Risk Shifts in the Market for Audits: An Examination of Changes in Risk for “Second Tier” Audit Firms

2009 ◽  
Vol 28 (2) ◽  
pp. 93-118 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chris E. Hogan ◽  
Roger D. Martin
Keyword(s):  
Business Risk ◽  
Switching Activity ◽  
Publicly Traded ◽  
Audit Market ◽  
Sarbanes Oxley ◽  
Big 4 ◽  
Audit Firms ◽  
Risk Characteristics ◽  
Changes In Risk ◽  
Second Tier

SUMMARY: The market for audit services has been affected in recent years by significant changes like the demise of Andersen and the implementation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. One impact of these market changes has been an increase in the frequency of auditor switches, and in particular, the frequency of clients switching from Big 4 auditors to smaller audit firms. We examine whether this switching activity has resulted in changes in the risk characteristics of publicly traded clients of Second Tier audit firms. This analysis is important as regulators are concerned about audit market concentration and would like to see the Second Tier audit firms expand their share of the publicly traded client market. Results indicate that Second Tier firms are accepting clients with potentially increased audit and client business risk characteristics relative to their existing client base, but they also appear to be “shedding” clients that have increased audit and client business risk characteristics relative to their existing client base. Some of the differences in risk characteristics for those departing clients are more pronounced in the period after 2000, when we expect the most significant changes in the audit market occurred. Second Tier auditors are increasingly exposed to more business risk as they accept larger clients coming from Big 4 predecessor auditors, which may increase their exposure to litigation.

The Impact of PCAOB AS5 and the Economic Recession on Client Portfolio Characteristics of the Big 4 Audit Firms

2013 ◽  
Vol 32 (4) ◽  
pp. 95-127 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph H. Schroeder ◽  
Chris E. Hogan
Keyword(s):  
Financial Risk ◽  
Economic Recession ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Publicly Traded ◽  
Audit Firm ◽  
Big 4 ◽  
Audit Firms ◽  
Risk Characteristics ◽  
The Impact

SUMMARY We examine the impact of PCAOB Auditing Standard No. 5 (AS5) and the economic recession on risk characteristics and degree of auditor/client misalignment in the publicly traded client portfolios of Big 4 firms. AS5 and the economic recession both likely resulted in an increase in audit firm personnel capacity as well as a decline in current and future revenue prospects, leading to concerns that the Big 4 firms may pursue clients that present greater risk to the portfolio. We find that the overall portfolio in 2009 presents greater financial risk, attributable to the impact of the recession on continuing clients. A net decrease in audit and auditor business risks is also attributable to continuing clients over this period, as increases for new clients are offset by reductions due to departing clients. Overall, the results, which should be of interest to regulators, indicate that Big 4 firms continued to balance their portfolio with risk in mind. Data Availability: Data are publicly available from sources identified in the paper.

The role of the Big 4 and second-tier international networks in redeveloping China’s audit market

2020 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Camillo Lento ◽  
Wing Him Yeung
Keyword(s):  
Audit Quality ◽  
Ordinary Least Squares ◽  
Second Phase ◽  
Tier 2 ◽  
Least Squares Regression ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Audit Market ◽  
Big 4 ◽  
Audit Firms ◽  
Second Tier

Purpose This study aims to explore the audit quality supplied by the Big 4, large indigenous Chinese (LIC) and five largest second-tier international network (Tier 2) audit firms in China during the second phase of their audit market development. Design/methodology/approach Ordinary least squares regression is used on an archival sample of firm-year observations. Endogeneity and self-selection bias are addressed by creating a propensity score matched sample and using two-stage regression with the inverse Mills’ ratio. Findings Strong evidence is found for higher levels of actual audit quality for the Big 4 relative to both LIC and Tier 2 audit firms. Weak evidence is found regarding the audit quality superiority of Tier 2 relative to LIC audit firms. Furthermore, the actual audit quality differential between the Big 4 relative to the LIC and Tier 2 firms widens after adopting International Financial Reporting Standards, which is contrary to the intention of Chinese regulators. Originality/value To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first known empirical study to trisect Big N and non-Big N audit firm proxies into the Big 4, LIC and Tier 2. Currently, only qualitative studies have fully appreciated the unique regulatory roles of these three firm structures in developing China’s audit market, which reflect tensions between reliance on foreign expertise and self-determination. In addition, this study adds to the ongoing global dialogue on Tier 2 as an alternative to the Big 4 and the benefits of international accounting network membership.

The Market Premium for Audit Partners with Big 4 Experience

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Aleksandra B. Zimmerman ◽  
Kenneth L. Bills ◽  
Monika Causholli
Keyword(s):  
Audit Quality ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Audit Firm ◽  
Audit Market ◽  
Big 4 ◽  
Audit Firms ◽  
Second Tier ◽  
Market Premium

This study investigates how non-Big 4 firm audit partners’ Big 4 experience is valued by the audit market. The Big 4 audit firms have differentiated themselves as nationally recognized firms for whose services companies are willing to pay a premium. It is unclear, however, whether this reputation follows individual auditors when they move to a non-Big 4 audit firm. We find that audit fees are higher for non-Big 4 audit partners with Big 4 experience with the fee premium ranging from 17 to 26 percent depending on the extent of experience when they are employed by small audit firms but find no evidence of a fee premium for Big 4 experience at the second-tier audit firms. Furthermore, in additional analyses, we do not find strong, consistent evidence that audit quality is higher for clients of non-Big 4 audit partners with Big 4 experience than their counterparts without Big 4 experience.

An Analysis of Big 4 Pricing and Firm Size: The Differential Impact of Demand and Supply Shocks on Large and Small Clients

2017 ◽  
Vol 34 (2) ◽  
pp. 204-230 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fatima Alali ◽  
Randal Elder ◽  
Jian Zhou
Keyword(s):  
Small Firm ◽  
Great Recession ◽  
Small Firms ◽  
Unique Contribution ◽  
Demand And Supply ◽  
The Great Recession ◽  
Audit Market ◽  
Sarbanes Oxley ◽  
Big 4 ◽  
Recession Period

We investigate Big 4 pricing over the period of 2000 to 2010. We classify the data into five periods: 2000-2001 as the pre-Sarbanes–Oxley Act (SOX) period, 2002-2003 as the SOX period, 2004-2006 as the Auditing Standard 2 (AS2) period, 2007 as the AS5 period, and 2008-2010 as the Great Recession period. The shocks to the audit market associated with these changes in auditing regulations and the economic environment have differential impacts on large clients and small clients. The percentage of small clients using Big 4 auditors dropped significantly over these shocks, whereas the percentage of large clients using Big 4 auditors experienced a large drop only from the SOX period to the AS2 period. We find that Big 4 pricing increased significantly from the pre-SOX period to the SOX period and continued to increase significantly in the AS2 period. Big 4 pricing experienced a significant decline in the AS5 period and declined insignificantly in the Great Recession period. Big 4 small firm pricing decreased significantly in the AS2 period compared with the SOX period and in the Great Recession period compared with the AS5 period. We find that the Big 4 pricing for small clients is contingent on the nature of competition. The Big 4 charged small firms higher prices in the SOX period, AS5 period, and Great Recession period when competition was lower. Our paper provides a unique contribution as a comprehensive analysis of Big 4 pricing and Big 4 small firm pricing.

The Effect of Corporate Governance on Auditor-Client Realignments

2012 ◽  
Vol 31 (2) ◽  
pp. 167-188 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cory A. Cassell ◽  
Gary A. Giroux ◽  
Linda A. Myers ◽  
Thomas C. Omer
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Audit Committee ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Portfolio Decisions ◽  
Audit Market ◽  
Sarbanes Oxley ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Audit Firms ◽  
Governance Index

SUMMARY Events leading up to the implementation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) increased the public's focus on corporate governance and increased regulatory scrutiny of corporate governance mechanisms. These events also contributed to a massive restructuring in the audit market that resulted in the transfer of a large number of clients from Big N to non-Big N audit firms. We extend prior research examining the determinants of auditor-client realignments by investigating the effect of corporate governance on downward (i.e., from Big N to non-Big N auditors) switching activity. We develop a corporate governance index comprised of governance characteristics that we expect auditors to find more desirable in their clients (specifically, board and audit committee independence, diligence, and expertise). The results suggest that Big N auditors consider client corporate governance mechanisms when making client portfolio decisions. Specifically, downward auditor-client realignments are more likely for clients that score lower on our corporate governance index. However, the influence of audit committee-related corporate governance components on downward auditor-client realignments decreased post-SOX. The reduced effect of audit committee-related corporate governance components is consistent with what would be expected if the audit committee-related rules imposed by SOX reduced the variation in audit committee quality across clients. Data Availability: The data used are publicly available from the sources cited in the text.

Market Reaction to Auditor Switching from Big 4 to Third-Tier Small Accounting Firms

2010 ◽  
Vol 29 (2) ◽  
pp. 83-114 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hsihui Chang ◽  
C. S. Agnes Cheng ◽  
Kenneth J. Reichelt
Keyword(s):  
Stock Market ◽  
Audit Quality ◽  
Market Reaction ◽  
Accounting Firms ◽  
Auditor Switching ◽  
Sarbanes Oxley ◽  
Big 4 ◽  
Period 2 ◽  
Prior Literature ◽  
Second Tier

SUMMARY: After the demise of Arthur Andersen, the public accounting industry has witnessed a significant migration of public clients to second-tier (Grant Thornton and BDO Seidman) and smaller third-tier accounting firms. While prior literature documents that smaller auditors are perceived by the stock market as an inferior substitute for a Big 4 auditor, this perception appears to have changed in recent years. In this paper, we analyze market responses to auditor switching from Big 4 to smaller accounting firms during 2002 to 2006. We break our sample period into two separate periods (Periods 1 and 2) based on when regulatory changes occurred. These changes included Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) 404 implementation, Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) inspections, and a tightened Form 8-K filing deadline. We find a relatively more positive stock market reaction to clients switching from a Big 4 to a smaller third-tier auditor in Period 2. This relatively more positive reaction in Period 2 reflects companies seeking better services rather than a lower audit fee, when an audit quality drop is less likely. Overall, our results suggest that companies and investors have become more receptive to smaller accounting firms.

How do audit fees change? Effects of firm size and section 404(b) compliance

2019 ◽  
Vol 34 (4) ◽  
pp. 393-437
Author(s):  
Alexey Lyubimov
Keyword(s):  
Audit Fees ◽  
Section 404 ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Control Effectiveness ◽  
Big 4 ◽  
Audit Firms ◽  
Audit Fee ◽  
Second Tier ◽  
Changes Over Time ◽  
Over Time

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to investigate the effect of the size of the audit firm and compliance with Section 404(b) on how audit fees change over time. Design/methodology/approach This study uses panel data and an OLS regression to examine the relationship between audit fee changes, firms’ size and Section 404(b) compliance. Findings Section 404(b)-compliant companies experience a larger change in audit fees if they are audited by Big 4 firms than second-tier firms. Second-tier audit firms increase the fees primarily for the companies which do not comply with Section 404(b). Practical implications Regulators have been concerned with the Big 4 fee premium for four decades. This study informs regulators that the Big 4 continue increasing their fees at a higher rate than second-tier firms for their Section 404(b)-compliant clients (even though recent research shows that second-tier firms have increased quality to match the Big 4). This suggests that the Big 4 fee premium increases for this subset of clients, adding to the regulatory concerns. Originality/value While prior research has established the existence of the Big 4 fee premium, little is known about how this premium changes over time. Prior research shows that audit fees increase when internal controls are weak; however, little is known about how Section 404(b) compliance (once control effectiveness is controlled) affects fee changes. This paper addresses these voids in research.

Insights into Large Audit Firm Sampling Policies

2015 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. P7-P18 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brant E. Christensen ◽  
Randal J. Elder ◽  
Steven M. Glover
Keyword(s):  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Internal Control ◽  
Sampling Methods ◽  
Accounting Firms ◽  
Audit Firm ◽  
Sarbanes Oxley ◽  
Big 4 ◽  
Audit Firms ◽  
Current Sampling ◽  
Audit Sampling

SUMMARY Changes in the audit profession after Sarbanes-Oxley, including mandatory audits of internal control over financial reporting and PCAOB oversight and inspection of audit work, have potentially changed the nature and extent of audit sampling in the largest accounting firms. In our study, “Behind the Numbers: Insights into Large Audit Firm Sampling Policies” (Christensen, Elder, and Glover 2015), we administered an extensive, open-ended survey to the national offices of the Big 4 and two other international accounting firms regarding their firm's audit sampling policies. We find variation among the largest firms' policies in their use of different sampling methods and in inputs used in the sampling applications that could result in different sample sizes. We also provide evidence of some of the sampling topics firms find most problematic, as well as changes to firms' policies regarding revenue testing due to PCAOB inspections. Our evidence provides important insights into current sampling policies, which may be helpful to audit firms in evaluating their sampling inputs and overall sampling approaches.

scholarly journals The application of business risk audit methodology within non-Big-4 firms

2015 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 226-246 ◽  
Author(s):  
Imad Kutum ◽  
Ian Fraser ◽  
Khaled Hussainey
Keyword(s):  
Quantitative Methods ◽  
Business Risk ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Audit Firm ◽  
Qualitative And Quantitative Methods ◽  
Big 4 ◽  
Audit Firms ◽  
Major Disadvantage ◽  
The Usa ◽  
The Uk

Purpose – This paper aims to explore the application of the business risk audit (BRA) approach within non-Big-4 audit firms in the USA, the UK and Canada. This paper focuses on the motivation for adopting this approach for non-Big-4 audit firms in the three countries, and the advantages, disadvantages and aftermath of applying this method. Design/methodology/approach – A combination of qualitative and quantitative methods to obtain the data necessary to address the research questions was used. Findings – It is found that non-Big-4 audit firms in the three countries have adopted BRA; their motivation was primarily to follow the standards in each country, and the general trend in the industry. The advantages identified are consistent with previous research; a direct benefit was noted for audit effectiveness and risk management for both clients and auditors. One major disadvantage of applying BRA is the cost burden to both the audit firm and their clients. Some of the interviewees claimed that this method is better suited to large firms and large audits. Originality/value – This is an innovative study that addresses a contemporary auditing issue. The majority of the audit research studies concentrate on the big audit firm practices; this study is the first to examine the application of audit practices within smaller audit firms.

Audit Firm Size and Going-Concern Reporting Accuracy

2006 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-17 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marshall A. Geiger ◽  
Dasaratha V. Rama
Keyword(s):  
Firm Size ◽  
Type I ◽  
Type Ii ◽  
Reporting Accuracy ◽  
Audit Firm ◽  
Reporting Error ◽  
Going Concern ◽  
Big 4 ◽  
Audit Firms ◽  
Second Tier

Prior research suggests that the Big 4 audit firms are of higher quality than are non-Big 4 firms. However, existing tests for an association between audit firm size and reporting accuracy are indirect and provide mixed results. Our study extends this line of research by examining whether the Big 4 audit firms exhibit higher quality reporting by having fewer “audit-reporting errors” in the context of issuing going-concern modified reports. Our analyses examine both types of going-concern reporting errors (i.e., type I errors—modified opinions rendered to subsequently viable clients; and type II errors—unmodified opinions rendered to subsequently bankrupt clients) over an 11-year period. We also examine reporting error rate differences between the national second-tier firms and regional/local third-tier firms. Our findings indicate that both type I and type II error rates for Big 4 audit firms are significantly lower compared to non-Big 4 firms. In contrast, we find no significant differences between the national second-tier and regional/local third-tier audit firms with respect to either type of reporting error. Our results provide evidence about a Big 4 audit quality difference in reporting on client's going-concern problems.

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