Managing Supply Uncertainty Under Chain-to-Chain Competition

Author(s):  
Biying Shou ◽  
Jianwei Huang ◽  
Zhaolin Li
Keyword(s):  
2017 ◽  
Vol 32 (3) ◽  
pp. 2394-2405 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bining Zhao ◽  
Antonio J. Conejo ◽  
Ramteen Sioshansi

2011 ◽  
Vol 208 (1) ◽  
pp. 581-592 ◽  
Author(s):  
Taesu Cheong ◽  
Chelsea C. White

2020 ◽  
pp. 1-23
Author(s):  
Zhibing Liu ◽  
Chi Zhou ◽  
Guoli Wang

We consider an order problem for two channels consisting of one common retailer and two competing suppliers that are subject to supply uncertainty. A new concept of supply risk level (SRL) of a channel is proposed to quantitatively characterize the supply risk of the channel due to supply uncertainty. Under different SRLs, we study the order strategies for the two channels in integrated and decentralized supply chains. Regardless of whether the game is integrated or decentralized, we find that the different SRLs give rise to a difference between the belief-degree costs of the two channels that directly influences the optimal order strategy, market supply and profit of each channel. This implies that the decision maker of the supply chain can take different risk attitudes toward the supply uncertainty of the two channels to adjust the potential market supply and profit of each channel because the decision maker generally replaces the SRL with his or her risk preference. Under given SRLs, we find that integration is a better strategy than decentralization. However, the channel profit with a higher belief-degree cost under decentralization is greater than that under integration in some cases. Finally, proper risk preferences for both channels are suggested to strike a balance between supply reliability and supply risk.


2020 ◽  
Vol 54 (3) ◽  
pp. 883-911 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zhibing Liu ◽  
Geni Xu ◽  
Chi Zhou ◽  
Huiru Chen

The main reason why supply uncertainty reduces supply chain performance is that it is difficult to estimate whether uncertain supply matches demand. Seldom do papers study retailers’ decision-selection problems according to the reliability of uncertain supply in satisfying demand. This paper considers the optimal decision selection of a retailer working with a main supplier facing supply uncertainty and a backup supplier whose yield is infinite or uncertain. The retailer can enforce demand management by adjusting prices, seeking the backup supplier to make up for the lack of products or mixing the two decisions. We provide the definition called the reliability level of serving the market (RLSM) to characterize the reliability of uncertain supply in satisfying market demand. Under different RLSMs, the participants maximize their profits based on a confidence level in three scenarios: benchmark, infinite backup supply and uncertain backup supply. Whether the main supplier determines the wholesale price or not, we find that in the benchmark, the retailer orders from the main supplier if the RLSM is low; otherwise, the retailer gives up purchasing the product. In the latter two scenarios, our results show that the particular order strategy chosen by the retailer depends on the values of the RLSM and that the retailer’s order quantity follows threshold rules. It is interesting that for different RLSMs, the retailer chooses either a price adjustment strategy, a backup supply strategy or neither of them but does not choose the mixed one, which is counterintuitive. We also derive the particular scenario that is good for the retailer by comparing the results in the three scenarios. Finally, a proper RLSM is suggested for the retailer to balance the reliability of serving the market and her profit.


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