scholarly journals The Eurozone Debt Crisis and the European Banking Union: A Cautionary Tale of Failure and Reform

Author(s):  
Emilios Avgouleas ◽  
Douglas W. Arner
2016 ◽  
Vol 6 (11) ◽  
pp. 15 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ross Alexander Spence

<p>The rationales for the creation of the European Banking Union (“EBU”), what its objectives are and the main pillars of support for such a scheme, are worthy of investigation.  This article means to critically discuss the various elements of the EBU and determine whether the Single Supervisory Mechanism and the Single Resolution Mechanism, the main pillars underpinning the structure, are robust enough to avert another debt crisis in Europe. At the EBU’s heart lies the Single Rulebook (“SR”), which aims to counter the risk of fragmentation and nationalist tendencies. This inward looking trend became apparent in the recent financial crises, and contributed greatly to them. In an effort to avoid repeating the divisive and disjointed mistakes of the past, the SR is instead looking to provide unity and harmonisation across all participating member states. </p>


2018 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 67-77
Author(s):  
Rui do Carmo

Set up in the past few years under the shadow of the Euro debt crisis, the European Banking Union (EBU) has been taking its first steps, aiming to prevent the dreaded repetition of the recent shortcomings of the several components of the European Monetary Union (EMU). By revisiting some specific events that led to the Euro crisis, this paper seeks to provide some insights on the understanding of the set-up of the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM), in the context of the broader conjunction of the several instruments put forward to provide the EBU with the resilience to prevent future crises. The text provides a brief background of the events that triggered the need for setting up the EBU, followed by an overview of its different constitutive elements and, finally, a critical analysis of the most prominent aspects of the SSM.


Author(s):  
Ross Cranston ◽  
Emilios Avgouleas ◽  
Kristin van Zweiten ◽  
Theodor van Sante ◽  
Christoper Hare

This chapter discusses banking supervision in practice. It focuses on two jurisdictions: the UK and the European Banking Union (EBU), and considers in particular the type of powers enjoyed by the UK and EBU regulators, and the way they exercise them in their supervisory approaches. In the process the chapter highlights loopholes in the respective regimes and to some extent evaluates their effectiveness. On 1 April 2013 the Financial Services Act 2012 came into force, removing the Financial Services Authority and delivering a new regulatory structure for the UK, which comprises the Prudential Regulation Authority responsible for microprudential regulation and supervision of banks, building societies, and investment firms; and the Financial Conduct Authority, in addition to a financial stability (macroprudential) body within the Bank of England, the Financial Policy Committee. The EBU brought about the centralization of bank supervision and resolution within the Eurozone. The trigger for the establishment of the EBU was the Eurozone debt crisis.


Author(s):  
Rachel A. Epstein

If post-communist countries realized marketized bank–state ties through transition and international pressure to privatize their banks with foreign capital, western Eurozone states have more recently come under pressure to follow suit. European Banking Union centralized bank supervision and introduced a single resolution board at the expense of national authority. Thus under banking union, national regulatory and supervisory forbearance was curbed; barriers to banking market entry were no longer the purview of national authorities; disproportionate bank lending to one’s own sovereign would be discouraged; and bank bondholders, creditors and depositors—i.e. market actors—paid the price for bank failures first, before governments and taxpayers. While European Banking Union put the euro on stronger foundations, it also curbed national economic policy discretion and limited tools for adjustment. Taking Italy, Portugal, Spain and Germany as examples, this chapter explains why and in what policy areas Eurozone states’ sovereignty clashed with banking union.


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