Hacker Behavior, Network Effects, and the Security Software Market

2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Debabrata Dey ◽  
Atanu Lahiri ◽  
Guoying Zhang
2012 ◽  
Vol 29 (2) ◽  
pp. 77-108 ◽  
Author(s):  
Debabrata Dey ◽  
Atanu Lahiri ◽  
Guoying Zhang

2016 ◽  
Vol 2016 (6) ◽  
pp. 39-56
Author(s):  
Andrey Shastitko ◽  
Alexandr Kurdin ◽  
Anastasiya Morosanova

The article analyses the main features of the intellectual activity results market through the lens of the product boundaries definition. Frequently the pirated copy is not considered as a substitute for original products in legal cases. However, unlicensed computer programs should be included in the product market boundaries regardless of its legal status if the consumer considers them as substitutes. The difference between these types of products (original and pirated) are hidden not in transformation but in transaction characteristics. It is also important to take into consideration the possible complementarity between pirated and original products expressed in the information and network effects. In order to assess the buyers’ choice it is necessary to adjust the methods evaluating product market boundaries prescribed by «The Procedure of market competition analysis» of the Russia’s Federal Antimonopoly Service.


Author(s):  
Christopher R. Knittel ◽  
Victor Stango

Abstract Incompatibility in markets with network effects reduces consumers' ability to "mix and match" components offered by different sellers, but can also spur changes in product attributes that might benefit consumers. In this paper, we estimate the effects of incompatibility on consumers in a classic hardware/software market: ATM cards and machines. We find that ATM fees ceteris paribus reduce the network benefit from other banks' ATMs. However, a surge in ATM deployment accompanies the shift to surcharging. Even under conservative assumptions regarding how much of the surge is directly attributable to surcharging, greater deployment often completely offsets the harm from higher fees. The results suggest that policy discussions of incompatibility must consider not only its direct effect on consumers, but also its effect on product attributes.


Author(s):  
Anastasia Kosyakina ◽  
Alina Podlesnaya

The present work is devoted to the description of the evolution of antimonopoly cases brought against Microsoft by the American, European and Russian antimonopoly authorities. The focus of this work is on assessing the ability of Microsoft as a manufacturer of an operating system that occupies a dominant position that can influence competition in the application software market, including the browser market, antivirus protection and media players. The position in the market of operating systems is closely related to the presence of direct and indirect network effects. It was found that in most cases Microsoft was accused of obtaining vertical restrictions and related sales in order to restrict competition. In addition, in later antitrust cases against Microsoft, there has been an increasing focus on behavioral aspects.


2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Lemley

The Internet software market is characterized by strong network effects andomnipresent intellectual property rights. In this paper, we attempt toexplore the relationship between the two, focusing on two examples: thegovernment's antitrust proceeding against Microsoft for browser tying, andSun's suit against Microsoft for altering Java. We conclude that the socialvalue of the Internet lies in its ability to facilitate interoperation, andthis in turn argues in favor of open access to network standards. Such openstandards may be achieved in the open market. Where they are not, the lawmay intervene, but it must be cautious not to overreach and to avoiddisturbing the incentives provided by intellectual property protection.


2018 ◽  
Vol 9 (4) ◽  
pp. 1-15 ◽  
Author(s):  
Evangelos Katsamakas

Digital goods, such as software, are significant elements of the contemporary digital economy. The authors propose a model that characterizes dynamic profit-maximizing competitive pricing strategies of digital goods with network effects. In a two-period game theory model, an incumbent firm has a quality advantage in period 1, but the potential disrupter has a quality advantage in period 2. They analyze pricing strategies and characterize conditions under which the potential disrupter becomes an actual disrupter. They discuss implications for user adoption of digital goods and opportunities for future research.


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