Agrarian Justice and Contextuality in Maxim Fiat Justitia Ruat Caelum and Fiat Justitia Ne Pereat Mundus

Maxim is a short sentence with deep meaning related to value and purpose of law include agrarian law. This article analyse the meaning of fiat justitia ruat caelum and fiat justitia ne pereat mundus as well as its relation to agrarian justice and its contextuality. Both of those maxim are paradigmatically analysed. This is a normative juridical research, use conceptual and historical approach with secondary data then qualitatively analysed. Concluded that fiat justitia ruat caelum and fiat justitia pereat mundus is part of legal formalism. The agrarian justice is achieved when the law is enforced as the text and its acontextual. In contrast, fiat justitia ne pereat mundus consider law is valid when it is according to the purpose and agrarian justice exist when it bring out prosperity for all people. Paradigmatically, fiat justicia ruat caelum and fiat justitia pereat mundus fall in positivism paradigm, consider rule is perfect, no interpretation, separation of law and morality, impossibility of interdisciplinary approach. In another hand, fiat justitia ne pereat mundus falls in post positivism paradigm which consider law is imperfect, interpretation is possible, no separation of law and morality and interdisciplinary approch is opened. The law is acontextual.

Angle of Deflection

This chapter reflects on the principle of 'angle of deflection' or 'measurable deflection'. This principle has been utilized superbly by Mark Cohen in his path-breaking work on Jewish economic activity in the Islamic world. But the principle of angle of deflection still has its critics. Some have seen in it a reflection of legal formalism. Whether law develops from within, as a consequence of an internal dynamic, or whether its motor force is social pressures and the personal predilections and ideologies of judges is an ancient jurisprudential question. The principle of angle of deflection is, however, not a jurisprudential but an evidentiary one. Both formalists and realists agree that the dominant motor force in a system does not operate to the exclusion of all else. The rule of the angle of deflection provides the historian with a criterion by which to assess whether or not a specific jurist in a specific case was influenced by outside considerations.

The Ethos of Arbitration

This chapter describes the ethos of arbitration. It first distinguishes between two well-known schools of thought regarding how legal decision-makers make decisions, how judges and arbitrators decide cases. It also looks at legal formalism and legal realism, at justification and decision-making, and at rules and ethos. Ultimately, the chapter argues that the ethos of arbitration plays a role in the decisions that arbitration produces. However, this ethos is not necessarily one that is suited for all the different types of parties and disputes that arbitration has come to cover. It also may not be one that current political societies will necessarily condone now that they are becoming aware of it. Moreover, it probably is even damaging for the arbitration industry in the longer run.

Canaries in the Mineshaft of American Democracy: North American Settler Genocide in the Thought of Raphaël Lemkin

Although it is often assumed that Raphael Lemkin’s original concept of genocide related only to Nazi atrocities, in fact the elements of the offense as Lemkin construed it predate his elaboration of genocide in Axis Rule in Europe. It is clear from Lemkin’s published and unpublished writings that he intended his definition to apply to other mass exterminations, including settler-Indian interactions on the North American frontier. Lemkin forsook the constrictive hermeneutics of legal formalism in favour of a broad understanding of genocide. At the heart of his concept was a concern with the preservation of unique cultural forms—the very phenomena under threat from civilian settler colonialism. Lemkin’s surprisingly non-legalistic concept of genocide is rooted less in 20th century legal developments than in European Romanticism. While law was the integument of his concept, the urge to protect cultural ways of being in the world was its life-blood.