scholarly journals Game Analysis of the Internal Control Information Disclosure of Listed Companies Based on Incomplete Information

Author(s):  
Xiu-Qing Zang ◽  
Ting-Ting Han ◽  
Juan Lv
2011 ◽  
Vol 403-408 ◽  
pp. 1676-1679
Author(s):  
Qi Jie Wang ◽  
Xiao Gang Wu

This paper studied the game theory about that the listed companies used internal control disclosure as signal under the condition of incomplete information, constructed a signal game model to analyze the internal control information disclosure problem under the condition of incomplete information. It also proposed some policy Suggestions to inspire the listed companies to disclose internal control message veritably.


2010 ◽  
Vol 159 ◽  
pp. 162-167
Author(s):  
Hong Ming Chen ◽  
Ya Nan Shi

The internal control is an important means to realize the purpose of organizations, however, the effectiveness of internal control depends on not only the design, more important, but its rationality, completion and effectiveness of operation. The disclosure of internal control information is usually a way of examining the effectiveness of internal control’s operation for management and evaluating the company’s operational condition and forecasting its development foreground for external stakeholders. Due to the lack of unified standards for disclosure of internal control information, the obscurity of responsibility, centralization of ownership and some others, the disclosure of internal control did not implement effectively. Based on the data of the 19 listed companies of real estate companies during 2007-2009, the article analyzes the influence of equity structure, sales growth, financial leverage, net assets yield, and audit opinion on financial report, enterprise scale, total asset turnover and current ratio to the disclosure of internal control information. It applies the principal component analysis (PCA) and multivariate linear regression


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