scholarly journals Self-Regulation and Social Welfare: The Political Economy of Corporate Environmentalism

1998 ◽  
Author(s):  
John W. Maxwell ◽  
Thomas P. Lyon ◽  
Steven C. Hackett
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Social Welfare ◽  
Self Regulation ◽  
The Political ◽  
Corporate Environmentalism

scholarly journals Self‐Regulation and Social Welfare: The Political Economy of Corporate Environmentalism

2000 ◽  
Vol 43 (2) ◽  
pp. 583-618 ◽  
Author(s):  
John W. Maxwell ◽  
Thomas P. Lyon ◽  
Steven C. Hackett
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Social Welfare ◽  
Self Regulation ◽  
The Political ◽  
Corporate Environmentalism

scholarly journals The Political Economy of Agricultural Trade Negotiations on the Uruguay Round of MTN: Can the U.S. and European Community Reach an Acceptable Compromise in the GATT?

1992 ◽  
Vol 24 (2) ◽  
pp. 163-172 ◽  
Author(s):  
Glen C.W. Ames
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Social Welfare ◽  
European Community ◽  
Agricultural Policy ◽  
Uruguay Round ◽  
Agricultural Trade ◽  
Policy Formulation ◽  
Trade Negotiations ◽  
The Political ◽  
The U.S

AbstractA model of the political economy of agricultural policy formulation was used to analyze the current stalemate in the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations. The combination of social welfare increasing and transferring policies in the European Community and the U.S. is one of the primary causes of the deadlock in trade negotiations. The Community's farm policy of high internal price supports, limited market access, and export subsidies represents short-term equilibria in the market for social-welfare policies which distribute benefits to producers at the expense of consumers and taxpayers. Thus, the opportunity for internal reform of the CAP leading to a compromise in the GATT negotiations is problematic at best. However, international commitments to agricultural policy reform will force the Community to make concessions which will bring equivalent change in domestic policy.

scholarly journals Political Economy From the Perspective of Ibn Khaldun

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Moch Bukhori Muslim ◽  
Saepullah Saepullah ◽  
Any Widayatsari
Keyword(s):  
Economic Growth ◽  
Political Economy ◽  
Social Welfare ◽  
The Political ◽  
Budget Management ◽  
Ibn Khaldun ◽  
Income Sources ◽  
The Social ◽  
The Creation

Te political economy encompasses the management of revenues and spending to achieve the social welfare of the community. Hence, development is not solely emphasized economic growth but also equity. Tis article discusses the political economy according to Ibn Khaldun, written in his book, Muqaddimah. Tis study concludes that that political budgets must be carried out in a balanced manner by establishing budget certainty and increasing the discipline in use of the budget. Legislators make laws, referring to the creation of income sources so that the community will be able to meet their needs independently, and thegovernment can gather capabilities to carry out their duties and functions. Ibn Khaldun saw budget management as a means to solve public matters while also factoring the interests of rulers and governments.

scholarly journals Book Review: S. Narayan. 2018. The Dravidian Years: Politics and Welfare in Tamil Nadu.

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Swati Narayan
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Economic Development ◽  
Social Justice ◽  
Social Welfare ◽  
Social History ◽  
Tamil Nadu ◽  
The Political ◽  
Public Administrator ◽  
Over Time

Narayan’s book The Dravidian Years provides a rare glimpse of the political economy landscape of the most transformative period in Tamil Nadu’s social history from an insider’s perspective of a former public administrator who has served for three decades in the Indian bureaucracy. The book depicts the southern Indian state’s evolution from a deeply casteist British province to one with a radical social justice agenda, which over time however mutates into a more diluted hybrid amalgamation of capitalistic economic development with an ingrained ethos of populist social welfare.

scholarly journals The political economy of immigration and welfare state effort: evidence from Europe

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (3) ◽  
pp. 357-375 ◽  
Author(s):  
Clare Fenwick
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Welfare State ◽  
Social Welfare ◽  
Welfare States ◽  
The Political ◽  
Foreign Born ◽  
Political Issue ◽  
Welfare Provision ◽  
Welfare Spending ◽  
Welfare Generosity

AbstractThis article explores whether immigration plays a role in determining national welfare state effort in 16 European countries. It examines the relationship between stocks of migrants, the foreign-born population, on two different indicators of welfare state effort – social welfare spending as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) and a welfare generosity index. The nexus between immigration and welfare is a controversial and highly sensitive political issue, and as such it typically divides opinion. Traditionally, it has been argued that increases in immigration create pressures for governments to reduce levels of social welfare provision. By building on theories and results from the political economy literature, this article provides further evidence on the debate through using a fresh approach to operationalize welfare state effort. The empirical results show that the foreign-born population has a positive and statistically significant relationship with social welfare spending and no statistically significant association with the welfare generosity index. The findings provide no evidence to support the hypothesis that the higher levels of immigration lead to reduced levels of social welfare provision. On the contrary, these findings lend support to the view that increasing immigration leads to welfare state expansion rather than retrenchment, and that European welfare states remain resilient in the face of the globalization of migration.

scholarly journals Social Welfare Effects of Transparency and Misinformation in a Political Economy

2019 ◽  
Vol 51 (3) ◽  
pp. 485-494 ◽  
Author(s):  
David S. Bullock ◽  
Klaus Mittenzwei ◽  
Timothy E. Josling
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Theoretical Model ◽  
Social Welfare ◽  
Welfare Effects ◽  
The Political ◽  
False Information ◽  
Misleading Information ◽  
Game Theoretical Model ◽  
Political Agents

AbstractWe present a game-theoretical model arguing that greater public transparency does not necessarily lead to higher social welfare. Political agents can benefit from providing citizens with misleading information aimed at aligning citizens’ choices with the political agents’ preferences. Citizens can lose from being fooled by political agents, though they can mitigate their losses by conducting costly inspections to detect false information. Producing and detecting false information is costly and can reduce social welfare.

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