Property Tax and Its Effects on Strategic Behavior of Leasing and Selling for a Durable-Good Monopolist

2009 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jae-Cheol Kim ◽  
Kim Minyoung ◽  
Se Hak Chun
Keyword(s):  
Strategic Behavior ◽  
Property Tax ◽  
Durable Good

Property tax and its effects on strategic behavior of leasing and selling for a durable-goods monopolist

2014 ◽  
Vol 29 ◽  
pp. 132-144 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jae-Cheol Kim ◽  
Min-Young Kim ◽  
Se-Hak Chun
Keyword(s):  
Durable Goods ◽  
Strategic Behavior ◽  
Property Tax ◽  
Durable Goods Monopolist

Timing of Emissions and Effects of Emission Taxes in Durable-Goods Oligopolies

2018 ◽  
Vol 18 (4) ◽  
Author(s):  
Amagoia Sagasta ◽  
José M. Usategui
Keyword(s):  
Imperfect Competition ◽  
Durable Goods ◽  
Strategic Behavior ◽  
Consumer Surplus ◽  
Perfect Competition ◽  
Emission Tax ◽  
Durable Good ◽  
Emission Taxes ◽  
The Future ◽  
Future Emission

Abstract Given an oligopoly of firms that produce and sell a durable good that causes pollution at production, during use or at disposal, the effects of present and future emission taxes on quantities, emissions, consumer surplus, producer surplus and the sum of consumer and producer surpluses and the revenue from emission taxes for each type of emission are analyzed. Among other results, it is proved that producers may support an increase in the emission tax in the future or in the present, that emissions in the present may be increasing in the emission tax in the future and that the timing of emissions may affect the directions of some effects of a change in an emission tax on welfare variables. The results obtained are based on the interaction between present and future emission taxes, the intertemporal effects of such taxes, imperfect competition, the strategic behavior of each firm in stealing sales from its rivals in the present and in the future, the type of emission and the producers’ commitment problem. The analysis is extended to the cases of monopoly and perfect competition.

Subjective Time Preference and Willingness to Pay for an Energy-Saving Durable Good

2001 ◽  
Vol 32 (3) ◽  
pp. 133-141 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gerrit Antonides ◽  
Sophia R. Wunderink
Keyword(s):  
Willingness To Pay ◽  
Energy Saving ◽  
Subjective Time ◽  
Durable Good ◽  
Discount Function ◽  
Hyperbolic Discount ◽  
The One ◽  
Two Parameter ◽  
Difference Effect ◽  
Better Than

Summary: Different shapes of individual subjective discount functions were compared using real measures of willingness to accept future monetary outcomes in an experiment. The two-parameter hyperbolic discount function described the data better than three alternative one-parameter discount functions. However, the hyperbolic discount functions did not explain the common difference effect better than the classical discount function. Discount functions were also estimated from survey data of Dutch households who reported their willingness to postpone positive and negative amounts. Future positive amounts were discounted more than future negative amounts and smaller amounts were discounted more than larger amounts. Furthermore, younger people discounted more than older people. Finally, discount functions were used in explaining consumers' willingness to pay for an energy-saving durable good. In this case, the two-parameter discount model could not be estimated and the one-parameter models did not differ significantly in explaining the data.

PROPERTY TAX: THE SOUTH AFRICAN AND KWAZULU-NATAL EXPERIENCE

2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joey Krishnan ◽  
Roshinee Naidoo ◽  
Greg Cowden
Keyword(s):  
South African ◽  
Property Tax ◽  
The South ◽  
Kwazulu Natal

Determinants of Property Tax Revenue : Lessons from Empirical Analysis

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rajul Awasthi ◽  
Tuan Minh Le ◽  
Chenli You
Keyword(s):  
Empirical Analysis ◽  
Property Tax ◽  
Tax Revenue

The Internet is a Semicommons

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
James Grimmelmann
Keyword(s):  
Open Field ◽  
Online Communities ◽  
Strategic Behavior ◽  
Private Property ◽  
The Internet ◽  
Field System ◽  
Technical Features ◽  
Dynamic Interplay ◽  
Enormous Success

78 Fordham Law Review 2799 (2010)The Internet is a semicommons. Private property in servers and network links coexists with a shared communications platform. This distinctive combination both explains the Internet's enormous success and illustrates some of its recurring problems.Building on Henry Smith's theory of the semicommons in the medieval open-field system, this essay explains how the dynamic interplay between private and common uses on the Internet enables it to facilitate worldwide sharing and collaboration without collapsing under the strain of misuse. It shows that key technical features of the Internet, such as its layering of protocols and the Web's division into distinct "sites," respond to the characteristic threats of strategic behavior in a semicommons. An extended case study of the Usenet distributed messaging system shows that not all semicommons on the Internet succeed; the continued success of the Internet depends on our ability to create strong online communities that can manage and defend the infrastructure on which they rely. Private and common both have essential roles to play in that task, a lesson recognized in David Post's and Jonathan Zittrain's recent books on the Internet.

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