scholarly journals The Cost of Moral Hazard and Limited Liability in the Principal-Agent Problem

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Felipe Balmaceda ◽  
Santiago Balseiro ◽  
José Rafael Correa ◽  
Nicolas E. Stier-Moses
Keyword(s):  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Limited Liability ◽  
Principal Agent ◽  
Principal Agent Problem ◽  
The Cost

scholarly journals The Cost of Moral Hazard and Limited Liability in the Principal-Agent Problem

2010 ◽  
pp. 63-74 ◽  
Author(s):  
Felipe Balmaceda ◽  
Santiago R. Balseiro ◽  
Jose R. Correa ◽  
Nicolas E. Stier-Moses
Keyword(s):  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Limited Liability ◽  
Principal Agent ◽  
Principal Agent Problem ◽  
The Cost

The Continuous-Time Principal-Agent Problem with Moral Hazard and Recursive Preferences

2010 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark D. Schroder ◽  
Sumit Sinha ◽  
Shlomo Levental
Keyword(s):  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Continuous Time ◽  
Principal Agent ◽  
Recursive Preferences ◽  
Principal Agent Problem

scholarly journals A Student of Year 12 in Harrow International School Hong Kong

2018 ◽  
Vol 4 (3) ◽  
pp. 260
Author(s):  
Nanqi Zhou
Keyword(s):  
Hong Kong ◽  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Information Asymmetry ◽  
Adverse Selection ◽  
Financial Market ◽  
International School ◽  
Principal Agent ◽  
Principal Agent Problem ◽  
The Government

<p class="BodyA">George Akerlof introduced the idea that due to asymmetric information between the buyer and the seller in the lemons market, the market for second-hand vehicles will eventually go on the wane. Parallel to this argument, this essay discusses the extent of problem caused by information asymmetry in the financial market, with the most prominent issues being adverse selection, moral hazard and principal agent problem. Yet, with more regulation from the government and the market, some of these problems can be ameliorated, thus reducing the role that asymmetric information plays in the financial market.</p>

scholarly journals MORAL HAZARD DAN AGENCY COST (Pencederaan Kontrak Bisnis dalam Perspektif Ekonomi Syarî’ah)

2019 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 239-256
Author(s):  
Wadhan Wadhan
Keyword(s):  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Production Process ◽  
Agency Cost ◽  
Principal Agent ◽  
Business Organization ◽  
Principal Agent Problem ◽  
Business Contract

A contract for business organization or production process may generally involve Principal- agent problems due to information asymetry. Islâmic business contracts has manifold avenues and modalities to be implemented as according to the suitability of time, place and environment.The essential benefits of the Islâmic business contracts is to ensure the benefit of the both partners in the contract. Since the contract for business organization or production process embodies some sort of problems like principal- agent problem due to information asymetry and moral hazard, this also be easily minimised in an Islâmic contract. Therefore, it may  be said that if in an Islâmic economy, Islâmic firm implements  the business contract  as designed and approved by the shariah, then principal- agent problem will be minimised and society  will be more benefited from the welfare motive of the producer and other market agents.

MORAL HAZARD, LIMITED LIABILITY AND TAXATION: A PRINCIPAL-AGENT MODEL 1

1990 ◽  
Vol 42 (1) ◽  
pp. 46-60 ◽  
Author(s):  
ANINDYA BANERJEE ◽  
TIMOTHY BESLEY
Keyword(s):  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Limited Liability ◽  
Principal Agent ◽  
Agent Model ◽  
Principal Agent Model

Moral Hazard with Limited Liability: Incentive Contracting Under Monotone Ratio Assumptions

2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wenbin Wang ◽  
Shanshan Hu ◽  
Xinxin Hu
Keyword(s):  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Limited Liability ◽  
Incentive Contracting

Paying Extra for a Label? Evidence of Principal-Agent Problem in the Housing Market

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Keyang Li ◽  
Jing Wu ◽  
Jianwei Xing ◽  
Jubo Yan
Keyword(s):  
Housing Market ◽  
Principal Agent ◽  
Principal Agent Problem

Innovation In Spectrum Repurposing: The C-Band As A Principal-Agent Problem

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
T. Randolph Beard ◽  
George S. Ford ◽  
Michael Stern
Keyword(s):  
Principal Agent ◽  
Principal Agent Problem
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