scholarly journals Degree of Satisfaction-based Adaptive Interaction in Spatial Prisoner's Dilemma

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jiaqi Li ◽  
Jianwu Dang ◽  
Jianlei Zhang ◽  
Zengqiang Chen ◽  
Matthias Dehmer
Keyword(s):  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
The Other ◽  
Square Lattice ◽  
Game Dynamics ◽  
Degree Of Satisfaction ◽  
Cooperative Dynamics ◽  
Adaptive Interaction ◽  
Spatial Prisoner’S Dilemma

Abstract To study why the altruistic cooperation behavior can emerge and maintain among egoistical individuals, researchers across several disciplines have made great contributions for the solutions of this fascinating problem. Ordinarily, the spatial structure is a most-often used framework to investigate the cooperative dynamics of evolutionary game. However, very few researchers take into account the reaction of evolutionary game dynamics to interactive intensity between individuals. On account of this, we propose a computational model of automatic adjustment the interactive intensity based on individual’s degree of satisfaction to study the iterated prisoner’s dilemma game in a two-dimensional square lattice. In this model, selfish individual considers whether the benefits obtained from the other party satisfies its own requirements to determine the intensity of interaction from it to the other party. More specifically, the interactive intensity from an individual x to its some neighbor y is driven by the relations between x obtained current benefit from y (denoted by Px→y) and x’s satisfaction payoff (denoted by Sp). If Px→y > Sp, x will increase the intensity of interaction from itself to y; On the contrary, if Px→y < Sp, x will weaken the intensity of interaction; Other scenario remain the same. Simulation results show that the proposed mechanism can effectively promote the emergence and maintain of cooperation in population, and the satisfying coefficient α (0 < α < 1) plays an essential role on cooperation. Interestingly, we found that there are some optimal values α can lead to the best promotion of cooperation. But individual’s overclaim (α > 1) is not conducive to the effective promotion of cooperation between selfish individuals even for some very small temptation to defect. Our results may contribute to the understanding of cooperative dynamics by considering the reaction of evolutionary game dynamics to network.

Evolutionary game dynamics of death-birth process with interval payoffs on graphs

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-12
Author(s):  
Bichuan Jiang ◽  
Lan Shu
Keyword(s):  
Natural Selection ◽  
Dynamic Equation ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Fixation Probability ◽  
Weak Selection ◽  
Birth Process ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma Game ◽  
Game Dynamics

In this paper, we study the evolutionary game dynamics of the death-birth process with interval payoffs on graphs. First of all, we derive the interval replication dynamic equation. Secondly, we derive the fixation probability of the B-C prisoner’s dilemma game based on the death-birth process under the condition of weak selection, analyze the condition of the strategy fixed in the population, that is the condition of strategy A being dominant is analyzed. So we can judge whether natural selection is beneficial to strategy A in the game process through this condition. Finally, the feasibility of this method is verified by several examples.

scholarly journals Cooperation evolves by the payoff-difference-based probabilistic reward

2021 ◽  
Vol 94 (11) ◽  
Author(s):  
Tetsushi Ohdaira
Keyword(s):  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
The Other ◽  
Evolution Of Cooperation ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma Game ◽  
The Public ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma Game ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Spatial Prisoner’S Dilemma

Abstract In the previous studies, the author proposes the payoff-difference-based probabilistic peer-punishment that the probability of punishing a defector increases as the difference of payoff between a player and a defector increases and shows that the proposed peer-punishment effectively increases the number of cooperators and the average payoff of all players. On the other hand, reward as well as punishment is considered to be a mechanism promoting cooperation, and many studies have discussed the effect of reward in the public goods game, a multiplayer version of the prisoner’s dilemma game. Based on the discussion of those existing studies, this study introduces the payoff-difference-based probabilistic reward that the probability of rewarding a cooperator increases as the difference of payoff between a player and a cooperator increases. The author utilizes the framework of the spatial prisoner’s dilemma game of the previous study and shows that the reward of this study realizes the evolution of cooperation except some cases. Graphic abstract

scholarly journals Dynamic aspiration based on Win-Stay-Lose-Learn rule in spatial prisoner’s dilemma game

PLoS ONE ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. e0244814
Author(s):  
Zhenyu Shi ◽  
Wei Wei ◽  
Xiangnan Feng ◽  
Xing Li ◽  
Zhiming Zheng
Keyword(s):  
Achievement Motivation ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Typical Feature ◽  
Value Theory ◽  
Rule Base ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma Game ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma Game ◽  
Spatial Prisoner’S Dilemma

Prisoner’s dilemma game is the most commonly used model of spatial evolutionary game which is considered as a paradigm to portray competition among selfish individuals. In recent years, Win-Stay-Lose-Learn, a strategy updating rule base on aspiration, has been proved to be an effective model to promote cooperation in spatial prisoner’s dilemma game, which leads aspiration to receive lots of attention. In this paper, according to Expected Value Theory and Achievement Motivation Theory, we propose a dynamic aspiration model based on Win-Stay-Lose-Learn rule in which individual’s aspiration is inspired by its payoff. It is found that dynamic aspiration has a significant impact on the evolution process, and different initial aspirations lead to different results, which are called Stable Coexistence under Low Aspiration, Dependent Coexistence under Moderate aspiration and Defection Explosion under High Aspiration respectively. Furthermore, a deep analysis is performed on the local structures which cause defectors’ re-expansion, the concept of END- and EXP-periods are used to justify the mechanism of network reciprocity in view of time-evolution, typical feature nodes for defectors’ re-expansion called Infectors, Infected nodes and High-risk cooperators respectively are found. Compared to fixed aspiration model, dynamic aspiration introduces a more satisfactory explanation on population evolution laws and can promote deeper comprehension for the principle of prisoner’s dilemma.

The Prisoner's Dilemma Game and Cooperation in the Rat

1984 ◽  
Vol 55 (3) ◽  
pp. 687-696 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rick M. Gardner ◽  
Terry L. Corbin ◽  
Janelle S. Beltramo ◽  
Gary S. Nickell
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Visual Communication ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Human Subjects ◽  
Cooperative Behavior ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
The Other ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma Game ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma Game ◽  
Cooperative Behaviors

Cooperation in pairs of rats playing the prisoner's dilemma game was investigated. Six pairs of animals were taught to make either cooperative or uncooperative responses by running to one or the other end of a T-maze. Two T-mazes were joined together such that animals could respond simultaneously. Animals were run under conditions in which visual communication was present and absent. Mutually uncooperative responses were the most common and mutually cooperative behaviors the least preferred. Introduction of a barrier between the mazes, which removed visual communication between pairs, sharply accentuated uncooperative behavior. Similarities of the present findings to results with human subjects and the implications of using game theory for studying cooperative behavior in animals are discussed.

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