scholarly journals KONSEP CROSS-GUARANTEE DALAM PROGRAM PENJAMINAN DAN KEMUNGKINAN PENERAPANNYA DI INDONESIA

2003 ◽  
Vol 1 (4) ◽  
pp. 31-43
Author(s):  
Maulana Ibrahim ◽  
Agusman Agusman
Keyword(s):  
Deposit Insurance ◽  
Too Big To Fail ◽  
Insurance Scheme ◽  
Sensitive Analysis ◽  
Risk Sensitive

Tulisan ini mencoba mengetengahkan salah satu bentuk pikiran alternatif dalam program penjaminan yang dikenal dengan konsep Cross-Guarantee. Sangat berbeda dengan konsep-konsep lainnya dalam program penjaminan, konsep ini sangat progresif dalam hal mempercayakan penyelenggaraan penjaminan kepada mekanisme pasar dan meniadakan intervensi pemerintah, sehingga mengarah sepenuhnya pada swastanisasi baik penyelenggaraan penjaminan maupun pelaksanaan pengaturan dan pengawasan bank yang menyertainya.Sebagai suatu konsep yang ditujukan untuk mengatasi berbagai kelemahan deposit insurance scheme yang berlaku sekarang ini, maka konsep Cross-Guarantee menekankan pentingnya penggunaan pendekatan risk-sensitive analysis dalam penetapan besarnya premi. Konsep ini juga mengupayakan adanya perlakuan yang sama untuk bank-bank besar dan bank-bank kecil dalam memper-oleh penjaminan. Pendekatan Too-Big-To-Fail (TBTF) yang sejak beberapa waktu terakhir telah menimbulkan inkonsistensi dalam proses penjaminan diharapkan dapat dihilangkan oleh konsep ini.Apabila diterapkan sepenuhnya, konsep Cross-Guarantee juga akan mengakibatkan perubahan yang sangat mendasar terhadap seluruh pola dan praktek penjaminan dan pengawasan bank yang sudah dijalankan selama ini. Dengan merujuk pada ide yang dilontarkan Bert Ely tentang Cross- Guarantee, dalam tulisan ini akan didalami prinsip-prinsip dasar yang terkandung dalam konsep tersebut beserta pengaruhnya terhadap pola penjaminan dan pengawasan bank, sekaligus mempelajari kemungkinan penerapannya di Indonesia.

scholarly journals Governing ‘too big to fail’ banks

2011 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 56-64 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andy Mullineux
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Parallel Mechanism ◽  
Deposit Insurance ◽  
Current Level ◽  
Too Big To Fail ◽  
Insurance Scheme ◽  
Ex Post ◽  
The Us ◽  
The Uk

This paper considers possible and proposed responses to the “To Big (complex, interconnected, important) To Fail (TBTF) Problem”. It argues that the corporate governance of large shareholder owned deposit taking banks is particularly problematic because of the implicit insurance their shareholders and bondholders enjoy, at the taxpayers expense. This creates issues of moral hazard and also competitive inequality, because TBTF banks can raise funds more cheaply than non-TBTF banks. The US pre-funded deposit insurance scheme with risk-related premia does a pretty good job managing the moral hazard issues relating to non-TBTF banks. A parallel mechanism involving a special resolution regime for TBTF banks and the equivalent of deposit insurance with risk-related premia needs to be put in place. Whether the scheme should be pre-funded or operated on a ex post „polluter pays‟ basis, and the associated tax regime for TBTF banks needs further consideration. Bondholders should not enjoy the current level of protection and „Co-Co‟ bonds may be part of the solution. Consumer Protection is a good idea and deposit taking banks should be regulated as other „utilities‟ are in the UK. The corporate governance problem would be simpler if all retail deposit taking banks were mutuals

scholarly journals Evaluation of European Deposit Insurance Scheme Funding Based on Risk Analysis

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pilar Gómez-Fernández-Aguado ◽  
Eduardo Trigo Mártinez ◽  
Rafael Moreno Ruíz ◽  
Antonio Partal-Ureña
Keyword(s):  
Risk Analysis ◽  
Deposit Insurance ◽  
Insurance Scheme

Origins of too-big-to-fail policy in the United States

2020 ◽  
Vol 27 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-15
Author(s):  
George C. Nurisso ◽  
Edward Simpson Prescott
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Federal Reserve ◽  
Systemic Risk ◽  
Deposit Insurance ◽  
The United States ◽  
Too Big To Fail ◽  
Interstate Banking ◽  
Legal Constraints ◽  
Federal Deposit Insurance ◽  
Over Time

This article traces the origin of too-big-to-fail policy in modern US banking to the bailout of the $1.2b Bank of the Commonwealth in 1972. It describes this bailout and those of subsequent banks through that of Continental Illinois in 1984. During this period, market concentration due to interstate banking restrictions is a factor in most of the bailouts and systemic risk concerns were raised to justify the bailouts of surprisingly small banks. Finally, most of the bailouts in this period relied on the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation's use of the Essentiality Doctrine and Federal Reserve lending. A discussion of this doctrine is used to illustrate how legal constraints on regulators may become less constraining over time.

Premium setting and bank behavior in a voluntary deposit insurance scheme

2007 ◽  
Vol 29 (2) ◽  
pp. 205-222 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ting-Fang Chiang ◽  
E-Ching Wu ◽  
Min-Teh Yu
Keyword(s):  
Deposit Insurance ◽  
Insurance Scheme ◽  
Bank Behavior

Modis: A Market-Oriented Deposit Insurance Scheme

2002 ◽  
Vol 02 (207) ◽  
pp. 1
Author(s):  
Edda Zoli ◽  
Danyang Xie ◽  
Reza Vaez-Zadeh ◽  
◽  
◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Deposit Insurance ◽  
Insurance Scheme

scholarly journals THE UNIVERSAL INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY MODEL FOR DEPOSIT INSURANCE PAYOUTS

Ekonomika ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 93 (2) ◽  
pp. 147-158
Author(s):  
Raimundas Žilinskas ◽  
Rimvydas Skyrius
Keyword(s):  
Information Technology ◽  
Recovery Rate ◽  
Deposit Insurance ◽  
Basic Function ◽  
Public Confidence ◽  
Technology Support ◽  
Insurance Scheme ◽  
Advantages And Disadvantages ◽  
Information Technology Support

Abstract. The basic function of all deposit insurance schemes is to pay deposit insurance payouts to depositors promptly for the losses they otherwise would suffer in the event of an insured financial institution’s closure. As a result, depositors are relieved of both the recovery-rate and time risks of a liquidation process up to the insured level of their deposits. Deposit insurance payouts – including the speed and convenience – vary across countries and can affect public confidence in the deposit insurance scheme. Information technology support in the payout process is essential. However, one of the major problems in the insurance payout process is the lack of the proper information technology. This paper addresses the factors related to the payout process, discusses the advantages and disadvantages of various approaches, and makes recommendations on the establishment of a universal information technology model for a deposit insurer to accomplish the procedures of insurance payouts.Key words: deposit insurance, deposit insurance payouts, information technology support

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