The Game Analysis of Rent-Seeking Behavior in the Public Project

2011 ◽  
Vol 94-96 ◽  
pp. 2233-2237 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kai Jiang ◽  
Ying Peng ◽  
Yu Shui Chen
Keyword(s):  
Incomplete Information ◽  
Rent Seeking ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Public Project ◽  
Game Analysis ◽  
Static Game ◽  
The Public ◽  
Seeking Behavior

Rent-seeking behavior in the public project is a problem which the construction administrative departments at all levels always attach great importance to. This paper analyzed the causes and harms of rent-seeking behavior in the public project. At the same time, according to the hypothesis that supervision department can drive its right impartially, this paper established a tripartite incomplete information static game model in the public project, and then analyzed the own rent-seeking behavior of supervision department, and got the specific measures that could reduce rent-seeking behavior.

Rent-Seeking Game Analysis and Countermeasure Study of Contractors in Various Stages of Construction Projects

2013 ◽  
Vol 405-408 ◽  
pp. 3473-3476
Author(s):  
Cheng Zhi Li ◽  
Feng Peng
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Social Welfare ◽  
Construction Projects ◽  
Rent Seeking ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Equilibrium Solutions ◽  
Game Analysis ◽  
Countermeasure Study ◽  
The Game Theory ◽  
Seeking Behavior

Project quality is affected by many factors,of which the rent-seeking behavior of the contractor is an important one.In this paper,the contractor’s rent-seeking behavior in various stage of construction projects and its effect to social welfare is analyzed based on the game theory and rent-seeking theory.After building a game model among the owner,contractor and supervisor,some suggestions are propounded to forestall such behavior from the point of equilibrium solutions.

Research on C2C e-commerce taxation based on mixed decision game

2022 ◽  
Vol 30 (3) ◽  
pp. 0-0
Keyword(s):  
Incomplete Information ◽  
Tax Revenue ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Rapid Rise ◽  
Progressive Taxation ◽  
Game Analysis ◽  
Static Game ◽  
Tax Neutrality ◽  
Balance Of Interests ◽  
Collection And Management

The rapid rise of C2C e-commerce in China has brought serious difficulties to China's tax collection and management. Based on the principle of progressive taxation, the necessity of Taxation on C2C e-commerce is analyzed and discussed. It is shown that the absence of Taxation in C2C e-commerce is contrary to the principle of tax equity and tax neutrality, and the tax revenue is lost.It is demonstrated that it is imperative that China to implement C2C e-commerce taxation in a comprehensive and standardized way. By constructing a hybrid decision game model between C2C business operators and tax authorities, the static game analysis of incomplete information is conducted for the balance of interests between tax authorities and e-commerce operators.

scholarly journals Research on C2C E-Commerce Taxation Based on Mixed Decision Game

2022 ◽  
Vol 30 (3) ◽  
pp. 1-14
Author(s):  
Jiamian Yu ◽  
Haiyan Yu
Keyword(s):  
Incomplete Information ◽  
Tax Revenue ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Rapid Rise ◽  
Progressive Taxation ◽  
Game Analysis ◽  
Static Game ◽  
Tax Neutrality ◽  
Balance Of Interests ◽  
Collection And Management

The rapid rise of C2C e-commerce in China has brought serious difficulties to China's tax collection and management. Based on the principle of progressive taxation, the necessity of Taxation on C2C e-commerce is analyzed and discussed. It is shown that the absence of Taxation in C2C e-commerce is contrary to the principle of tax equity and tax neutrality, and the tax revenue is lost.It is demonstrated that it is imperative that China to implement C2C e-commerce taxation in a comprehensive and standardized way. By constructing a hybrid decision game model between C2C business operators and tax authorities, the static game analysis of incomplete information is conducted for the balance of interests between tax authorities and e-commerce operators.

An evolutionary game analysis of user-pay public–private partnership projects

2020 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Danrong Song ◽  
Jinbo Song ◽  
Hehui Yuan ◽  
Yu Fan
Keyword(s):  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Public Private Partnership ◽  
Decision Makers ◽  
Successful Implementation ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Public And Private ◽  
Private Partnership ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Game Analysis ◽  
The Public

PurposeWith the growing demand for infrastructure and public services in recent years, PPP-UP have attracted a great deal of attention. However, while the user focuses on the payment for use and the private sector is concerned with its return on investment, the public sector pays more attention to the efficient utilization of public funds. In order to analyze the willingness of each stakeholder to join PPP-UP, an evolutionary game model involving the three parties is constructed.Design/methodology/approachAn evolutionary game model is established that considers the users and the public and private sectors in user-pay public-private-partnership projects (PPP-UP). Eight scenarios of equilibriums and the game's evolutionary stable strategies are analyzed, and the corresponding stability conditions are then obtained. A situation where all three players are willing to cooperate in theory is also examined. The key influencing parameters that affect cooperation behaviors are further discussed.FindingsFirst, the results illustrate that by properly adjusting the influencing factors, the cooperation status among the three parties can be changed along with certain evolutionary trends. Second, it is hard to modify unsatisfactory evolutionary stability by small changes in both the price compensation of and the construction and operation compensation. Third, it is necessary to involve the users in the decision-making process in PPP-UP and take their demands regarding benefits and payments into account.Originality/valueIn this paper, we focus on PPP-UP to research interactions among the public and private sectors and the users. Based on the analysis of the evolutionary game, to facilitate the successful implementation and development of a project, several conditions are needed to ensure tripartite cooperation. Several recommendations are then proposed for decision-makers in PPP-UP.

The Differential Game Analysis on the Construction Problem of the Public Libraries

2014 ◽  
Vol 687-691 ◽  
pp. 1662-1667
Author(s):  
Xue He ◽  
Shuang Liang Tian ◽  
Ping Chen ◽  
Wen Wen Tian
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Differential Game ◽  
Public Libraries ◽  
Social Utility ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Optimal Solutions ◽  
Game Analysis ◽  
Construction Problem ◽  
The Public ◽  
Differential Game Theory

Using the differential game theory, we studied the investment problem on public libraries, and established the Leader-follower differential game model, which is between the governments and the private enterprises (social organization). By building the Hamiltonian solving the Stackelberg balanced optimal solutions in the main two game players when they choose their strategies. By adjusting the strategy of government and social utility’s coefficient of dynamic to increase the comprehensive social utility of libraries.

Game Analysis of Preventing Conspiracy in Construction Project

2011 ◽  
Vol 50-51 ◽  
pp. 409-413 ◽  
Author(s):  
Li Chao Feng ◽  
Chun Feng Liu ◽  
Shao Hong Yan ◽  
Ai Min Yang ◽  
Jin Peng Wang
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
National Economy ◽  
Construction Project ◽  
Rent Seeking ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Main Body ◽  
Construction Project Management ◽  
Game Analysis ◽  
Project Management System ◽  
Utility Matrix

With rapid growth of national economy, infrastructure construction maintains its vigorous development, but there are some serious problems in this field, for example, construction unit and supervision unit may conspire together to swindle governmental capital. This paper introduces some background which exists in construction project management system, analyses relation and benefit of project’s tripartite main body, and establishes conspiracy game’s utility matrix of construction unit and supervision unit by introducing game theory. By establishing conspiracy game model between construction unit and supervision unit, the paper mainly discusses conspiracy action which may occur between construction unit and supervision unit (rent-seeking and rent-creating), gets equilibrium probabilities of seeking rent and creating rent, and make some further analysis.

Polanyi's Revenge

2013 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 177-186 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lisa L. Martin
Keyword(s):  
Economic Theory ◽  
Market Failure ◽  
Social Institutions ◽  
Rent Seeking ◽  
Global Capitalism ◽  
Decision Makers ◽  
Market Outcomes ◽  
The Public ◽  
The Past ◽  
Seeking Behavior

Since the beginning of the financial crisis of 2008, authors and politicians have regularly reminded us of the duality of crisis and opportunity. For policymakers, administrations, and candidates, crises represent opportunities to implement long-desired reforms, seize the public stage, and reframe old arguments in the light of today's urgency. As the books under review here suggest, crises also represent opportunities for scholars. Arguments that failed to gain traction in the past may now deserve new attention as they help us understand the roots of crisis or how to recover from it. New audiences may be receptive to established arguments, now that other policies have caused us grief and are failing to promote recovery. The public and decision makers could be open to listening to these arguments and their implications, now that crisis has revealed deep vulnerabilities.The three books that form the basis of this review essay represent trenchant critiques of neoliberal economic theory and policies, including such foundational policy assumptions as globalization, deregulation, and reliance on sophisticated financial tools. Their authors, three prominent economists, draw our attention to problems of market failure, such as rampant rent-seeking behavior and externalities. By focusing on entrenched dilemmas that include widening inequality and the compatibility of democracy and globalization, they remind us of the ways in which markets are embedded in social institutions, and how such institutions both respond to markets and shape market outcomes. All bring with them a deep commitment to understanding the functioning of society and how to maintain the benefits of global capitalism while reining in its most destructive implications.

The Analysis of Government Re-Regulation Caused by Externality of Building Energy-Saving

2012 ◽  
Vol 446-449 ◽  
pp. 2267-2271
Author(s):  
Ting Wang ◽  
Qian Li ◽  
Hong Liang Ma
Keyword(s):  
Economic Theory ◽  
Energy Saving ◽  
Market Failure ◽  
Building Energy ◽  
Rent Seeking ◽  
Game Model ◽  
The Game Theory ◽  
Seeking Behavior ◽  
Building Energy Saving ◽  
The Government

In this paper, aiming at the problem of “market failure” in the building energy-saving field, we discuss the principle of externality in this field and analyze how the externality of building energy-saving leads to the rent-seeking behavior of building energy-saving products manufacturers or developers using the economic theory. Based on the Game theory, we analyze the revenue and cost of unproductive activities between building energy-saving regulation department and building energy-saving products manufacturers or developers, how the government supervises and regulates corruption which comes from unproductive activities, and the tripartite game model of the rent-seeking behavior in the domain of energy-saving is built. On the basis of the establishment and solution of the tripartite game model，we put forward effective countermeasures and methods for government re-regulation.

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