scholarly journals Labor Market Pooling and Human Capital Investment Decisions

2009 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elke Amend ◽  
Patrick Herbst
2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 125-155 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Waldman ◽  
Ori Zax

In a world characterized by asymmetric learning, promotions can serve as signals of worker ability, and this, in turn, can result in inefficient promotion decisions. If the labor market is competitive, the result will be practices that reduce this distortion. We explore how this logic affects human capital investment decisions. We show that, if commitment is possible, investments will be biased toward the accumulation of firm-specific human capital. We also consider what happens when commitment is not possible and show a number of results including that, if investment choices are not publicly observable, choices are frequently efficient. (JEL D82, J24, J31, M12, M51)


1993 ◽  
Vol 25 (2) ◽  
pp. 82-94 ◽  
Author(s):  
Judith I. Stallmann ◽  
Thomas G. Johnson ◽  
Ari Mwachofi ◽  
Jan L. Flora

AbstractHuman capital theory suggests that job opportunities will create incentives for human capital investment. If job information does not flow freely, or if they prefer not to move, students will make investment decisions based upon local job markets. Communities with a high percentage of low-skill jobs which do not reward high school and higher education do not create incentives for students to finish high school or continue beyond high school. Data from Virginia support this hypothesis. Targeted job creation, and improved labor market information may create incentives for increased human capital investment in many rural communities.


2012 ◽  
Vol 61 (1) ◽  
pp. 157-186 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Akresh ◽  
Emilie Bagby ◽  
Damien de Walque ◽  
Harounan Kazianga

2000 ◽  
Vol 90 (1) ◽  
pp. 73-95 ◽  
Author(s):  
David E Wildasin

This paper presents a general-equilibrium model where human capital investment increases specialization and exposes skilled workers to region-specific earnings risk. Interjurisdictional mobility of skilled labor mitigates these risks; state-contingent migration of skilled labor also improves efficiency. With perfect capital markets, labor-market integration raises welfare and reduces ex post earnings inequality. If instead human capital investment can only be financed through local taxes, labor-market integration leads to interjurisdictional fiscal competition, shifting the burden of taxation to low-skilled immobile workers. Decentralized public provision of human capital investment creates earnings inequalities and is inefficient. (JEL H00)


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