scholarly journals A teoria da decisão judicial: como os juízes julgam?

2019 ◽  
Vol 8 (4) ◽  
Author(s):  
Maria Isabel Rosifini Alves Rezende

Como os juízes decidem? A resposta a essa pergunta comporta dois vieses, um seguindo a linha formalista, segundo a qual a atividade de julgar consiste, basicamente, em uma subsunção – isto é, o julgador nada mais é do que um operador de uma grande máquina de silogismo, aplicando a lei abstrata a um caso concreto, de forma mecânica; e outro que observa a linha realista, por meio da qual referida atividade depende, principalmente, de outros elementos, denominados extralegais, por serem alheios ao Direito.O presente ensaio tem como objetivo demonstrar qual movimento se aplica, na prática, ao processo decisório judicial, principalmente no âmbito do Poder Judiciário Brasileiro.Para tanto, será feita, sucintamente, uma distinção entre as linhas formalista e realista. Após, serão expostos alguns métodos e modelos criados com o escopo de esclarecer como funciona o processo de tomada de decisão, bem como será analisado, brevemente, o princípio da imparcialidade, a fim de que se chegue às considerações finais de maneira genérica.Descritores: Teoria da decisão; Decisões Judiciais; Jurisprudência; Julgamento.ReferênciasTumonis V. Legal Realism & Judicial Decision-Making. Jurisprudence. 2012;19(4):1361-82.Posner RA. How judges think. London: Harvard University Press; 2008.Frank J. Courts on trial: mith and reality in american justice. Princeton: Princeton University Press; 1973.Hutcheson Jr JC. Judgment Intuitive: The Function of the “Hunch” in Judicial Decision. 1929, p. 274-88.Richards D. When judges have a hunch – intuition and experience in judicial decision-making. ARSP. 2016;102(2):245-60.Struchiner N, Brando MS. Como os juízes decidem os casos difíceis do direito? Novas Fronteiras da Teoria do Direito: da filosofia moral à psicologia experimental.  Rio de Janeiro: PoD/PUC Rio; 2013.Cestari R, Nojiri S. Intepretações históricas e teóricas do Realismo Jurídico. XXIV Encontro Nacional do CONPEDI – UFS, Teorias da Decisão e Realismo Jurídico; 2015. p. 142-66.Holmes Jr OW. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76. 1905.Leiter B. Rethinking legal realism: toward a naturalized jurisprudence. Tex L Rev. 1997; 76(2):267-315.Friedman B. The politics of judicial review. Tex L Rev. 2005;84(2):257-337.Horta RL, Costa AA. Das Teorias da Interpretação à Teoria da Decisão: por uma perspectiva realista acerca das influências e constrangimentos sobre a atividade judicial. R Opin Jur. 2017;15(20):271-97.Ferreira PFAN. Como decidem os ministros do STF: pontos ideais e dimensões de preferências [dissertação]. Brasília: Universidade de Brasília; 2013.Cross  FB.  Decisionmaking  in  the   U.S.  Circuit Courts of Appeals. Cal L Rev. 2003;91(6):1457-515.Hughes CE. Addresses and papers of Charles Evans Hughes,Governor of New York,1906-1908. New York: GP Putnam’s Sons; 1908.Ribeiro LM, Arguelhes DW. Preferências, Estratégias e Motivações: Pressupostos institucionais de teorias sobre comportamento judicial e sua transposição para o caso brasileiro, Rev Direito e Prax. 2013;4(7):85-121.Segal JA, Spaeth HJ. The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 1993.Kahneman D, Frederick S. A model of heuristic judgment. The Cambridge handbook of thinking and reasoning. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 2005.Stanovich KE, West RF. Individual differences in reasoning: implications for the rationality debate? Heuristics and biases: the psychology of intuitive judgment. Gilovich T, Griffin D, Kahneman D (org). New York: Cambridge University Press; 2002.Costa EJF. Levando a imparcialidade a sério: proposta de um modelo interseccional entre direito processual, economia e psicologia [tese]. São Paulo:Pontifícia Universidade Católica; 2016.Guthrie C, Rachlinski JJ, Wistrich AJ. Blinking on the bench: how judges decide cases. Cornell L Rev. 2007; 93(1):1-43.

Legal Theory ◽  
2010 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 111-133 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brian Leiter

In teaching jurisprudence, I typically distinguish between two different families of theories of adjudication—theories of how judges do or should decide cases. “Formalist” theories claim that (1) the law is “rationally” determinate, that is, the class of legitimate legal reasons available for a judge to offer in support of his or her decision justifies one and only one outcome either in all cases or in some significant and contested range of cases (e.g., cases that reach the stage of appellate review); and (2) adjudication is thus “autonomous” from other kinds of reasoning, that is, the judge can reach the required decision without recourse to nonlegal normative considerations of morality or political philosophy. I also note that “formalism” is sometimes associated with the idea that judicial decision-making involves nothing more than mechanical deduction on the model of the syllogism—Beccaria, for example, expresses such a view. I call the latter “Vulgar Formalism” to emphasize that it is not a view to which anyone today cares to subscribe.


2008 ◽  
Vol 33 (03) ◽  
pp. 779-803 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul Frymer

This essay reviews the recent volume edited by Ronald Kahn and Ken I. Kersch, The Supreme Court and American Political Development(2006), as well as the broader literature by law scholars interested in American Political Development (APD). The Law and APD literature has advanced our knowledge about courts by placing attention on the importance of executive and legislative actors, and by providing political context to our understanding of judicial decision making. But this knowledge would be more powerful if it would embrace the broader APD field's orientation toward the importance of state and institutional autonomy for understanding politics and political change. Law and APD scholars could go further in examining the ways in which courts and judges act institutionally, and how the legal branch as an institution impacts American politics and state-building. In doing so, Law and APD scholars would contribute not only to our understanding of judicial decision making but also to our understanding of the place and importance of courts in American politics.


2006 ◽  
Vol 37 (1) ◽  
pp. 153
Author(s):  
Bevan Marten

This article is a book review of E W Thomas The Judicial Process (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2005) (414 + xxvi pages) Hardback NZ$180. In his belief that too many judges are simply 'muddling along' without a sound conception of what their role entails, Justice Thomas (a retired judge) has written a book putting forward a theory of judicial decision-making. The book represents the development of Thomas' thinking since an earlier monograph on the subject, but the two pillars on which he bases his theory remain unchanged: that the demands of justice in the individual case, and the requirement that the law meets society's reasonable needs, be at the forefront of every judgment. Marten notes that the book is deliberately pitched at a level that many people can read and enjoy. On the whole, Marten states that the book is a well-written and engaging book by one of New Zealand's most distinctive judges.


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