A tale of the land, the insider, the outsider and human rights (an exploration of some problems and possibilities in the relationship between the English common law property concept, human rights law, and discourses of exclusion and inclusion)

Legal Studies ◽  
2003 ◽  
Vol 23 (1) ◽  
pp. 33-65 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anna Grear

This paper examines the interplay between discourses of exclusion and inclusion in the relationship between land law and human rights. It explores the common law conception of property in land and its relationship with the conceptual structure of property before suggesting that the particular form the conception takes in the English common law is problematic as a discourse of exclusion in the light of inclusive human rights considerations. However, further submerged exclusions in law are also explored, suggesting a problematic ideological continuity between land law and human rights law, notwithstanding identifiable surface tensions between them as contrasting discourses. Once the continuity of hidden exclusions is identified, the paper explores the theoretical unity between the deep structure of property as ‘propriety’ and human rights as ‘what is due’, and suggests their mutual potential for embracing more inclusive concerns. Finally, two modest proposals for future theoretical reform are offered: the need for a more anthropologically adequate and inclusive construct of the human being as legal actor, and the need for a more differentiated, context-sensitive formulation of the common law1 property conception, one capable of reconciling conceptually necessary elements of excludability with inclusive human rights impulses.

2020 ◽  
Vol 43 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Kirby

This article examines the decision in Al-Kateb v Godwin (2004) 219 CLR 562. It revisits the suggested ‘heresy‘ that international human rights law may influence the interpretation of the Australian Constitution and other legal texts. Accessing universal human rights law, including in constitutional adjudication, was endorsed in the Bangalore Principles on the Domestic Application of International Human Rights Norms 1988. The author suggests that interpreting statutory language in this way is not dissimilar to the common-law principle of interpreting statutes so as to uphold basic rights. But should an analogous approach be permissible in deciding the meaning of constitutional language? Although arguably invoked by the majority of the High Court in Mabo v Queensland [No 2] (1992) 175 CLR 1, in the context of declaring the common-law, so far this approach has not been accepted for constitutional elaboration in Australia. But should this be so in the age of global problems and internationalism?


2012 ◽  
Vol 21 (1) ◽  
pp. 141-152
Author(s):  
Carol Brennan

WHO HAS FIRST CLAIM ON “THE LOYALTY OF THE LAW”?Smith v Chief Constable of the Sussex Police (hereafter Smith) was heard by the House of Lords at the same time as Chief Constable of the Hertfordshire Police v Van Colle and another because they had two uniting factors. First, they both concerned the recurring question of the ambit of police liability in the situation described by Lord Bingham thus: “…if the police are alerted to a threat that D may kill or inflict violence on V, and the police take no action to prevent that occurrence, and D does kill or inflict violence on V, may V or his relatives obtain civil redress against the police, and if so, how and in what circumstances?”2  Secondly, considering the cases together highlighted the wider issue of the relationship between decisions under the Human Rights Act 1998 (hereafter the HRA) and the development of the common law. The Law Lords embarked on a more extensive examination of these issues in Smith and thus that case will be the exclusive focus of this note.  In addition, the study of Smith raises questions regarding proposals for law reform as well as about judicial perceptions of policy priorities. 


2014 ◽  
Vol 42 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-25 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dan Meagher

The Human Rights (Parliamentary Scrutiny) Act 2011 (Cth) (‘the Act’) has established a new model of pre-legislative rights scrutiny of proposed Commonwealth laws. This is undertaken by the political arms of government and involves: (1) the requirement that a statement of (human rights) compatibility must accompany proposed laws and certain legislative instruments when introduced into Parliament; and (2) the establishment of the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights (‘PJCHR’) which regularly reports to the Parliament on the compatibility of its proposed laws with human rights. This article looks at the relationship between the Act – and these two new mechanisms – and the interpretive role of the courts. It does so by first considering the (possible) direct use of statements of compatibility and PJCHR reports by Australian courts in the interpretation of Commonwealth laws that engage human rights. It then assesses whether the Act may exert an indirect influence on the content and scope of the common law interpretive presumptions that protect human rights.


Author(s):  
Mark P. Thompson ◽  
Martin George

In addition to the concepts of tenure and estates, another fundamental aspect of England’s Land Law is the impact of equity. The intervention of equity was originally based upon the need to enforce obligations of conscience and to redress defects in the common law, and also gave rise to the trust. But while the trust might be equity’s greatest creation, the intervention of equity also addressed other areas of Land Law where the common law position was considered to be defective or oppressive. A notable example is the law of mortgages. Aside from modifying the common law, equity also recognized other rights that did not result in the beneficial entitlement to the land. This chapter discusses the historical basis of equity in England, the creation of equitable rights, the enforceability of equitable and legal rights, and human rights.


Author(s):  
Martin George ◽  
Antonia Layard

In addition to the concepts of tenure and estates, another fundamental aspect of England’s Land Law is the impact of equity. The intervention of equity was originally based upon the need to enforce obligations of conscience and to redress defects in the common law, and also gave rise to the trust. But while the trust might be equity’s greatest creation, the intervention of equity also addressed other areas of Land Law where the common law position was considered to be defective or oppressive. A notable example is the law of mortgages. Aside from modifying the common law, equity also recognized other rights that did not result in the beneficial entitlement to the land. This chapter discusses the historical basis of equity in England, the creation of equitable rights, the enforceability of equitable and legal rights, and human rights.


Legal Studies ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 40 (2) ◽  
pp. 209-229
Author(s):  
Achas K Burin

AbstractTwenty years after the Human Rights Act 1998 came into force, where are we in our understanding of the relationship between tort and human rights? This paper argues that we are not as far along in our understanding as we could be. The reason for that has been the methodology we used to understand the relationship, focused as it was around remedies, limitation and causation. This paper proposes a new approach, based around the right rather than the remedy. It aims to theorise one particular cause of action – the duty in Osman v United Kingdom – to exemplify this approach. For English lawyers, who have historically used the framework of the forms of action to understand our own law, it is argued that this a good way to comprehend the European jurisprudence.


Obiter ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 41 (2) ◽  
pp. 239-256
Author(s):  
Jamil Ddamulira Mujuzi

Customary law has been part of Ugandan law for many years. Section 2 of the Local Council Courts Act, 2006 defines “customary law” to mean “the rules of conduct established by custom and long usage having the force of law and not forming part of the common law nor formally enacted in any legislation”. Ugandan courts have explained the relationship between customary law and other laws. In 1995, Uganda adopted a constitution that includes, among other things, a bill of rights that prohibits discriminatory and degrading laws and customs. This was informed during the making of the Constitution by the arguments of many Ugandans that discriminatory and degrading customary practices and laws should be abolished by the Constitution. In this article, the author illustrates the steps that have been taken by the drafters of the Constitution, Parliament (through legislation) and courts to outlaw discriminatory and degrading cultural practices. The author recommends ways in which some of these measures could be strengthened.


2014 ◽  
Vol 26 ◽  
pp. 62-97 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jocelynne Scutt

Nullity law in Australia and Fiji provides that marriages can be void on various grounds, including duress and fraud. Despite some differences, United Kingdom (UK) law says marriages can be void or voidable on similar grounds. Courts in each jurisdiction have granted annulment in cases of forced marriage where duress “threatens life and limb”. Courts now say lesser force or threats, including pressure to comply with religious or traditional duty, can nullify marriage. Yet courts continue to require high level force such as passport confiscation, physical abuse, threats of eviction from the family home, and economic harm. This, as with allegations of fraud which receive short shrift, results from returning to common law authorities decided before migration resulted in significant demographic changes, particularly regarding culture and religion. UK authority draws a distinction between “forced” and “arranged” marriages, saying nullity is granted rightly in cases of the former, yet because “culture” “sanctifies” the latter, refusing nullity is right. Yet is this distinction valid? Should such marriages be recognised by Australian, Fijian and UK courts as contracted with full and free consent of the parties? An exploration of contemporary cases against the common law background to fraud and duress as nullity grounds indicates that allowing culture to be the measure denies women’s (and sometimes men’s) entitlement to contract marriage with full and free consent according to international human rights law.


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