Premium setting and bank behavior in a voluntary deposit insurance scheme

2007 ◽  
Vol 29 (2) ◽  
pp. 205-222 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ting-Fang Chiang ◽  
E-Ching Wu ◽  
Min-Teh Yu
Keyword(s):  
Deposit Insurance ◽  
Insurance Scheme ◽  
Bank Behavior

scholarly journals Evaluation of European Deposit Insurance Scheme Funding Based on Risk Analysis

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pilar Gómez-Fernández-Aguado ◽  
Eduardo Trigo Mártinez ◽  
Rafael Moreno Ruíz ◽  
Antonio Partal-Ureña
Keyword(s):  
Risk Analysis ◽  
Deposit Insurance ◽  
Insurance Scheme

Modis: A Market-Oriented Deposit Insurance Scheme

2002 ◽  
Vol 02 (207) ◽  
pp. 1
Author(s):  
Edda Zoli ◽  
Danyang Xie ◽  
Reza Vaez-Zadeh ◽  
◽  
◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Deposit Insurance ◽  
Insurance Scheme

scholarly journals KONSEP CROSS-GUARANTEE DALAM PROGRAM PENJAMINAN DAN KEMUNGKINAN PENERAPANNYA DI INDONESIA

2003 ◽  
Vol 1 (4) ◽  
pp. 31-43
Author(s):  
Maulana Ibrahim ◽  
Agusman Agusman
Keyword(s):  
Deposit Insurance ◽  
Too Big To Fail ◽  
Insurance Scheme ◽  
Sensitive Analysis ◽  
Risk Sensitive

Tulisan ini mencoba mengetengahkan salah satu bentuk pikiran alternatif dalam program penjaminan yang dikenal dengan konsep Cross-Guarantee. Sangat berbeda dengan konsep-konsep lainnya dalam program penjaminan, konsep ini sangat progresif dalam hal mempercayakan penyelenggaraan penjaminan kepada mekanisme pasar dan meniadakan intervensi pemerintah, sehingga mengarah sepenuhnya pada swastanisasi baik penyelenggaraan penjaminan maupun pelaksanaan pengaturan dan pengawasan bank yang menyertainya.Sebagai suatu konsep yang ditujukan untuk mengatasi berbagai kelemahan deposit insurance scheme yang berlaku sekarang ini, maka konsep Cross-Guarantee menekankan pentingnya penggunaan pendekatan risk-sensitive analysis dalam penetapan besarnya premi. Konsep ini juga mengupayakan adanya perlakuan yang sama untuk bank-bank besar dan bank-bank kecil dalam memper-oleh penjaminan. Pendekatan Too-Big-To-Fail (TBTF) yang sejak beberapa waktu terakhir telah menimbulkan inkonsistensi dalam proses penjaminan diharapkan dapat dihilangkan oleh konsep ini.Apabila diterapkan sepenuhnya, konsep Cross-Guarantee juga akan mengakibatkan perubahan yang sangat mendasar terhadap seluruh pola dan praktek penjaminan dan pengawasan bank yang sudah dijalankan selama ini. Dengan merujuk pada ide yang dilontarkan Bert Ely tentang Cross- Guarantee, dalam tulisan ini akan didalami prinsip-prinsip dasar yang terkandung dalam konsep tersebut beserta pengaruhnya terhadap pola penjaminan dan pengawasan bank, sekaligus mempelajari kemungkinan penerapannya di Indonesia.

scholarly journals THE UNIVERSAL INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY MODEL FOR DEPOSIT INSURANCE PAYOUTS

Ekonomika ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 93 (2) ◽  
pp. 147-158
Author(s):  
Raimundas Žilinskas ◽  
Rimvydas Skyrius
Keyword(s):  
Information Technology ◽  
Recovery Rate ◽  
Deposit Insurance ◽  
Basic Function ◽  
Public Confidence ◽  
Technology Support ◽  
Insurance Scheme ◽  
Advantages And Disadvantages ◽  
Information Technology Support

Abstract. The basic function of all deposit insurance schemes is to pay deposit insurance payouts to depositors promptly for the losses they otherwise would suffer in the event of an insured financial institution’s closure. As a result, depositors are relieved of both the recovery-rate and time risks of a liquidation process up to the insured level of their deposits. Deposit insurance payouts – including the speed and convenience – vary across countries and can affect public confidence in the deposit insurance scheme. Information technology support in the payout process is essential. However, one of the major problems in the insurance payout process is the lack of the proper information technology. This paper addresses the factors related to the payout process, discusses the advantages and disadvantages of various approaches, and makes recommendations on the establishment of a universal information technology model for a deposit insurer to accomplish the procedures of insurance payouts.Key words: deposit insurance, deposit insurance payouts, information technology support

scholarly journals Does a deposit insurance scheme induce moral hazard among bankers? Evidence from an experiment with bankers

2018 ◽  
Vol 20 (3) ◽  
pp. 353
Author(s):  
Gumilang Aryo Sahadewo ◽  
Bernardinus Maria Purwanto ◽  
Rimawan Pradiptyo
Keyword(s):  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Deposit Insurance ◽  
Empirical Studies ◽  
Credit Market ◽  
Bank Failures ◽  
Insurance Scheme ◽  
Deposit Rate ◽  
Trade Off ◽  
Bank Run ◽  
Do So

The implementation of a deposit insurance scheme entails a trade off. On one hand, as shown in theoretical and empirical studies, a deposit insurance scheme reduces the likelihood of a bank run. On the other hand, a deposit insurance scheme induces moral hazard among bankers that may lead to bank failures. We rigorously test the effect of different deposit coverage limit and the implementation of a differential premium treatment on bankers’ behaviors in the deposit and credit market. We do so by designing a laboratory experiment that involves real bankers as participants. We find that the coverage limit treatments do not have any effect on deposit rate offer. Nevertheless, we find that a high deposit coverage limit induces smaller banks to have a higher share of risky projects. This is evidence of moral hazard particularly among small banks.

scholarly journals RISK TAKING BEHAVIOR OF INDONESIAN BANKS: ANALAYSIS ON THE IMPACT OF DEPOSIT INSURANCE COOPERATION ESTABLISHMENT

2013 ◽  
Vol 15 (3) ◽  
pp. 3-25
Author(s):  
Moch Doddy Ariefianto ◽  
Soenartomo Soepomo
Keyword(s):  
Risk Taking ◽  
Deposit Insurance ◽  
Interest Rate Risk ◽  
Basel Ii ◽  
Data Set ◽  
Explanatory Variables ◽  
Before And After ◽  
Bank Behavior ◽  
Risk Taking Behavior ◽  
The Impact

This paper studies the risk taking behavior of Indonesian Banking Industry, especially before and after the establishment and the implementation of Deposit Insurance Corporation (IDIC). Using common set of explanatory variables; we test several empirical models to reveal the conduct of risk management by banks. In the spirit of BASEL II Accord, this paper take closer look at three types of risk behaviors namely credit risk, market or interest rate risk and operational risk, prior and post the establishment of IDIC. We tested the hypotheses using panel data set of banks operational in period of 2000-2009. The dataset consists of 121 banks with semiannual frequency (2420 observations). Our findings show that these variables explain well the three type bank risk exposures. The implementation of IDIC alters the bank behavior albeit in somewhat different way than initially hypothesized. The risk taking responses also varies across bank types. We found that State Owned Enterprise banks (SOE) behave differently relative to the rest types of the bank. Related to size, SOE banks behave more conservative after the implementation of IDIC. On the other hand its response on conditioned capital post the IDIC implementation is the opposite; they became more aggressive. We view the public pressure on this state banks has influenced the way they manage the risk.Keywords : Risk taking behavior, BASEL II, Deposit Insurance.JEL Classification: G11, G21, G32, C23

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