nazi propaganda machinery as Goebbels' protégé and director of the movie Jud Süss in 1940, which counts as one of the worst anti-semitic films released during the Nazi regime. After having lost several civil lawsuits, Lüth asserted the violation of constitutional rights. Over six years later, he was to be proved correct: The Federal Constitutional Court ruled that Lüth's complaint was covered by the right to freedom of speech guaranteed in Art. 5 of the German Basic Law (Grundgesetz). The Court stated that the fundamental rights as laid down in the Grundgesetz are not only of importance as subjective rights protecting the individual against state intrusions on the private sphere. As a whole they also unfold an objective dimension in representing society's crucial values. Therefore, they govern the entire legal order - including civil law and private law relations! This was indeed understood as a staggering conclusion with which the Court went far beyond the issue at stake. Since Lüth, German legal discourse characterizes this phenomenon as the third-party or horizontal effect of basic rights (Drittwirkung).


2021 ◽  
Vol 17 (4) ◽  
pp. 799
Author(s):  
Mohammad Mahrus Ali ◽  
Zaka Firma Aditya ◽  
Abdul Basid Fuadi

Sepuluh tahun yang lalu putusan Mahkamah Konstitusi Nomor 3/PUU-VIII/2010 telah menegaskan bahwa  bahwa pemberian hak pengusahaan perairan pesisir (HP3) oleh pemerintah kepada pihak swasta bertentangan dengan konstitusi, terutama dengan Pasal 33 ayat (4) UUD 1945. Pembentuk undang-undang kemudian merespon putusan tersebut dengan merevisi UU Nomor 27 Tahun 2007 menjadi Undang-Undang Nomor 1 Tahun 2014 tentang Perubahan Atas Undang-Undang Nomor 27 Tahun 2007 tentang Pengelolaan Wilayah Pesisir dan Pulau-Pulau Kecil. Revisi tersebut telah mengubah Rezim HP3 dari UU 27/2007 menjadi rezim perizinan dalam UU 1/2014. Sayangnya, perubahan tersebut justru menimbulkan berbagai persoalan mulai dari konflik antara undang-undang serta peraturan dibawah undang-undang yang pada akhirnya sangat berpotensi merugikan hak-hak konstitusional masyarakat pesisir pantai. Penelitian ini memfokuskan pada aspek yuridis maupun sosiologis terkait perlindungan hak-hak konstitusional masyarakat pesisir pantai setelah Putusan Mahkamah Konstitusi Nomor 3/PUU-VIII/2010. Penelitian ini secara mendalam membahas mengenai tindaklanjut putusan MK a quo oleh pembentuk undang-undang, pemerintah pusat hingga pemerintah daerah dan stakeholder serta pemenuhan hak-hak konstitusional masyarakat pesisir pantai. Penelitian ini merupakan penelitian hukum normatif dengan cara meneliti Putusan MK Nomor 3/PUU-VIII/2010. Pembahasan secara deskriptif digunakan untuk memahami politik hukum pengelolaan wilayah pesisir sebagai upaya memenuhi hak-hak konstitusional masyarakat pesisir pantai. Disamping itu, Pengelolaan wilayah pesisir secara terpadu yang merupakan proses yang dinamis, multidisiplin, dan berulang untuk mempromosikan pengelolaan kawasan pesisir yang berkelanjutan. Termasuk seluruh siklus pengumpulan informasi, perencanaan, pengambilan keputusan, manajemen dan pemantauan implementasi. Ten years ago, the Constitutional Court Decision Number 3/PUU-VIII/2010 confirmed that the granting of concession rights for coastal waters (after this: HP3) by the government to private parties was contrary against the constitution, especially Article 33 paragraph (4) of the 1945 Constitution. Legislators then respond to the decision to revise Law No. 27 of 2007 as Law No. 1 of 2014 on the Amendment of Law No. 27 of 2007 on the Management of Coastal Areas and Small Islands. The revision has changed the HP3 regime from Law 27/2007 to the licensing regime in Law 1/2014. Unfortunately, these changes would lead to various juridical problems ranging from conflict between the laws and regulations under legislation that ultimately is potentially detrimental to the constitutional rights of coastal communities. This research focuses on juridical and sociological aspects related to the coastal communities protection of constitutional rights after the Constitutional Court Decision Number 3/PUU-VIII/2010. This research in-depth discusses the follow-up of the Constitutional Court decision a quo by legislators, central government, local governments, stakeholders, and the fulfilment of the constitutional rights of coastal communities. This research is normative legal research by examining the Constitutional Court decision Number 3/PUU-VIII/2010. The descriptive discussion used to understand coastal zone management law's politics to fulfil the constitutional rights of coastal communities. Besides, integrated coastal zone management (Integrated Coastal Zone Management) is a dynamic process, multidisciplinary, and repeated to promote sustainable coastal areas' sustainable management. It includes the whole cycle of information collection, planning, decision-making, management, and implementation monitoring.


2016 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 604
Author(s):  
Faiq Tobroni

This paper has three key issues. The first issue discusses the arguments constructed by applicant of judicial review (JR) to assess the constitutional rights’ violations caused by the application of Article 2 (1) UUP. The second issue discusses on how the Constitutional Court (MK) seated position of state associated marital affairs in the rejection of JR. The third issue discusses model of freedom of ijtihad (legal thought) on interfaith marriage as the impact of MK’s Decision. Based on    the discussion, regarding to the first issue, the applicant of JR assess the application of Article 2 (1) UUP has legitimized the state as the sole interpreters of religious teachings for a requirement validity of the marriage. According to the applicant,  the role is used by the state (The Office for Religious Affairs/KUA) to not accept interfaith marriage. This refusal led to the violation of some other constitutional rights. Furthermore, as the findings of the second issue, MK’s decision has placed   the real position of state not as interpreters of religious teachings, but merely to accommodate the results of religious scholars’s ijtihad regarding marriage into the state law. Thus, it is not true that the state has violated the constitutional right to more intervene the religious life of citizens. Last findings as the third issue, MK’s decision has affected the model of ijtihad freedom on interfaith marriage. Actually interfaith marriage can still be served through the Civil Registry Office (KCS). KCS could be an alternative way to facilitate the interfaith marriages for all religions in Indonesia. Special for KUA, the institution reject to record interfaith marriage.   In this way, it only accommodates freedom of ijtihad within the limits of ijtihad jama’i. KUA just accomodates ijtihad by institutions such as the Majelis Ulama Indonesia, Nahdlatul Ulama, Muhammadiyah and other similar institutions that reject interfaith marriage. Special for marriage in muslim community, ijtihad jama’i is better than ijtihad fardiy because the second could trigger the liberalization of marriage laws (temporary marriages, polygamy more than four, underage marriages and denial of recording).


2020 ◽  
Vol 35 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Jihan Khairunnisa

Land ownership for Indonesian citizens the result of mixed marriages without marriage agreement Indonesian citizen can only use the use rights and lease rights to buildings in the ownership of land. This study uses a normative juridical approach. It can be concluded that according to Law No. 5/1960 for Indonesian citizens, mixed marriages may own land with a status other than use rights and lease rights to buildings if there is a marriage agreement before or at the time of marriage. However, after the Constitutional Court ruling number 69 / PUU-XIII / 2015 gave a breath of fresh air for mixed marriages to still be able to receive their constitutional rights by making marriage agreements during the marriage.


Author(s):  
Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde ◽  
Mirjam Künkler ◽  
Tine Stein

In this article Böckenförde contrasts his concept of open encompassing neutrality (found in most Scandinavian countries and in Germany) with that of distancing neutrality, as practised in France. While the latter champions negative religious freedom, open encompassing neutrality aims for a balancing of negative and positive religious freedom. Religious freedom for Böckenförde is multidimensional and includes the right to have (or not) a religious faith (freedom of belief), to affirm (or not) this faith privately and openly (freedom to profess), to exercise (or not) one’s religion publicly (freedom of worship), and to join together (or not) in religious communities (religious freedom of association). The correlate to these individual and group rights is the open and overarching principle of the state’s neutrality towards religion and other worldviews, entailing a prohibition on the state justifying law on religious grounds. Furthermore, it requires the state not to privilege religion over non-religion and one religious faith over another. Siding with the ruling of the Federal Constitutional Court (at a time when he was not a sitting judge), Böckenförde underlines that even religious communities who reject the democratic state have the right to be recognized and legally protected. What matters is not whether communities accept or reject the state, but whether they obey or violate its laws. This was the court’s view on the Jehovah’s Witnesses, and it must also be applied, Böckenförde writes, to religious fundamentalists who do not accept the secular order, as long as they do not violate any laws.


2002 ◽  
Vol 61 (3) ◽  
pp. 499-544
Author(s):  
Amanda Perreau-Saussine

The phrase “hierarchy of norms” sounds alien or continental to the ears of most British constitutional lawyers: generations have been taught that, in order to respect the sovereignty of Parliament, they should compare statutes only in temporal terms, preferring a more recent statute over incompatible older ones. In Thoburn v. Sunderland City Council and related appeals [2002] EWHC 195 (Admin), [2002] 3 W.L.R. 247, four greengrocers and a fishmonger, backed by the UK Independence Party, unsuccessfully invoked this doctrine of implied repeal to challenge the validity of the UK’s messy implementation of European Metrication Directives. If obiter dicta by Laws L.J. are followed, it will be not for our political representatives but for our courts to decide whether to prefer older statutes protecting “constitutional rights” over more recent statutes, and to rank constitutional rights.


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