Conference Impressions: The Persisting Riddle of Fundamental Rights Jurisprudence and the Role of the Constitutional Court in a Democratic State

2003 ◽  
Vol 4 (3) ◽  
pp. 277-280 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elena Barnert ◽  
Natascha Doll
Keyword(s):  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Constitutional Rights ◽  
Basic Law ◽  
Democratic State ◽  
Civil Lawsuits ◽  
Federal Constitutional ◽  
The Individual ◽  
The Right

On January 15th 1958, the German Bundesverfassungsgericht (Federal Constitutional Court - FCC) pronounced a judgement deemed to be a prime example for the Court's early jurisprudence concerning the scope of fundamental rights in Germany: The Court's famous “Lüth”-decision resulted from a constitutional complaint brought by Erich Lüth, former member of the Hamburg senate.* In the early 1950s, Lüth had called upon film distributors and the public to boycott Veit Harlan's tearjerker movie Unsterbliche Geliebte (Immortal Beloved). Cause for his appeal was Harlan's prominent role in the Nazi propaganda machinery as Goebbels' protégé and director of the movie Jud Süss in 1940, which counts as one of the worst anti-semitic films released during the Nazi regime. After having lost several civil lawsuits, Lüth asserted the violation of constitutional rights. Over six years later, he was to be proved correct: The Federal Constitutional Court ruled that Lüth's complaint was covered by the right to freedom of speech guaranteed in Art. 5 of the German Basic Law (Grundgesetz). The Court stated that the fundamental rights as laid down in the Grundgesetz are not only of importance as subjective rights protecting the individual against state intrusions on the private sphere. As a whole they also unfold an objective dimension in representing society's crucial values. Therefore, they govern the entire legal order - including civil law and private law relations! This was indeed understood as a staggering conclusion with which the Court went far beyond the issue at stake. Since Lüth, German legal discourse characterizes this phenomenon as the third-party or horizontal effect of basic rights (Drittwirkung).

scholarly journals State duties of protection and fundamental rights

2017 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 20
Author(s):  
Christian Starck
Keyword(s):  
Separation Of Powers ◽  
Human Life ◽  
Science Research ◽  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Basic Law ◽  
Federal Constitutional ◽  
The Right ◽  
Protective Regulations

Duties of protection are duties of the state to protect certain legal interests of its citizens. They cover the interests of life, health, freedom and property and also protect some other interests and certain constitutionally recognised institutions. State duties of protection must be considered in connection with fundamental rights. The foundations of modern constitutionalism and attendant procedures are essential to develop guidelines for a constructive critique of the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court. This is done with reference to the recent history of France, Germany and England. The historical excursus reveals that a single theory underlies the variety of constitutional states. The development of the constitutional state gave rise to the significance of the preservation of freedom through the maintenance of law and the separation of powers. This has given rise to various legal devices, based also in part on experience with moderate rule and earlier theories of the imperium limitatum.A textual analysis of the German Basic Law is undertaken to determine whether and how the duties of protection are expressly created. Furthermore, the duties that have been discovered in the Basic Law by the Federal Constitutional Court are considered. These duties include the protection of human life and health, personal freedom, the right to autonomous development of one's personality, freedom of science, research and teaching, marriage and the family, children, mothers, professional freedom, property and the protection of German nationals against foreign states. Finally the justification of such duties and the constitutional control of the manner of protection are considered.In a final section a critique of relevant constitutional jurisprudence is undertaken. It is argued that claims to protection cannot be directly binding law. They presuppose legislation. If statutory protection is connected with infringements of third-party fundamental rights, the principle of proportionality can be adopted to test whether the protection is effective. Insofar as protection can be achieved without infringements of rights, one must attempt to test the effectiveness of protection by some other means. Where the legislature omits to protect at all, the court should limit itself to establishing the existence of a duty and to querying its non-fulfilment. The Court may not pass protective regulations or impose a duty to pass specific regulations. Where general statutory norms apply, protective duties can be realised through the socalled indirect third-party effect of fundamental rights. In its reaching its decision, the German Federal Constitutional Court is responsible for preserving the political discretion of the legislature in protecting interests and remembering the structural distinction between "hard" defensive rights and "soft" protective duties in order to prevent the erosion of the directly binding nature of defensive rights.

scholarly journals Protección de los derechos fundamentales en la pandemia del coronavirus

2021 ◽  
pp. 71
Author(s):  
Oliver Lepsius
Keyword(s):  
Legal Status ◽  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Basic Law ◽  
Lower Courts ◽  
Toma De Decisiones ◽  
Federal Constitutional ◽  
Executive Decision Making ◽  
Proportionality Test ◽  
The Individual

¿Ha cambiado la situación de los derechos fundamentales en tiempos de la pandemia provocada por el coronavirus? Lo cierto es que la protección de los derechos fundamentales no es una vía de un solo sentido que comienza con el individuo, sino una promesa de la Ley Fundamental que debe ser implementada por todos los poderes estatales. Todo el ordenamiento jurídico en sí debe ser libre, no solo el estatus legal del individuo. En los últimos meses, incluso la jurisprudencia de los tribunales inferiores y del Tribunal Constitucional Federal ha demostrado ser bastante débil. En opinión del autor, el mérito de haber provocado un cambio fundamental en la cultura de ejecución de toma de decisiones dentro del poder judicial corresponde al Tribunal Supremo Administrativo (en adelante OVG) de Münster, que en su «decisión Gütersloh» (OVG Münster, decisión de 29.06.2020-13 B 940/20.NE-Lockdown Gütersloh) volvió a la aplicación correcta de la prueba de proporcionalidad.Has the situation of fundamental rights changed in times of the corona pandemic? One thing is certain: the protection of basic rights is not a one-way street that begins with the individual, but a promise of the Basic Law that must be implemented by all state powers. The legal system as such, not just the legal status of the individual, should be a free one. In the last few months, even the case law of the lower courts and the Federal Constitutional Court has proven to be rather pale. The merit of having brought about a fundamental change in the executive decision-making culture within the judiciary belongs in the perception of the author to the Supreme Administrative Court (OVG) Münster, which in its «Gütersloh decision» (OVG Münster, decision of 29.06.2020 - 13 B 940 / 20.NE - Lockdown Gütersloh) showed the way back to a normal proportionality test.

Rethinking the Doctrinal System of Fundamental Rights: New Decisions of the Federal Constitutional Court

2002 ◽  
Vol 3 (11) ◽  
Author(s):  
Marion Albers
Keyword(s):  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
Self Determination ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Individual Freedom ◽  
Legal Basis ◽  
Basic Law ◽  
Federal Constitutional ◽  
The Individual ◽  
Scope Of Protection ◽  
Freedom Of Action

The German doctrinal system of fundamental rights is characterized by the interplay of three components: the scope of protection, the impairment and the explicit justification of restrictions. In the traditional conception fundamental rights serve as individual rights as a defense against governmental or administrative activities which impair the protected freedom without being legitimated by the Basic Law. The impairment occupies the central role: The scope of protection shall not define but leave room for the individual freedom, and that is possible because it refers to present possibilities and to interests like self-determination, freedom of action or freedom of property. In contrast, the “impairment” is strictly defined. It is a governmental or administrative order or prohibition by or based upon law; the order or prohibition includes sanctions; it is addressed to the person protected by a specific fundamental right, and it reduces the freedom protected by this very right. In case of an impairment, the governmental or administrative act has to meet all requirements of Basic Law. One of the most important requirements is the parliamentary legal basis.

The Secularized State

2020 ◽  
pp. 220-236
Author(s):  
Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde ◽  
Mirjam Künkler ◽  
Tine Stein
Keyword(s):  
Religious Freedom ◽  
Religious Faith ◽  
The State ◽  
Religious Communities ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Freedom Of Association ◽  
Democratic State ◽  
Federal Constitutional ◽  
Freedom Of Belief ◽  
The Right

In this article Böckenförde contrasts his concept of open encompassing neutrality (found in most Scandinavian countries and in Germany) with that of distancing neutrality, as practised in France. While the latter champions negative religious freedom, open encompassing neutrality aims for a balancing of negative and positive religious freedom. Religious freedom for Böckenförde is multidimensional and includes the right to have (or not) a religious faith (freedom of belief), to affirm (or not) this faith privately and openly (freedom to profess), to exercise (or not) one’s religion publicly (freedom of worship), and to join together (or not) in religious communities (religious freedom of association). The correlate to these individual and group rights is the open and overarching principle of the state’s neutrality towards religion and other worldviews, entailing a prohibition on the state justifying law on religious grounds. Furthermore, it requires the state not to privilege religion over non-religion and one religious faith over another. Siding with the ruling of the Federal Constitutional Court (at a time when he was not a sitting judge), Böckenförde underlines that even religious communities who reject the democratic state have the right to be recognized and legally protected. What matters is not whether communities accept or reject the state, but whether they obey or violate its laws. This was the court’s view on the Jehovah’s Witnesses, and it must also be applied, Böckenförde writes, to religious fundamentalists who do not accept the secular order, as long as they do not violate any laws.

scholarly journals Some Kind of Right

2020 ◽  
Vol 21 (S1) ◽  
pp. 40-44
Author(s):  
Jud Mathews
Keyword(s):  
German Law ◽  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Eu Member States ◽  
Right To Be Forgotten ◽  
Federal Constitutional ◽  
The Right ◽  
German Federal Constitutional Court ◽  
German Federal Constitutional ◽  
Specific Reason

AbstractThe Right to Be Forgotten II crystallizes one lesson from Europe’s rights revolution: persons should be able to call on some kind of right to protect their important interests whenever those interests are threatened under the law. Which rights instrument should be deployed, and by what court, become secondary concerns. The decision doubtless involves some self-aggrandizement by the German Federal Constitutional Court (GFCC), which asserts for itself a new role in protecting European fundamental rights, but it is no criticism of the Right to Be Forgotten II to say that it advances the GFCC’s role in European governance, so long as the decision also makes sense in the context of the European and German law. I argue that it does, for a specific reason. The Right to Be Forgotten II represents a sensible approach to managing the complex pluralism of the legal environment in which Germany and other EU member states find themselves.

Federal Constitutional Court Defines the Power of Parliamentary Minorities in the Constitutionally Established, Parliamentary Investigative Committees

2002 ◽  
Vol 3 (10) ◽  
Author(s):  
Volker Röben
Keyword(s):  
Max Weber ◽  
Specific Aspect ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Central Function ◽  
German State ◽  
Members Of Parliament ◽  
Basic Law ◽  
Parliamentary Committee ◽  
Federal Constitutional ◽  
The Right

The Untersuchungsausschuss-Fall (Parliamentary Committee Case) 2 BvE 2/01, decided by the Bundesverfassungsgericht (BVerfG – Federal Constitutional Court) on 8 April 2002, concerns the so-called right of enquête, a central function of Parliament under the parliamentary system designed by the German Basic Law. The right of enquête, the investigation by Parliament by taking evidence complete with the subpoena powers normally reserved to criminal investigations, has been an integral part of both the Weimar and the Bonn Constitutions. Max Weber, in the era of the Bismarck-Constitution for the German state founded in 1871, made a forceful pitch for the equality of the Parliament and Executive. He argued that members of Parliament needed to be professionals and to have full access to the information that, traditionally, was the source of power of the executive. Instituting committees of investigation with the power to take evidence was the means to do so. In fact, Weber went further, arguing that the right to call for an investigative parliamentary committee needed to be vested in a (qualified) minority of the members of Parliament. There is no equivalent of this specific aspect in the other European parliamentary systems. Article 34 of the Weimar Constitution provided that one fifth of the members of Parliament could ask for the institution of a committee of investigation. The same quorum had the right to move for the hearing of specific evidence by the committee.

scholarly journals THE RIGHT TO HUMAN DIGNITY IN THE SYSTEM OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF UKRAINE AND GERMANY

2020 ◽  
pp. 27-32
Author(s):  
O. Kosilova
Keyword(s):  
Human Dignity ◽  
Human Life ◽  
Legal Framework ◽  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Constitutional Rights ◽  
Eral Republic ◽  
Human Right ◽  
Fundamental Value ◽  
The Right

The article analyzes human dignity as a legal category and fundamental natural human right. The place and role of the right to human dignity in the system of constitutional rights of Ukraine and Germany are compared. The scientific substantiation of the right to human dignity in Ukraine and Germany, its normative protection in both countries, is investigated. The approaches to defining and interpreting the right to human dignity in the practice of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine and the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany are compared. The relationship between the right to human dignity and other human rights is determined, as well as the sphere of protection of this right. In particular, there are parallels between the right to life and the right to human dignity, and their relationship is determined. It is substantiated that the human life and dignity of each person enjoy the same constitutional protection regardless of the duration of the individual's physical existence. It is established that among Ukrainian scholars there is no unified view of the right to dignity as a fundamental natural right. The right to human dignity in Ukraine is enshrined in the norms of constitutional, civil and criminal law. For the most part, the protection of the right to human dignity is correlated with the right to the protection of honour and goodwill. The right to human dignity and honour are not clearly distinguished. The legisla- tion of Ukraine does not contain a legal norm defining the concept of the right to human dignity. The case-law of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine in this area is not sufficiently developed and does not constitute a proper legal framework. In Germany, the right to human dignity is a decisive and fundamental human right that is fundamental to all other rights. Human dignity is the supreme fundamental value and the root of all fundamental rights. The right to human dignity enshrined in Article 1 of the Constitution of the Fed- eral Republic of Germany defines it as an absolute value, which means that it cannot be restricted by any other norm, even by another fundamental right that follows from human dignity.

scholarly journals FORMS OF EXTREMISM IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

2020 ◽  
pp. 25-31
Author(s):  
Nadezhda G. Geymbukh ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Political Parties ◽  
Federal Republic ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Federal Republic Of Germany ◽  
Left Wing ◽  
Basic Law ◽  
The People ◽  
Democratic State ◽  
Federal Constitutional ◽  
The Stability

Representatives of German state (constitutional) law define political extremism as "a set of political beliefs and aspirations... which are aimed at denying the democratic constitutional state and its fundamental values". Based on the definition, the criterion for recognising any "political belief or aspiration" as extremist is the notion of a democratic constitutional state. In line with this, the Federal Constitutional Court of the Federal Republic of Germany has given an expansive interpretation of a "free democratic state" that "constitutes a legal state order whose basis is the self-determination of the people according to the will of the majority, freedom and equality. It excludes all forms of despotism or arbitrariness. Among the basic principles of this order are at least: the protection of human rights as laid down in the Basic Law of Germany, the sovereignty of the people, the separation of powers, the responsibility of the government, the legitimacy of government, the independence of the judiciary and the principle of multi-partyism. According to article 21, paragraph 2 of the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany (1949), political parties that "endeavour to harm or destroy the foundation of the free demo-cratic order or to endanger the existence of the Federal Republic of Germany" are declared unconstitutional by the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany. The possibility to ban political parties as provided for in the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany guarantees the development of a democratic political system of the state. It is worth emphasising that the stability and democratism of the German political system and the stability of the constitutional order in the state depend not only on the prohibition provision in the Basic Law of the FRG, but above all on the ability of political parties to reach agreement on the basic principles of a "free democratic state system" and to implement these principles in the minds of the people. To realise these goals, Germany has the Federal Office for the Protection of the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany of 1949, a public authority whose task is to control and supervise the legality of the activities of political parties. The forms of extremism in the Federal Republic of Germany are "left-wing extremism" and "right-wing extremism". In right-wing extremism, the older generation is gradually being freed from the aggressive youth, in an increased willingness to use force. Left-wing extremism has become less focused on global global themes - it has become more local and regional, more relatable and at the same time integrated. Because of the new nature of the development of extremism in a united Germany a left-right antagonism has emerged. At the same time, different tendencies of West and East Germany can be observed: in West Germany the struggle "left vs. right" prevails, in East Germany the struggle "right vs. left" prevails.

scholarly journals Social and Economic Rights in the German Basic Law? An Analysis with Respect to Jurisprudence of the Federal Constitutional Court

2020 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 190
Author(s):  
Christoph Enders
Keyword(s):  
Federal Republic ◽  
Separation Of Powers ◽  
The State ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Federal Republic Of Germany ◽  
Economic Rights ◽  
Basic Law ◽  
Federal Constitutional ◽  
Right To Participation ◽  
The Right

The Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany did originally not provide for social or economic rights understood as claims to benefits. The Federal Constitutional Court (FCC) did, indeed, recognise the states obligation to protect individuals against assault by others (right to security) and further ruled that everyone has the right to use facilities provided by the state under equal conditions (right to participation). These rights, however, aim to ensure that the state uses existing means as intended. In addition, the FCC by now has recognised a “right to the guarantee of a dignified minimum subsistence”. It is an original entitlement as the state is obliged to create and provide benefits for individuals in need. This new legal construction, however, misconceives the division of responsibilities between the FCC and the legislator and collides with the principle of the separation of powers

German Constitutional Law

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bumke Christian ◽  
Voßkuhle Andreas
Keyword(s):  
Constitutional Law ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Equal Treatment ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Basic Law ◽  
German Constitution ◽  
Federal Constitutional ◽  
Book Covers ◽  
The Right ◽  
German Constitutional Law

This book provides a comprehensive summary of German constitutional law, in particular the case law of the German Federal Constitutional Court. It provides first-hand insight into the complex principles of the Basic Law, or Grundgesetz (GG), and an authoritative introduction to the history of the German constitution, the Basic Law, and the methodology of the Federal Constitutional Court. As well as an analysis of the general principles of German constitutional law, the book covers the salient articles of the German constitution and offers relevant extracts of the Court's most important decisions on the provisions of the Basic Law. It provides notes and discussions of landmark cases to illustrate their legal and historical context and give the reader a clear understanding of the principles governing German constitutional law. The book covers the fundamental rights catalogue of the Basic Law and offers a comprehensive account of its intellectual moorings. It includes landmark jurisprudence on the equal treatment of same-sex couples, life imprisonment, the legal structure of property, the right to assembly, and the right to informational self-presentation. The book also covers the provisions and respective case law governing the state structure of Germany, for instance the recent decisions on the prohibition of the far-right German nationalist party, and the Court's jurisprudence on European integration, including the most recent decisions on the OMT program of the European Central Bank.

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