scholarly journals Product Quality Control Strategy of Dual Distribution Channel Structure in Three-Echelon Supply Chain

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lilong Zhu ◽  
Bingjie Lu
Keyword(s):  
Product Quality ◽  
Consumer Surplus ◽  
Retail Price ◽  
Channel Structure ◽  
Quality Level ◽  
Product Quality Control ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Retail Channel ◽  
Quality Control Strategy ◽  
Internet Channel

Abstract Based on the three-stage Stackelberg dynamic game model, this paper considers how to make product quality control strategy in the three-echelon supply chain consisting of the manufacturer, retailer and customer in the case of retailer dual channel structure (traditional retail channel, internet channel) and manufacturer dual channel structure (traditional retail channel, a third-party platform internet channel). When there are two types of decision model (decentralized decision, centralized decision), we analyze the demand price elasticity, market share ratio, revenue sharing ratio and quality cost coefficient how to influence the product demand, product quality level, retail price and direct price in different channels, expected revenue functions of manufacturer and retailer, consumer surplus and product quality control strategy. We find that: First of all, the retail price and direct price are positively related to product quality level, and the product quality level is negatively related with the demand price elasticity in traditional retail channel and the demand price elasticity in internet channel. What's more, the retailers’ retail price in traditional retail channel will be higher than direct price in internet channel. Thirdly, in the case of centralized decision, the manufacturers' product quality level, retail price, joint expected revenue and consumer surplus will all rise, but the direct price will fall. Fourthly, when the manufacturer establishes the dual channel structure, i.e., entrusting the third-party platform to build the internet channel, the manufacturer's product quality level, retail price, direct price, expected revenue, and consumer surplus will all decline. Finally, we conduct the numerical example by Matlab 2018, which verifies the validity and credibility of our conclusions, and points out the direction for the specific application of the model in practice.

scholarly journals Manufacturer's channel selection in a capital-constrained supply chain under bargaining

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Qiang Yan ◽  
Fangyu Ye
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Bank Loans ◽  
Channel Structure ◽  
Direct Channel ◽  
Equity Financing ◽  
Capital Shortage ◽  
Sales Channels ◽  
Optimal Decisions ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Retail Channel

In the context of a capital-constrained supply chain, we examine how a direct channel added by a manufacturer influences the players’ optimal decisions and profits under bargaining. The capital constrained retailer adopts a type of hybrid financing scheme including bank credit and equity financing to alleviate its capital shortage. We characterize the equilibrium results under different sales channels, and examine the impacts of the bank loans ratio and bargaining power on the players’ optimal decisions. The conditions of the equilibrium channel choices are derived. We find that if the retailer’s bank loans ratio in the retail channel is beyond a certain threshold, a dual-channel structure can enhance the profits of the manufacturer and supply chain. The retailer, however, will benefit from the direct channel when its bank loans ratio in the retail channel is below a certain threshold. We further demonstrate that a dual-channel structure can reduce the degree of double marginalization of the overall supply chain. In addition, to solve the potential channel conflict, a bilateral payment mechanism is developed to achieve Pareto improvement for both players. Numerical examples are included to illustrate the major results of the paper.

scholarly journals Pricing and quality decisions in a supply chain with consumers' privacy concern

2022 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
pp. 0
Author(s):  
You Zhao ◽  
Zibin Cui ◽  
Jianxin Chen ◽  
Rui Hou
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Product Quality ◽  
Personal Information ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Consumer Surplus ◽  
Information Loss ◽  
Quality Level ◽  
Selling Price ◽  
Privacy Concern ◽  
Price Increases

<p style='text-indent:20px;'>This study considers a supply chain consists of one manufacturer produces a product with a quality level and sells it through one retailer. A stylized model is developed to investigate the impacts of consumers' privacy concerns on pricing, quality decisions, and profitability through the relationship between product quality and personal information. When consumers' privacy concern is considered, the product quality level, the wholesale price, the payoffs of the manufacturer and retailer, and consumer surplus decrease with the personal information loss, whereas the selling price increases if this loss is low. Our results also show that the retailer prefers to charge a high selling price if the information benefit and the personal information loss are low, or the information benefit is relatively high. Moreover, a "win-win-win" outcome can be achieved among the manufacturer, retailer, and consumers if the personal information loss is sufficiently low. In the case of quality-differentiated products, however, although the manufacturer improves the product quality level, the wholesale prices are increased if the information benefit and the personal information loss are low, or the information benefit is high.</p>

scholarly journals Pricing and Coordination Strategies of Dual Channels Considering Consumers’ Channel Preferences

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (20) ◽  
pp. 11191
Author(s):  
Rufeng Wang ◽  
Siqi Wang ◽  
Shuli Yan
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Customer Loyalty ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Retail Price ◽  
The Internet ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Physical Channel ◽  
Dual Channels ◽  
Channel Preferences ◽  
Internet Channel

With the rapid development of electronic commerce, consumers can freely buy the same product from a manufacturers’ Internet channel or a resellers’ physical channel. Based on the consumers’ channel preferences, this article classifies consumers into three types and investigates the price decision in a dual-channel supply chain using a Stackelberg game, which assumes that the manufacturer, as the game leader, first sets the wholesale price, then the reseller decides the retail price, according to the wholesale price. Furthermore, some numerical experiments are developed to investigate the impact of consumer acceptance, the degree of customer loyalty, and the proportion of identical shoppers on prices and profits. The results show that whether both the retail price and the wholesale price rise or fall depends on a combination of the cost of the physical channel and the Internet shopper’s acceptance of the Internet channel. The reseller’s profit is always lower than the manufacturer’s profit. The reseller’s profit is lower and the manufacturer’s profit is higher, compared with that of a traditional single channel supply chain. The numerical experiments showed that when an Internet shopper’s acceptance of an Internet channel is lower, the wholesale price and retail price in the dual channels will increase with an increase of the degree of customer loyalty (the proportion of identical shoppers). The reseller’s profit (the manufacturer’s profit) will reduce (rise) with the augmentation of the Internet shopper’s acceptance of an Internet channel. Finally, we design a revenue-sharing contract that can coordinate the supply chain and implement a win–win strategy for all partners. This work makes some contributions to the research area of coordination in dual-channel supply chains.

SYSTEM APPROACH TO COAL PRODUCT QUALITY CONTROL

2017 ◽  
Vol 17 (6) ◽  
pp. 13-24
Author(s):  
E.V. Freydina ◽  
◽  
E.V. Freydina ◽  
A.A. Botvinnik ◽  
A.N. Dvornikova ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Quality Control ◽  
Product Quality ◽  
System Approach ◽  
Product Quality Control ◽  
Coal Product
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