Yardstick Competition to Tame the Leviathan

2000 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthias Wrede
Keyword(s):  
Yardstick Competition

Is Democracy Exportable?

2019 ◽  
pp. 724-742
Author(s):  
Pierre Salmon
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Regime Change ◽  
Private Life ◽  
Yardstick Competition ◽  
Human Rights Abuses ◽  
The People

Among many aspects to the question of whether democracy is exportable, this contribution focuses on the role of the people, understood not as a unitary actor but as a heterogeneous set: the citizens. The people matter, in a different way, both in the countries to which democracy might be exported and in the democratic countries in which the question is about promoting democracy elsewhere. The mechanisms or characteristics involved in the discussion include yardstick competition, differences among citizens in the intensity of their preferences, differences among autocracies regarding intrusion into private life, citizens’ assessments of future regime change, and responsiveness of elected incumbents to the views of minorities. The second part of the contribution explains why promotion of democracy is more likely to work through citizens’ concern with human rights abuses than with regime characteristics.

scholarly journals Managerial Accountability Under Yardstick Competition

2020 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Michele G. Giuranno ◽  
Marcella Scrimitore ◽  
Giorgos Stamatopoulos
Keyword(s):  
Rent Seeking ◽  
Yardstick Competition ◽  
Good Practices ◽  
Direct Competition

AbstractTwo well-known mechanisms for enhancing managers’ accountability are yardstick competition and internal monitoring. Yardstick competition puts managers in direct competition when firms make decisions for re-appointment. Monitoring is used by firms to detect managers’ rent-seeking activities. While common wisdom suggests that the joint use of the two means would reinforce each other in promoting managers good practices, we find that their interplay distorts managers’ behavior who may end up acting in a less accountable way. Furthermore, differences in monitoring across firms bias that distortion, yielding even more counterintuitive results.

scholarly journals Fiscal disparity, institutions and asymmetric yardstick competition

2019 ◽  
Vol 181 ◽  
pp. 74-76
Author(s):  
Alfa Farah
Keyword(s):  
Yardstick Competition

scholarly journals Technical Efficiency Gains from Port Reform: The Potential for Yardstick Competition in Mexico

2001 ◽  
Author(s):  
Antonio Estache ◽  
Marianela González ◽  
Lourdes Trujillo
Keyword(s):  
Technical Efficiency ◽  
Yardstick Competition ◽  
Efficiency Gains ◽  
Port Reform

Yardstick Competition and Quality

2009 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 589-613 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas P. Tangerås
Keyword(s):  
Yardstick Competition

Editor's Introduction for Forecasting the 2013 German Elections

2013 ◽  
Vol 46 (03) ◽  
pp. 477-478 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bruno Jérôme
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Unemployment Rate ◽  
Extensive Literature ◽  
Economic Variable ◽  
Yardstick Competition ◽  
The Past

In the past 40 years an extensive literature has grown up around aggregate political economy models of elections, but few articles have focused on the German case. Initially, Kirchgässner (1977; 1991), developed vote-popularity (VP) functions, with the unemployment rate as the dominant economic variable predicting the German ruling parties' performance. Thereafter, using vote functions (VF) from 1961 to 1994, Jérôme, Jérôme-Speziari, and Lewis-Beck (2001) tested the “yardstick” competition existing between French and German economic votes.

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