The UN Security Council Resolution 1540: to Strengthen the International Law in Non-Proliferation Sphere

2014 ◽  
pp. 24-33
Author(s):  
E. Kirichenko
Keyword(s):  
United Nations ◽  
International Law ◽  
Security Council ◽  
Security Council Resolution ◽  
Legal Basis ◽  
Un Security Council ◽  
The United Nations

The article addresses the UNSC Resolution 1540 as the unique legally binding document strengthening international legal basis of MDW non-proliferation regime. It analyses the activity of Committee 1540, its priorities, as well as results of monitoring of Resolution implementation by the states-parties to the United Nations.

The United Nations Compensation Commission— Developments Since October 1992

1995 ◽  
Vol 89 (2) ◽  
pp. 416-423 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ronald J. Bettauer
Keyword(s):  
United Nations ◽  
International Law ◽  
Security Council ◽  
Security Council Resolution ◽  
First Year ◽  
Governing Council ◽  
Executive Secretary ◽  
Injury Category ◽  
The United Nations ◽  
Foreign Governments

Paragraph 16 of Security Council Resolution 687 (April 3, 1991) reaffirmed that “Iraq … is liable under international law for any direct loss, damage, … or injury to foreign Governments, nationals and corporations, as a result of Iraq’s unlawful invasion and occupation of Kuwait.” This resolution and Security Council Resolution 692 (May 20, 1991) established the United Nations Compensation Commission (UNCC) to administer a system to provide compensation for claims for which Iraq is liable under paragraph 16. The Commission has a Governing Council, composed of the members of the Security Council; panels of commissioners, appointed from time to time to review particular groups of claims; and a secretariat headed by an Executive Secretary. The Commission’s Governing Council first met in Geneva in July 1991 and in the first year of its existence adopted decisional criteria for six categories of claims: Category “A” — claims of individuals for fixed amounts for departure from Iraq or Kuwait; Category “B” — claims of individuals for fixed amounts for death or serious personal injury; Category “C” —claims of individuals for amounts up to $100,000; Category “D” —claims of individuals for amounts above $100,000; Category “E” —claims of corporations; and Category “F” — claims of governments and international organizations.

WPS and Adopted Security Council Resolutions

2018 ◽  
pp. 97-109
Author(s):  
Laura J. Shepherd
Keyword(s):  
United Nations ◽  
Security Council ◽  
Security Council Resolution ◽  
Policy Framework ◽  
Future Directions ◽  
Representational Practices ◽  
Un Security Council ◽  
Peace And Security ◽  
The United Nations ◽  
Over Time

This chapter outlines the architecture of the Women, Peace, and Security agenda at the United Nations. Building on the explanation of the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 provided earlier in the volume, it explores the meanings of “women,” “peace,” and “security” that are constructed through the WPS policy framework. The chapter traces the continuities and changes to the central concepts in the resolutions and reflects on the implications of these representational practices as they affect the provisions and principles of the WPS agenda in practice. Moreover, the chapter draws out the key provisions of each resolution to explore the tensions that have arisen over time regarding the types of energy and commitment that have become manifest in the architecture supporting WPS implementation. This in turn enables a brief analysis of likely future directions of WPS practice and a comment on the ways in which Security Council dynamics might affect and effect certain possibilities while excluding or proscribing others.

What Future for the UN Charter System of War Prevention?

2003 ◽  
Vol 97 (3) ◽  
pp. 590-598 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard A. Falk
Keyword(s):  
United Nations ◽  
International Law ◽  
Security Council ◽  
United Nations Security Council ◽  
Sovereign State ◽  
Un Security Council ◽  
Inspection Process ◽  
The United Nations ◽  
The Relationship

President George W. Bush historically challenged the United Nations Security Council when he uttered some memorable words in the course of his September 12, 2002, speech to the General Assembly: “Will the UN serve the purpose of its founding, or will it be irrelevant?” In the aftermath of the Iraq war there are at least two answers to this question. The answer of the U.S. government would be to suggest that the United Nations turned out to be irrelevant due to its failure to endorse recourse to war against the Iraq of Saddam Hussein. The answer of those who opposed the war is that the UN Security Council served the purpose of its founding by its refusal to endorse recourse to a war that could not be persuasively reconciled with the UN Charter and international law. This difference of assessment is not just factual, whether Iraq was a threat and whether the inspection process was succeeding at a reasonable pace; it was also conceptual, even jurisprudential. The resolution of this latter debate is likely to shape the future role of the United Nations, as well as influence the attitude of the most powerful sovereign state as to the relationship between international law generally and the use of force as an instrument of foreign policy.

Has the United Nations Security Council Implicitly Removed Al Bashir's Immunity?

2010 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 275-288 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sophie Papillon
Keyword(s):  
United Nations ◽  
International Law ◽  
Security Council ◽  
United Nations Security Council ◽  
Legal Basis ◽  
Customary International Law ◽  
Arrest Warrant ◽  
Head Of State ◽  
Un Security Council ◽  
Heads Of State

AbstractOn 4 March 2009, the ICC issued an arrest warrant for Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, the incumbent Head of State of Sudan. This article's purpose is to suggest a legal basis for reconciling the well established rule on personal immunities under customary international law with the prosecution of Heads of State from non-parties to the ICC Statute. While arguing for the legality of Al Bashir's warrant as well as the legality of the warrant's enforcement, this article explores the basis upon which the UN Security Council can remove immunities. By giving special attention to the concept of waivers, the article suggests that the UN organ implicitly removed Al Bashir's immunity when it referred the situation of Sudan to the ICC in 2005.

scholarly journals Like it or Not, Unilateral Sanctions Are Here to Stay

AJIL Unbound ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 113 ◽  
pp. 146-151
Author(s):  
David S. Cohen ◽  
Zachary K. Goldman
Keyword(s):  
United Nations ◽  
International Law ◽  
Security Council ◽  
International Institutions ◽  
Ad Hoc ◽  
Economic Sanctions ◽  
International Support ◽  
Design Build ◽  
Un Security Council ◽  
The United Nations

Financial and economic sanctions are often adopted to serve multiple ends, including deterrence and prevention, but they are best understood as a tool to incentivize change in a target's behavior. In pursuit of this coercive objective, it is generally—but not always—the case that sanctions are more effective when they are imposed multilaterally, and the broader the coalition the better. This is because multilateral sanctions leverage the diverse sources of pressure that coalition partners can bring to bear on a target and carry with them the legitimacy of broad international support. Taken to its extreme, this argument may suggest that sanctions should always be multilateral, whether adopted through the United Nations, another forum, or an ad hoc coalition. But as we explain below, there are at least two significant reasons that militate in favor of unilateral sanctions. First, within the broad limits of international law, every country must retain the authority to impose sanctions to protect its sovereign security interests, even when it cannot muster a coalition of like-minded allies or a sufficient number of votes—and avoid a veto—on the UN Security Council. Second, imposing “smart” sanctions is actually a difficult business, requiring a complex administrative apparatus to design, build, implement, enforce, and defend them. International institutions, including the United Nations, are inherently less able to build the necessary structures to effectively enforce sanctions. For all of these reasons, two systems of sanctions—one national, one supranational—will likely coexist into the future.

Report on the Protection of Civilians in the Non International Armed Conflict in Iraq: 5 June – 5 July 2014; Human Rights Council Resolution S-22/1; & Security Council Resolution 2170, 2178

2015 ◽  
Vol 54 (2) ◽  
pp. 306-346 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonathan P. Worboys
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
United Nations ◽  
Security Council ◽  
Armed Conflict ◽  
Security Council Resolution ◽  
Human Rights Council ◽  
High Commissioner ◽  
Un Security Council ◽  
The United Nations

The United Nations (UN) Report on the Protection of Civilians in the Non International Armed Conflict in Iraq (Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights and UN Assistance Mission for Iraq), UN Security Council Resolutions 2170 and 2178, and UN Human Rights Council Resolution S-22/1 (UN Documents) form a key part of the international community’s efforts to resolve, manage, and document the ongoing non-international armed conflict in Iraq.

AS BAD AS IT GETS: THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS'S BEHRAMI AND SARAMATI DECISION AND GENERAL INTERNATIONAL LAW

2009 ◽  
Vol 58 (2) ◽  
pp. 267-296 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marko Milanović ◽  
Tatjana Papić
Keyword(s):  
United Nations ◽  
International Law ◽  
Security Council ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
European Court ◽  
House Of Lords ◽  
Un Security Council ◽  
The United Nations

AbstractThis article examines the European Court of Human Rights's encounter with general international law in its Behrami and Saramati admissibility decision, where it held that the actions of the armed forces of States acting pursuant to UN Security Council authorizations are attributable not to the States themselves, but to the United Nations. The article will try to demonstrate that the Court's analysis is entirely at odds with the established rules of responsibility in international law, and is equally dubious as a matter of policy. Indeed, the article will show that the Court's decision can be only be explained by its reluctance to decide on questions of State jurisdiction and norm conflict, the latter issue becoming the clearest when Behrami is compared to the Al-Jedda judgment of the House of Lords.

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