scholarly journals Corporate Governance, Opaque Bank Activities, and Risk/Return Efficiency: Pre- and Post-Crisis Evidence from Turkey

Author(s):  
Olivier De Jonghe ◽  
Mustafa Disli ◽  
Koen J. L. Schoors
2017 ◽  
Vol 9 (18) ◽  
Author(s):  
Heriberto García

Abstract. After the adoption of the Corporate Governance Code (Code) in Mexico, many companies increased financial performance and the leveraged during the following five years; we investigated the effect of how those firms improved the corporate governance practices and how was translated into better risk return company. We analyzed how and where better corporate governance practices affects performance and what was the relationship with Transparency, New Regulation and Governance Practices. Also we explored the gaps between transparency and information disclosure of Mexican Firms listed in U.S stockexchange and non U.S listed firms our findings were related to the potential growth of the Mexico Financial Market, Law and Finance.Keywords: corporate governance, financial performance, regulationResumen. Después de la adopción del Código de Gobierno Corporativo en México, algunas compañías incrementaron el desempeño financiero y el uso de deuda durante los siguientes cinco anos, nuestra investigación se enfoca en como dichas compañías mejoraron sus prácticas de gobierno corporativo y como estas prácticas se han traducido en un mejor relación de riesgo y rendimiento. En esta investigación exploramos cómo y en dónde mejores prácticas de gobierno corporativo afectan el desempeño y qué relación tiene con laTransparencia, Nuevas Regulaciones y prácticas de Gobierno Corporativo. Con lo anterior también identificamos aquellas compañías que cotizan fuera de México para identificar potenciales diferencias en dichas prácticas.Palabras clave: desempeño financiero, gobierno corporativo, regulación


2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Kléber Formiga Miranda ◽  
Jefferson Ricardo do Amaral Melo ◽  
Orleans Silva Martins

Purpose This study aims to examine the listing of firms at the highest corporate governance level of the Brazilian stock exchange (B3) as a means of legitimation and its relationship with risk and return on investment. Design/methodology/approach This paper analyzes 205 companies from 2010 to 2019, in which firms listed at the Novo Mercado level were compared with groups composed of other firms traded on B3. Findings The main results demonstrate that a listing at the supposedly higher level of corporate governance in Brazil does not indicate lower risk, a higher return or even a better risk-return ratio. Research limitations/implications The findings are restricted to this sample, representing the association identified between the analyzed phenomena and not a cause-effect relationship. Practical implications The highest level of corporate governance in Brazil brings together firms that present a higher risk (at least systematic) and lower returns (at least financial) because they seek to legitimize themselves in the market as firms committed to better management practices. Social implications These findings are useful to investors, the stock exchange, regulatory agents and the companies themselves to reflect on the purpose and usefulness of different levels of corporate governance in Brazil. Originality/value This study differs from the others that relate corporate governance to risk or return because it does not deal individually with corporate governance practices, but rather the phenomenon that is listed in a special governance level, created by the stock exchange, serving as a kind of seal legitimation.


2021 ◽  
Vol 15 (3) ◽  
pp. 128-165
Author(s):  
Ranjan Dasgupta

Prior empirical research emphasises ‘troubled’ firm context and ‘quality management’ perspective as reasons for a ‘paradoxical’ or negative risk-return association for firms. But, to the best of our knowledge, no studies examine the role of individual corporate governance mechanisms in influencing such a ‘paradox’. Therefore, the study investigates this issue by classifying 675 sample Indian firms over the period 2000-2017 into high performing and low performing firms in line with the strategic reference point theory and the behavioural theory. To fulfil study objectives, it uses four different firm-return measures and estimate firm-level risk with standard deviations of each return measures previous 5 years’ values on a rolling basis. In the univariate model, the study uses the notion of target (reference) return level under firm’s own and social aspiration levels in time-variant and market cycles contexts, and then compute Kendall’s correlations in between distance from such targets and their standard deviations. The study also carries out a multivariate regression model with necessary controls to further validate its univariate findings. The study results report significant influential role that board size and women directors’ presence play in both high and low performing firms’ ‘paradoxical’ risk-return association. On the contrary, board meetings, busy board and board tenure develops a risk-return ‘paradox’ for high performing firms only. These results hold true across my return measures, strategic reference points, market cycles and corporate governance regimes after controlling for firm- and industry-level heterogeneities under both univariate and multivariate analyses.


2018 ◽  
Vol 26 (3) ◽  
pp. 406-424 ◽  
Author(s):  
Salah Alhammadi ◽  
Simon Archer ◽  
Carol Padgett ◽  
Rifaat Ahmed Abdel Karim

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to examine the practices of Islamic banks in managing the so-called profit sharing investment accounts (PSIA) which they offer as a Shari’ah-compliant alternative to interest-bearing deposit accounts using an unrestricted Mudarabah contract. In particular, the paper aims to examine the risk-return characteristics of such accounts and to compare these to the returns and risks of shareholders in the same banks. It is relevant that PSIA holders (unrestricted investment account holders – UIAH) are exposed to losses on the assets in which their deposits are invested, while the bank as asset manager (Mudarib) does not bear these losses and as Mudarib typically receives more than 50 per cent of the profits earned on the PSIA. The issue is whether the UIAH are being treated equitably. The influence of a set of corporate governance variables on this issue was also analyzed. Design/methodology/approach A sample of 28 Islamic banks was selected from five countries for the period 2002-2013, with data being obtained from Bankscope and Bloomberg and, where necessary, from the banks’ annual reports. First, the risk-return characteristics of the UIAHs’ rates of return and shareholders’ rates of return on equity (ROE) were compared by calculating for each bank the coefficients of variation (CV) of the two series of rates of return. Second, a panel data approach was used to evaluate the effectiveness of corporate governance by examining the extent to which the size of the difference between the rates of return for shareholders and for UIAH was associated with a set of corporate governance variables. Third, a comparison was made between the risk-return characteristics of UIAH’s rates of return and shareholders’ dividend yield rate for a sub-sample of 20 banks for which the information was available. Findings For a significant proportion of the banks (9 out of 28), the CVs of the PSIA returns were higher than those of the shareholders’ ROEs, which suggested that in these cases the PSIA holders were receiving inequitable treatment. Likewise, for 7 out of the 20 banks in the sub-sample, the CVs of the PSIA holders’ rates of return were higher than those of the shareholders’ dividend yield rate. In explaining the size of the differences between the rates of return on PSIA and the shareholders’ ROEs, the variable with the greatest explanatory power was the return on assets, implying that when this was high the bank took a maximum Mudarib share of profits. Some other corporate governance variables had the expected signs, as did a country dummy representing the maturity of the market for Islamic banking, but there was little evidence of the effectiveness of corporate governance in protecting the interests of the UIAH. Research limitations/implications A limitation of the research was that the inefficiency of the stock markets in the relevant countries and the fact that a few of the banks were not listed made it impossible to use shareholders’ stock market returns. ROE is not a very good proxy, as it is unclear how much value should be placed on retained earnings. Dividend yield rates provide a better comparison with UIAH rates of return, but the data were available for only 20 of the banks. Nevertheless, the results of the analysis strongly suggest that in a significant proportion of cases, UIAH are not being treated equitably. Practical implications The implication is that the regulation of Islamic banks needs to be improved to provide better protection to UIAH. Social implications Islamic banks operate mainly in emerging markets where the effectiveness of regulation is limited. The ethical basis of Islamic finance provides some mitigation of this problem but apparently fails to do so in a significant proportion of cases. This should be borne in mind when assertions are made about the ethical basis of Islamic finance. Originality/value There is a dearth of empirical studies of the practices of Islamic banks and in particular of their treatment of their customers. This is because of various factors: the relative novelty of Islamic finance, the paucity of data and the relatively small size of the body of researchers in the field. This paper aims to contribute to filling this gap.


2011 ◽  
Vol 3 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Allan Pinheiro Holanda ◽  
Vera Maria Rodrigues Ponte

 Ao aderir às boas práticas de governança corporativa, as empresas conseguem usufruir de um conjunto de benefícios, dentre os quais se destaca a diminuição do risco. Desse modo, com base no dilema risco-retorno, os investidores exigiriam menores retornos das empresas com menores riscos. A pesquisa que deu origem ao presente artigo teve como objetivo investigar a relação existente entre a adesão às boas práticas de governança corporativa, o risco e o retorno. Parte-se da hipótese de que as empresas com maior adesão às boas práticas de governança corporativa apresentam menor risco e menor retorno. Trata-se de pesquisa exploratória e descritiva, que adotou procedimentos bibliográficos e documentais e de natureza quantitativa, reunindo uma amostra de 266 empresas brasileiras listadas na BM&FBovespa no ano 2009. As variáveis risco e retorno foram mensuradas, respectivamente, pelo desvio-padrão do Lucro Antes dos Juros e Impostos (EBIT) sobre o Ativo Total e pelo retorno sobre o Patrimônio Líquido inicial, ambos obtidos na base de dados do software Economática®. Já quanto à variável governança corporativa, a adesão às boas práticas foi estabelecida pela listagem nos segmentos da BM&FBovespa. Para a avaliação estatística da correlação entre as variáveis foi utilizada a Análise de Correspondência múltipla. Os resultados da pesquisa evidenciaram que uma maior adesão às boas práticas de governança corporativa está associada a um risco médio-baixo e a um retorno médio-baixo, havendo, assim, subsídios para rejeição da hipótese da pesquisa.


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