Game Analysis of Hydropower Bidding under Incomplete Information

2020 ◽  
Vol 104 (sp1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Jiaojiao Li ◽  
Linfeng Zhao
2022 ◽  
Vol 30 (3) ◽  
pp. 0-0

The rapid rise of C2C e-commerce in China has brought serious difficulties to China's tax collection and management. Based on the principle of progressive taxation, the necessity of Taxation on C2C e-commerce is analyzed and discussed. It is shown that the absence of Taxation in C2C e-commerce is contrary to the principle of tax equity and tax neutrality, and the tax revenue is lost.It is demonstrated that it is imperative that China to implement C2C e-commerce taxation in a comprehensive and standardized way. By constructing a hybrid decision game model between C2C business operators and tax authorities, the static game analysis of incomplete information is conducted for the balance of interests between tax authorities and e-commerce operators.


2011 ◽  
Vol 94-96 ◽  
pp. 2233-2237 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kai Jiang ◽  
Ying Peng ◽  
Yu Shui Chen

Rent-seeking behavior in the public project is a problem which the construction administrative departments at all levels always attach great importance to. This paper analyzed the causes and harms of rent-seeking behavior in the public project. At the same time, according to the hypothesis that supervision department can drive its right impartially, this paper established a tripartite incomplete information static game model in the public project, and then analyzed the own rent-seeking behavior of supervision department, and got the specific measures that could reduce rent-seeking behavior.


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