scholarly journals Regulating the International Audit Market and the Removal of Barriers to Entry: The Provision of Non Audit Services by Audit Firms and the 2006 Statutory Audit Directive

Author(s):  
Marianne Ojo
2021 ◽  
Vol 19 (164) ◽  
pp. 724-742
Author(s):  
Ovidiu Constantin Bunget ◽  
Alin-Constantin Dumitrescu ◽  
Rodica Gabriela Blidisel ◽  
Oana Alina Bogdan ◽  
Valentin Burca ◽  
...  

The audit market, developed out of the need to strengthen the credibility and the quality of financial reporting, has led since the 1980s to a concentration around large audit firms, the dominance effect being marked on the one hand by the auditor’s increasing reputation and notoriety, and on the other hand by the client’s association with a reputed auditor, which contributes to improving the company’s image on the market. In this context, a major issue is represented by the level of the fees charged, as they represent key elements that may affect the auditor’s independence. Moreover, a sensitive aspect is the relationship between the fee charged for financial audit services and the one for non-audit services and the compensation practices between them. The European Commission wants to facilitate competition in an overly concentrated market and also provide the opportunity for small and medium-sized audit firms to become active players in the large corporate audit market through joint audit, in which at least one of the audit firms is not part of the Big4 group. The mandatory audit firm rotation and the limitation on the non-audit services provided are the main aspects of the recent audit reform that directly influences the fee level. The main purpose of this study is to analyse whether there is a pattern of audit costs at the community level. In this context, this paper aims to assess the uniformity of audit costs, namely to determine the structure of the audit market in the European Union. The research involves data set comparison methods, by analysing a sample of 2,896 firms listed on the stock exchange in 35 different states over the period 2013-2021.


2009 ◽  
Vol 36 (1) ◽  
pp. 29-59 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ignace De Beelde ◽  
Nathalie Gonthier-Besacier ◽  
Alain Mikol

The objective of this paper is to trace the development of the French auditing profession, the commissaires aux comptes, focusing on the appearance of the large Anglo-American audit firms on the French market. The French audit market has always shown a number of peculiarities, including the continued importance of a number of local audit firms. The French auditing profession finds its roots in late 19th century company law that introduced an obligation for companies to release audited financial statements. The profession became regulated in its modern form in the 1960s. This paper attempts to explain the growing impact of the international audit firms on the French auditing profession. It also demonstrates how local professionals and the French state reacted to these developments.


2017 ◽  
Vol 30 (3) ◽  
pp. 344-361 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paula Isabel Rodriguez Castro ◽  
Emiliano Ruiz Barbadillo ◽  
Estíbaliz Biedma López

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to analyse whether the major international audit firms reach collusive agreements in Spain, in order to exercise market power and impose higher prices than those of competitors. According to the traditional theory of oligopoly, the ability to achieve these agreements is dependent primarily on the high level of market concentration, so that multiple studies have analysed the relationship between concentration and prices. However, the concentration has serious limitations to infer collusion and therefore the exercise of market power (Dedman and Lennox, 2009). Design/methodology/approach Based on an alternative current of the theory of industrial organisation, the authors use measures of industrial mobility as a measure of collusion or rivalry of firms in oligopolistic markets. Findings The results reveal that international audit firms do not reach collusive agreements to limit competition between them. Social implications According to the empirical evidence obtained, the measures taken by the regulatory bodies to avoid market concentration would not be necessary or efficient and they would have significant costs for the audit market (GAO, 2003, 2008; FRC, 2009; European Commission, 2010; Competition Commission, 2013). Originality/value To the authors’ knowledge, this is the first study to introduce mobility measures to explain market collusion and the exercise of market power in the audit market.


1999 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-17 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chris E. Hogan ◽  
Debra C. Jeter

Dramatic changes in recent years in the audit market suggest the timeliness of an investigation of trends in auditor concentration and an extension of prior research (e.g., Danos and Eichenseher 1982). In recent press, large audit firms have claimed that specialization is a goal of increasing importance. Peat Marwick, for example, has restructured along industry lines, claiming to be recruiting professionals for national teams of multidisciplinary experts organized to “focus on the same industry to serve clients optimally.” On the other hand, litigation concerns might prompt auditors to diversify their risks by diversifying their clientele. In this study, we examine trends in industry specialization from 1976 to 1993 and the industry factors which may affect specialization; whether market share increases are greater for audit firms classified as specialists; and whether the nation's largest audit firms have increased their market share in the industries which they have identified as their focus industries. We find evidence that concentration levels have increased over this period, consistent with the claims of the large audit firms. We find that auditor concentration levels are higher in regulated industries, in more concentrated industries and in industries experiencing rapid growth, but lower in industries with a high risk of litigation. Levels of concentration have increased over time in nonregulated industries providing evidence that scale economies or superior efficiencies of heavy-involvement auditors are not limited to regulated industries but extend to nonregulated industries as well. We also find that for the audit firms classified as market leaders at the beginning of the year, market share has increased over time, whereas market share has declined for firms with a smaller share at the beginning of the year. This suggests that there are returns to investing in specialization.


2012 ◽  
Vol 31 (2) ◽  
pp. 167-188 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cory A. Cassell ◽  
Gary A. Giroux ◽  
Linda A. Myers ◽  
Thomas C. Omer

SUMMARY Events leading up to the implementation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) increased the public's focus on corporate governance and increased regulatory scrutiny of corporate governance mechanisms. These events also contributed to a massive restructuring in the audit market that resulted in the transfer of a large number of clients from Big N to non-Big N audit firms. We extend prior research examining the determinants of auditor-client realignments by investigating the effect of corporate governance on downward (i.e., from Big N to non-Big N auditors) switching activity. We develop a corporate governance index comprised of governance characteristics that we expect auditors to find more desirable in their clients (specifically, board and audit committee independence, diligence, and expertise). The results suggest that Big N auditors consider client corporate governance mechanisms when making client portfolio decisions. Specifically, downward auditor-client realignments are more likely for clients that score lower on our corporate governance index. However, the influence of audit committee-related corporate governance components on downward auditor-client realignments decreased post-SOX. The reduced effect of audit committee-related corporate governance components is consistent with what would be expected if the audit committee-related rules imposed by SOX reduced the variation in audit committee quality across clients. Data Availability: The data used are publicly available from the sources cited in the text.


2009 ◽  
Vol 84 (2) ◽  
pp. 355-382 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elizabeth Carson

ABSTRACT: This study investigates the role of global audit firm networks in the market for audit services. Underlying theory suggests that there are benefits from the use of network structures, which enable these firms to expand efficiently into the global audit market and to develop global industry specializations. I identify global and national industry specialist auditors via market share metrics based on client assets audited, and use a large sample of 15,583 clients from 62 countries in 2000 and 14,628 clients from 60 countries in 2004. I find in both periods that audit fee premiums are consistently associated with global specialist auditors, irrespective of whether those audit firms are or are not national specialists.


2009 ◽  
Vol 28 (2) ◽  
pp. 93-118 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chris E. Hogan ◽  
Roger D. Martin

SUMMARY: The market for audit services has been affected in recent years by significant changes like the demise of Andersen and the implementation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. One impact of these market changes has been an increase in the frequency of auditor switches, and in particular, the frequency of clients switching from Big 4 auditors to smaller audit firms. We examine whether this switching activity has resulted in changes in the risk characteristics of publicly traded clients of Second Tier audit firms. This analysis is important as regulators are concerned about audit market concentration and would like to see the Second Tier audit firms expand their share of the publicly traded client market. Results indicate that Second Tier firms are accepting clients with potentially increased audit and client business risk characteristics relative to their existing client base, but they also appear to be “shedding” clients that have increased audit and client business risk characteristics relative to their existing client base. Some of the differences in risk characteristics for those departing clients are more pronounced in the period after 2000, when we expect the most significant changes in the audit market occurred. Second Tier auditors are increasingly exposed to more business risk as they accept larger clients coming from Big 4 predecessor auditors, which may increase their exposure to litigation.


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