Financial Stability Board: Is Its Institutionalization a Reality?

2015 ◽  
Vol 59 (11) ◽  
pp. 78-90
Author(s):  
E. Dzhagityan

The article deals with the evolution of the Financial Stability Board (FSB) into a full-scale and sound authority of international banking regulation. Founded in 1999 as the Financial Stability Forum, the FSB has become an international body in 2009 overseeing the international financial regulation reform, also known as Basel III. Nonetheless, FSB’s responsibilities and competence are still limited to the annual determination of global systemically important banks (G-SIBs) and the development of the reform strategies for G-20 consideration. FSB has already proved to be a credible coordinator of Basel III implementation. Its initiatives on effective resolution strategies and total loss absorbing capacity for G-SIBs not only notably contributed to the set of regulatory tools and techniques aimed at minimization of systemic risks and enhancement of stress resilience of the banking industry but also designed approaches to mitigate the threat of “too big to fail” banks for the national economy at large. However, new regulatory paradigm requires principally new metrics to measure macro- and micro-level risks. Yet synchronization of the regulatory reform at the national and supranational levels stands beyond the accepted scope of synergetic effect of the reform. This means that FSB’s organizational status makes it less capable to be in line with financial sector dynamics, its growing interconnectedness and complicating infrastructure, and rapidly changing economic environment. Under these circumstances regulatory transformation lacks mechanism that would overcome fallouts of regulatory arbitrage as well as risks of shadow banking. Reform inconsistency may spur perilous effect of regulatory “glocalization” in that national regulatory regimes may stop abiding by most of the Basel III principles and standards, which may ultimately ruin sense, logic, and continuum of the reform. Shortage of factors that calibrate consistency and continuity of regulatory reform diminishes FSB’s involvement into it. FSB’s efforts in promoting basics of reform synchronization between national and international realms are weakened by fragmentation of the financial markets as well as by different adaptive abilities of financial institutions to the new regulatory order. On the other side, single-principles-centered quantitative and qualitative platforms of banking regulation are among the imminent traits of the global financial sector. The mentioned conflicts put on the agenda the inevitability of a higher international status of the FSB as a powerhouse of a single regulatory concept aiming at global financial stability. Driven by that mission FSB is urged to become an independent international institute to administer closer collaboration among national regulators as a regulatory information hub. This will decisively complement its kit of existing instruments in attaining more balanced reform implementation and will ensure synergetic effect when applying regulatory actions into risk identification and risk management as well as resolution and recovery of G-SIBs. Acknowledgements. The research was supported by a grant of the RFH, project № 15-02-00669/15 “Development of the conceptual framework for cross-border capital flow amid escalation of geopolitical risks for the Russian Federation”.

2016 ◽  
pp. 77-93 ◽  
Author(s):  
E. Dzhagityan

The article looks into the spillover effect of the sweeping overhaul of financial regulation, also known as Basel III, for credit institutions. We found that new standards of capital adequacy will inevitably put downward pressure on ROE that in turn will further diminish post-crisis recovery of the banking industry. Under these circumstances, resilience of systemically important banks could be maintained through cost optimization, repricing, and return to homogeneity of their operating models, while application of macroprudential regulation by embedding it into new regulatory paradigm would minimize the effect of risk multiplication at micro level. Based on the research we develop recommendations for financial regulatory reform in Russia and for shaping integrated banking regulation in the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU).


Author(s):  
Howell E. Jackson ◽  
Jeffery Y. Zhang

This chapter examines the impact of private and public enforcement of securities regulation on the development of capital markets. After a review of the literature, it considers empirical findings related to private and public enforcement as measured by formal indices and resources, with particular emphasis on the link between enforcement intensity and technical measures of financial market performance. It then analyses the impact of cross-border flows of capital, valuation effects, and cross-listing decisions by corporate issuers before turning to a discussion of whether countries that dedicate more resources to regulatory reform behave differently in some areas of market activities. It also explores the enforcement of banking regulation and its relationship to financial stability and concludes by focusing on direct and indirect, resource-based evidence on the efficacy of the US Securities and Exchange Commission’s enforcement actions.


Author(s):  
Danila Andreevich Yakovlev ◽  

Currently, the issue of banking regulation is one of the most urgent due to the fact that the destabilization of this area can threaten the financial stability of the entire country. The Basel Agreements use common approaches to the capital of banks in different countries, they are formulated taking into account possible risks and the presence of systemically important banks. The article analyzes the impact of the Basel III standards on the banking system and assesses the impact of these standards on the development of the banking system.


2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 (1) ◽  
pp. 21-40
Author(s):  
Eduard Dzhagityan ◽  
Anastasiya Podrugina ◽  
Sofya Streltsova

The article looks into the reasons underlying the outspread of the full-scale mechanism of banking regulation over U. S. investment banks. We analyze the effect of the Basel III standards on stress-resilience of investment banks and examine the role of U. S. investment banks in ensuring financial stability. Based on regression analysis we found that minimum capital adequacy standards of Basel III do not have negative effect on ROE of the U. S. investment banks that are G-SIB category-designate; however, additional capital requirements (Higher Loss Absorbency (HLA) surcharge) that depend on G-SIB’s systemic significance according to their bucket as per Financial Stability Board classification do have significant and negative effect on ROE in the post crisis period. Besides, leverage requirements that also depend on G-SIB’s systemic significance have a statistically significant effect on ROE.


2013 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 17-37
Author(s):  
Constanze Lehleiter

AbstractThe European Union (EU) has faced not only the international financial crisis, but also the European banking and the sovereign debt crisis. A lack of efficient regulations and supervision were a serious cause of recent developments. As a reaction, the EU finally implemented a framework covering both micro- and macro-prudential policies. Measures such as the new capital requirements, the deposit guarantee schemes, the green paper on shadow banking and, most importantly, the new approach for a macro-prudential supervision are headed towards crisis prevention. However, the challenge is to define regulations enhancing financial stability, which, at the same time, do not prevent institutions from generating reasonable financial risks and do not reduce growth. In that regard, the presented measures still have deficits which have to be faced. Furthermore, coordination between various authorities and the European Commission remains another challenge.


2021 ◽  
pp. 000276422110200
Author(s):  
Sara Hsu ◽  
Xun Han

Government officials in China have taken different views regarding shadow banking. Some have seen the industry as overly risky, potentially undermining the formal financial system, while others have asserted that it is an increasingly important part of the financial system, filling a gap in finance provision to particular sectors and smaller firms. Do their views matter? Regulators have striven to crack down on the riskiest practices in shadow banking, but are the policies effective? In this article, we analyze the impact of government attitudes and actions on the shadow banking sector. Using a unique data set based on information collected from various sources in a difference-in-difference model, we find that shadow banking regulation plays a strong role in China’s financial sector, while contradictory government views (in the form of commentary in the People’s Daily) on shadow banking do not. This reveals that shadow banking is strongly affected by political authority when it is codified into regulation. Only some aspects of shadow banking can be legitimized through regulation, while the remainder of China’s financial system remains constrained due to state dominance over the financial sector. This underscores the “funny” nature of shadow banking’s money flows. This article is one of the first to study the effects of government views and regulations on the shadow banking system.


2016 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 47
Author(s):  
Lastuti Abubakar ◽  
C. Sukmadilaga ◽  
Tri Handayani

Based on the Global Shadow Banking Monitory Report 2015 issued by the Financial Stability Board, global shadow banking activities manage 80% of global GDP and 90% of the global financial system assets. Hence, this study aimed to examine the regulation and supervision of shadow banking activities in Indonesia. The method used is normative juridical with descriptive analytical research specifications. Based on the research results as follows : regulation of shadow banking in Indonesia's financial services sector covers all financial institutions outside the banking sector or Non-Bank Financial Institutions that the regulations are scattered in various rules. Indonesia has developed an integrated surveillance system for the entire financial services sector, include NBFIs. Development of shadow banking regulation will be based on the strengthening of reporting, monitoring, supervision and regulation. Keywords : regulatory developments, shadow banking, and supervision


2017 ◽  
Vol 12 (4) ◽  
pp. 163-174 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andriy Ramskyi ◽  
Valeria Loiko ◽  
Olena Sobolieva-Tereshchenko ◽  
Daria Loiko ◽  
Valeriia Zharnikova

The urgency of the issue is related to changes in the Ukrainian banks’ business environment, taking into account the impact of domestic and global financial instability and the implementation of the regulatory framework for banking regulation of the National Bank of Ukraine in accordance with the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision recommendations. The main goal of this research is to analyze the degree of implementation and compliance with the Basel III regulations in Ukrainian banking system. To carry out the research, regulatory and legislative documents of the National Bank of Ukraine, the Basel Accords, statistic data of the Ukrainian banks and the National Bank of Ukraine were used. For this purpose, the analysis of main indicators of Ukrainian banks’ financial stability within the period of 2014–2017 is made. Thus, post-crisis regulatory changes have aimed at restoring bank stability. The results seem to suggest that bank regulatory changes may be repressive, for instance, cleaning and optimization of the banking system as an effective tool for anticrisis management. As a result, it was concluded that banks with foreign capital are the most stable in the banking system of Ukraine in comparison with domestic banks.


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