The Prisoner's Dilemma Game and Cooperation in the Rat

1984 ◽  
Vol 55 (3) ◽  
pp. 687-696 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rick M. Gardner ◽  
Terry L. Corbin ◽  
Janelle S. Beltramo ◽  
Gary S. Nickell

Cooperation in pairs of rats playing the prisoner's dilemma game was investigated. Six pairs of animals were taught to make either cooperative or uncooperative responses by running to one or the other end of a T-maze. Two T-mazes were joined together such that animals could respond simultaneously. Animals were run under conditions in which visual communication was present and absent. Mutually uncooperative responses were the most common and mutually cooperative behaviors the least preferred. Introduction of a barrier between the mazes, which removed visual communication between pairs, sharply accentuated uncooperative behavior. Similarities of the present findings to results with human subjects and the implications of using game theory for studying cooperative behavior in animals are discussed.

2021 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
William Press

This is the story of a minor discovery in mathematical game theory. It concerns the prisoner’s dilemma game, which, played once, involves little strategy. But consider the iterated prisoner’s dilemma (IPD) game. In the IPD, there is information in the previous plays, which each player can use to devise a superior strategy that remains self-interested.


1969 ◽  
Vol 24 (3) ◽  
pp. 711-718 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sarah Jane Noland ◽  
David W. Catron

39 high school girls from the North Carolina School of the Arts (NCSA group) and 39 comparable girls from a regular city-county school system (HS group) were compared on degree of cooperative behavior to assess group differences between artistically oriented students and regular HS students. Cooperative behavior was assessed by having each S make 50 cooperative or competitive choices in the Prisoner's Dilemma game. The NCSA group was expected to be more competitive because within the performing arts, competition is a pervasive characteristic. Each Ss opponent was an accomplice of E who responded according to a predetermined schedule containing 76% cooperative responses. Each S changed opponents (accomplices) and repeated 50 trials under the same conditions. The NCSA group was less cooperative than the HS group ( p < .01) except on the initial trials, and there was less cooperation on the second game than on the first ( p < .01). The HS group did not decrease across trials in Game 1 as had been expected. The decrease in cooperation at the beginning of Game 2 was more marked for the NCSA group. Five scales on the Adjective Check List differentiated the groups.


2021 ◽  
Vol 94 (11) ◽  
Author(s):  
Tetsushi Ohdaira

Abstract In the previous studies, the author proposes the payoff-difference-based probabilistic peer-punishment that the probability of punishing a defector increases as the difference of payoff between a player and a defector increases and shows that the proposed peer-punishment effectively increases the number of cooperators and the average payoff of all players. On the other hand, reward as well as punishment is considered to be a mechanism promoting cooperation, and many studies have discussed the effect of reward in the public goods game, a multiplayer version of the prisoner’s dilemma game. Based on the discussion of those existing studies, this study introduces the payoff-difference-based probabilistic reward that the probability of rewarding a cooperator increases as the difference of payoff between a player and a cooperator increases. The author utilizes the framework of the spatial prisoner’s dilemma game of the previous study and shows that the reward of this study realizes the evolution of cooperation except some cases. Graphic abstract


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