Ownership Structure, Management Control and Agency Costs: Direct Empirical Evidence

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sridhar Gogineni ◽  
Scott C. Linn ◽  
Pradeep K. Yadav
Keyword(s):  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Agency Costs ◽  
Management Control

Empirical Evidence on Ownership Structure, Management Control and Agency Costs

2010 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sridhar Gogineni ◽  
Scott C. Linn ◽  
Pradeep K. Yadav
Keyword(s):  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Agency Costs ◽  
Management Control

The Relation between Efficient Risk-Sharing Arrangements and Firm Characteristics: Evidence from the Managed Care Industry

2002 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 99-117 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew J. Leone
Keyword(s):  
Control Systems ◽  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Primary Care Physicians ◽  
Risk Sharing ◽  
Agency Costs ◽  
Organizational Form ◽  
Management Control ◽  
Firm Characteristics ◽  
Physician Payment ◽  
Independent Contractors

This study examines contracts between HMOs and Primary Care Physicians. These contracts represent one important component of HMOs' management control systems. I argue that HMOs design contracts to minimize agency costs that arise from the physician moral hazard problem. The agency costs and resulting HMO-physician-payment arrangements depend on an HMO's organizational form, customer mix, and environment. Physicians can work as HMO employees or as independent contractors operating individually or in group practice. These features, together with the HMO ownership structure, determine the HMO's organizational form. The level of Medicare enrollment characterizes the HMO's customer mix. The empirical results presented in this study are generally consistent with the theory.

scholarly journals Firm Performance and the Nature of Agency Problems in Insiders-controlled Firms: Evidence from Pakistan

2012 ◽  
Vol 51 (4II) ◽  
pp. 161-183 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fahad Abdullah ◽  
Attaullah Shah ◽  
Safi Ullah Khan
Keyword(s):  
Firm Performance ◽  
Property Rights ◽  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Agency Costs ◽  
Adam Smith ◽  
Agency Problems ◽  
Management Control ◽  
Research Studies

More than two centuries ago, Adam Smith (1776) showed skepticism about the efficiency of joint stock companies because of the separation of management from ownership. He observed that managers of joint stock companies cannot be expected to watch over the business with the same anxious vigilance as owners in a partnership would. Adam Smith’s worry remained buried for a century and a half until Berle and Means (1932) rekindled interest in this area when they hypothesised in their book that dispersed shareholding is an inefficient form of ownership structure. They argued that separation of ownership and management control has changed the role of owner from being active to the passive agent. Dispersed shareholders lack incentives to monitor self-interested managers who possess only a small fraction of the total shareholdings. The propositions by Adam Smith (1776) and Berle and Means (1932) received some support when Jensen and Meckling (1976) tied together the elements of property rights, agency costs, and finance to develop a theory of ownership structure of a firm. Jensen and Meckling asserted that agency costs are real, which the owner can reduce either by increasing ownership stake of the agent in the firm or by incurring monitoring and bonding costs. In early tests, several research studies supported the views of Jensen and Meckling. However, these studies did not account for endogeneity problem.

Agency Costs, Mispricing, and Ownership Structure

CFA Digest ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 43 (2) ◽  
pp. 14-16
Author(s):  
Gregory G. Gocek
Keyword(s):  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Agency Costs

Value-based management control systems and the dynamics of working capital: Empirical evidence

2021 ◽  
Vol 52 ◽  
pp. 100740
Author(s):  
Olena Mavropulo ◽  
Marc Steffen Rapp ◽  
Iuliia A. Udoieva
Keyword(s):  
Control Systems ◽  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Management Control ◽  
Management Control Systems ◽  
Working Capital ◽  
Value Based Management

scholarly journals Do family firms perform better: A Belgian survey

2007 ◽  
Vol 4 (4) ◽  
pp. 173-182
Author(s):  
Christiane Bughin ◽  
Olivier Colot ◽  
Karin Comblé
Keyword(s):  
Agency Theory ◽  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Family Firms ◽  
Management Practices ◽  
Family Values ◽  
Economic Literature ◽  
Paired Samples ◽  
Better Than

A large conceptual economic literature presents assumptions that family owned and controlled firms perform better than others, essentially on the basis of agency theory, ownership structure, cultural specificities and particular management practices. Large empirical evidence has been supplied by various studies, even if there are still contradictory debates. This paper uses the paired samples methodology to compare operational, economic and financial profitabilities of Belgian family firms. Evidence is given that they perform better, and this significantly for economic profitability. Discussion is engaged about the contribution of family values and practices to their results.

scholarly journals Ownership Structure and earnings management: Empirical evidence from listed pharmaceuticals and chemical firms of Bangladesh

2020 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 58-69
Author(s):  
Dewan Azmal Hossain
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Good Governance ◽  
Foreign Ownership ◽  
Jel Classification ◽  
Financial Information ◽  
Least Square ◽  
The Relationship

Objective – This study aims to examine the relationship between ownership structure (determined by institutional and foreign ownership) and earnings management in the context of Bangladeshi Pharmaceuticals and Chemical firms. Methodology/Technique – Out of 32 listed firms, this study examined 29 firms from the pharmaceuticals and chemical industry of Bangladesh from 2014 to 2018. Three firms are omitted as they got listed in 2018 and 2019 respectively. This study uses discretionary working capital accrual to measure earnings management that is the dependent variable. Ordinary least square regression analysis is conducted to assess the result of this study. Institutional and foreign ownership are independent variables. ROA, size, cash flow from operation, and leverage are control variables. Findings – It is found that institutional ownership is negatively related to earnings management and foreign ownership is positively related to earnings management but none of them are statistically significant indicating institutional and foreign ownership do not help in resolving or reducing the earnings management problems in the context of Bangladeshi pharmaceuticals and chemical firms. Novelty – Previous studies in Bangladesh deal only with the techniques of earnings management. To my knowledge, it is the first study that tries to assess the relationship of ownership structure defined by institutional and foreign shareholdings with earnings management in the context of Bangladeshi pharmaceuticals and chemical firms. These two ownership patterns are selected because they are supposed to increase the quality of financial information and also because in Bangladesh state and general shareholders are too dispersed to monitor the governance issues. The practical implications of this study is that investors should not consider institutional and foreign ownership percentage as a determining factor of good governance when considering investment decisions rather should look for other firm-specific factors as institutional and foreign shareholders are found to be inactive in increasing the quality of financial information in the context of Bangladesh. Policymakers should identify why institutional and foreign shareholders are not active and should revise the governance mechanisms accordingly. Type of Paper: Empirical Keywords: Ownership structure; Institutional Shareholdings; Foreign Shareholdings; Earnings Management; Bangladesh. Reference to this paper should be made as follows: Hossain, D.A. 2020. Ownership Structure and earnings management: Empirical evidence from listed pharmaceuticals and chemical firms of Bangladesh, J. Fin. Bank. Review, 5 (2): 58 – 69 https://doi.org/10.35609/jfbr.2020.5.2(3) JEL Classification: G40; G41; G49.

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