Flecurity - The Solution to India's Rigid Employment Protection Legislations

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pallavi Arora
2014 ◽  
pp. 126-140
Author(s):  
O. Mironenko

Employers incur costs while fulfilling the requirements of employment protection legislation. The article contains a review of the core theoretical models and empirical results concerning the impact of these costs on firms’ practices in hiring, firing, training and remuneration. Overall, if wages are flexible or enforcement is weak, employment protection does not significantly influence employers’ behavior. Otherwise, stringent employment protection results in the reduction of hiring and firing rates, changes in personnel selection criteria, types of labour contracts and dismissal procedures, and, in some cases, it may lead to the growth of wages and firms’ investments to human capital.


2011 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 1850225 ◽  
Author(s):  
Miki Malul ◽  
Mosi Rosenboim ◽  
Tal Shavit ◽  
Shlomo Yedidia Tarba

This paper explores the role of employment protection when powerful external crises reduce demand for products. We first present a theoretical framework that shows that employment protection has a U-shaped effect on abnormal unemployment during a negative exogenous shock to an economy. Using data from the 33 OECD countries, we analyze how the level of employment protection affected the stability of unemployment rates during the recent global economic crisis. The results suggest that countries with an intermediate level of employment protection will have more stable unemployment rates during a world crisis. The policy implication of our paper is that countries should seek a medium level of employment protection that may act as an automatic stabilizer of the economy on the macro level.


2021 ◽  
Vol 69 ◽  
pp. 101972
Author(s):  
Massimiliano Bratti ◽  
Maurizio Conti ◽  
Giovanni Sulis

2021 ◽  
pp. 095968012110113
Author(s):  
Michel Goyer ◽  
Miguel Glatzer ◽  
Rocio Valdivielso del Real

The adjustment to the financial crisis was particularly brutal for Eurozone countries targeted by private bondholders. Financial assistance through the newly created Eurozone governance system was conditional on the implementation of austerity measures and the introduction of structural reforms in industrial relations (decentralization of collective bargaining and liberalization of employment protection). Our analysis focuses on the formation process and the structural features of Eurozone supranational institutions. Building from the insights of actor-centred institutionalism, we illustrate the importance of coalitions among some, but not all, important actors based on the overlapping of their non-monolithic preferences in the process of institutional innovation. The structural features of Eurozone institutions curtailed member states’ ability to effectively resist the imposition of internal devaluation policies. A contested outcome, these institutional features were secured by a specific coalition of important actors – most notably, the German government and the European Central Bank – based on their overlapping interests around internal devaluation policies.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document