Sarbanes Oxley, Non Audit Services and the Mandatory Rotation of Audit Firms

2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marianne Ojo
Keyword(s):  
Sarbanes Oxley ◽  
Audit Firms ◽  
Mandatory Rotation ◽  
Non Audit Services

Analysis of the Sarbanes-Oxley Ban on Non-Audit Services From an Auction Model Perspective

2019 ◽  
pp. 0148558X1986905
Author(s):  
Ramy Elitzur ◽  
Arieh Gavious ◽  
Yizhaq Minchuk
Keyword(s):  
Empirical Studies ◽  
Audit Failure ◽  
Sarbanes Oxley ◽  
Audit Firms ◽  
Nonaudit Services ◽  
Private Value ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Auction Model ◽  
Non Audit Services

This study analyzes the impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act’s (SOX) ban on providing both auditing and nonaudit services by auditors to their clients. We use a first-price private value auction to compare a setting in which auditors can compete for both audit and nonaudit services with an auction in which they can compete for only one of the two services. Consistent with empirical studies, we show that the ban on nonaudit services results in fee hikes for both audit and nonaudit services, as the number of bidders (audit firms) is smaller in the post-SOX setting relative to pre-SOX setting in both auctions. Consequently, we demonstrate that, after the ban, payoffs have increased for audit firms and decreased for their clients, due to the increase in both audit and nonaudit services fees. Finally, we show that increasing the penalty for an audit failure, contrary to common wisdom, results in improved payoffs for audit firms.

scholarly journals Independence: The Fall Of Andersen And The Rise Of Sarbanes Oxley

2011 ◽  
Vol 3 (7) ◽  
Author(s):  
H. Francis Bush
Keyword(s):  
Lower Percentage ◽  
Font Size ◽  
Related Services ◽  
Sarbanes Oxley ◽  
Audit Firms ◽  
Audit Opinions ◽  
Arthur Andersen ◽  
Non Audit Services

<p class="MsoBodyText2" style="text-align: justify; margin: 0in 0.6in 0pt 0.5in;"><span style="font-style: normal; font-size: 10pt;"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman;">In this study, the author examines the audit firms&rsquo; fees associated with audit services and audit-related services as a percentage of total fees charged to individual firms as reported to the SEC.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp; </span>This study was motivated by discussion of the impacts on audit opinions of the amount of work beyond an audit for which an auditing firm contracts.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp; </span>The results indicate that the fees that Arthur Andersen charged its individual clients indeed had a lower percentage of total fees associated with audit work.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp; </span>Further, for the year 2002, on average, firms reported a higher percentage of fees from auditors were associated with audit work.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp; </span>Firms that previously contracted with Arthur Andersen contracted significantly less non-audit services than their counterparts.</span></span></p>

Enriching AIS Courses With SOX Compliance Activities

2010 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-24 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joann Segovia ◽  
Carol M. Jessup ◽  
Marsha Weber ◽  
Sheri Erickson
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Internal Controls ◽  
Accounting Profession ◽  
Investor Confidence ◽  
Reporting Requirements ◽  
Sarbanes Oxley ◽  
Audit Firms ◽  
Significant Change

A very significant change to the accounting profession occurred in 2002 when the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) was enacted. This legislation had a significant impact on corporations and their audit firms. The objective was to improve corporate governance and its quality of financial reporting to improve investor confidence. This paper provides instructors with a background on SOX and suggests readings and activities that reflect the requirements of SOX as it relates to the AIS environment and the analysis of internal controls. These activities can strengthen students' understandings of how corporations respond to the various reporting requirements of this Act.

The Effect of Corporate Governance on Auditor-Client Realignments

2012 ◽  
Vol 31 (2) ◽  
pp. 167-188 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cory A. Cassell ◽  
Gary A. Giroux ◽  
Linda A. Myers ◽  
Thomas C. Omer
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Audit Committee ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Portfolio Decisions ◽  
Audit Market ◽  
Sarbanes Oxley ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Audit Firms ◽  
Governance Index

SUMMARY Events leading up to the implementation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) increased the public's focus on corporate governance and increased regulatory scrutiny of corporate governance mechanisms. These events also contributed to a massive restructuring in the audit market that resulted in the transfer of a large number of clients from Big N to non-Big N audit firms. We extend prior research examining the determinants of auditor-client realignments by investigating the effect of corporate governance on downward (i.e., from Big N to non-Big N auditors) switching activity. We develop a corporate governance index comprised of governance characteristics that we expect auditors to find more desirable in their clients (specifically, board and audit committee independence, diligence, and expertise). The results suggest that Big N auditors consider client corporate governance mechanisms when making client portfolio decisions. Specifically, downward auditor-client realignments are more likely for clients that score lower on our corporate governance index. However, the influence of audit committee-related corporate governance components on downward auditor-client realignments decreased post-SOX. The reduced effect of audit committee-related corporate governance components is consistent with what would be expected if the audit committee-related rules imposed by SOX reduced the variation in audit committee quality across clients. Data Availability: The data used are publicly available from the sources cited in the text.

Aspects Regarding the Structure of the Financial Audit Market in the European Union from Fees Perspective

2021 ◽  
Vol 19 (164) ◽  
pp. 724-742
Author(s):  
Ovidiu Constantin Bunget ◽  
Alin-Constantin Dumitrescu ◽  
Rodica Gabriela Blidisel ◽  
Oana Alina Bogdan ◽  
Valentin Burca ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Stock Exchange ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Data Set ◽  
Audit Market ◽  
Audit Firms ◽  
Financial Audit ◽  
The One ◽  
Non Audit Services

The audit market, developed out of the need to strengthen the credibility and the quality of financial reporting, has led since the 1980s to a concentration around large audit firms, the dominance effect being marked on the one hand by the auditor’s increasing reputation and notoriety, and on the other hand by the client’s association with a reputed auditor, which contributes to improving the company’s image on the market. In this context, a major issue is represented by the level of the fees charged, as they represent key elements that may affect the auditor’s independence. Moreover, a sensitive aspect is the relationship between the fee charged for financial audit services and the one for non-audit services and the compensation practices between them. The European Commission wants to facilitate competition in an overly concentrated market and also provide the opportunity for small and medium-sized audit firms to become active players in the large corporate audit market through joint audit, in which at least one of the audit firms is not part of the Big4 group. The mandatory audit firm rotation and the limitation on the non-audit services provided are the main aspects of the recent audit reform that directly influences the fee level. The main purpose of this study is to analyse whether there is a pattern of audit costs at the community level. In this context, this paper aims to assess the uniformity of audit costs, namely to determine the structure of the audit market in the European Union. The research involves data set comparison methods, by analysing a sample of 2,896 firms listed on the stock exchange in 35 different states over the period 2013-2021.

Risk Shifts in the Market for Audits: An Examination of Changes in Risk for “Second Tier” Audit Firms

2009 ◽  
Vol 28 (2) ◽  
pp. 93-118 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chris E. Hogan ◽  
Roger D. Martin
Keyword(s):  
Business Risk ◽  
Switching Activity ◽  
Publicly Traded ◽  
Audit Market ◽  
Sarbanes Oxley ◽  
Big 4 ◽  
Audit Firms ◽  
Risk Characteristics ◽  
Changes In Risk ◽  
Second Tier

SUMMARY: The market for audit services has been affected in recent years by significant changes like the demise of Andersen and the implementation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. One impact of these market changes has been an increase in the frequency of auditor switches, and in particular, the frequency of clients switching from Big 4 auditors to smaller audit firms. We examine whether this switching activity has resulted in changes in the risk characteristics of publicly traded clients of Second Tier audit firms. This analysis is important as regulators are concerned about audit market concentration and would like to see the Second Tier audit firms expand their share of the publicly traded client market. Results indicate that Second Tier firms are accepting clients with potentially increased audit and client business risk characteristics relative to their existing client base, but they also appear to be “shedding” clients that have increased audit and client business risk characteristics relative to their existing client base. Some of the differences in risk characteristics for those departing clients are more pronounced in the period after 2000, when we expect the most significant changes in the audit market occurred. Second Tier auditors are increasingly exposed to more business risk as they accept larger clients coming from Big 4 predecessor auditors, which may increase their exposure to litigation.

Auditor Conservatism after Enron

2010 ◽  
Vol 29 (1) ◽  
pp. 267-278 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dorothy A. Feldmann ◽  
William J. Read
Keyword(s):  
Financial Statement ◽  
Going Concern ◽  
Corporate Scandals ◽  
Sarbanes Oxley ◽  
Audit Firms ◽  
The Media ◽  
Time Periods ◽  
Audit Opinions ◽  
Auditor Conservatism

SUMMARY: Corporate scandals and the resulting passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) in 2002 significantly affected the auditing profession. The quality of financial statement audits was called into questioned and the media and regulators held audit firms responsible. Several studies found evidence of an increase in the issuance of going-concern opinions after the passage of SOX relative to earlier time periods (Geiger et al. 2005; Nogler 2008; Myers et al. 2008). Auditors, it appears, behave more conservatively when the profession is in the headlines. We replicate and extend this research to determine whether the heightened conservatism continues or whether it fades as time passes. We examine audit opinions issued 12 months or less prior to a bankruptcy filing for 565 companies from 2000–2008. Our findings indicate that while the proportion of going-concern modifications increases sharply in 2002–2003 compared to 2000–2001, it declines in the periods that follow, ultimately returning to its pre-Enron level.

Insights into Large Audit Firm Sampling Policies

2015 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. P7-P18 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brant E. Christensen ◽  
Randal J. Elder ◽  
Steven M. Glover
Keyword(s):  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Internal Control ◽  
Sampling Methods ◽  
Accounting Firms ◽  
Audit Firm ◽  
Sarbanes Oxley ◽  
Big 4 ◽  
Audit Firms ◽  
Current Sampling ◽  
Audit Sampling

SUMMARY Changes in the audit profession after Sarbanes-Oxley, including mandatory audits of internal control over financial reporting and PCAOB oversight and inspection of audit work, have potentially changed the nature and extent of audit sampling in the largest accounting firms. In our study, “Behind the Numbers: Insights into Large Audit Firm Sampling Policies” (Christensen, Elder, and Glover 2015), we administered an extensive, open-ended survey to the national offices of the Big 4 and two other international accounting firms regarding their firm's audit sampling policies. We find variation among the largest firms' policies in their use of different sampling methods and in inputs used in the sampling applications that could result in different sample sizes. We also provide evidence of some of the sampling topics firms find most problematic, as well as changes to firms' policies regarding revenue testing due to PCAOB inspections. Our evidence provides important insights into current sampling policies, which may be helpful to audit firms in evaluating their sampling inputs and overall sampling approaches.

Investors’ Expectations of the Improvement in the Credibility of Audit Opinions following PCAOB Inspection Reports with Identified Deficiencies

2010 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 36-56 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jesse C. Robertson ◽  
Richard W. Houston
Keyword(s):  
Public Confidence ◽  
Audit Opinion ◽  
Outreach Programs ◽  
High Profile ◽  
Perceived Credibility ◽  
Sarbanes Oxley ◽  
Accounting Scandals ◽  
Audit Firms ◽  
Public Company ◽  
Audit Opinions

ABSTRACT: Following high-profile accounting scandals (e.g., Enron), Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which established the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB). The PCAOB conducts regular inspections of audit firms and issues inspection reports that describe audit deficiencies identified during the inspections. One purpose of these reports is to improve public confidence in auditor credibility. We conduct a between-subjects experiment to provide initial evidence concerning investors’ perceptions of audit opinion credibility following PCAOB inspections. While we find an overall increase in perceptions of the credibility of future audit opinions, the degree to which perceptions increase is a function of three salient characteristics of PCAOB reports. Specifically, we find that investors anticipate more (less) improvement in the credibility of future opinions when: (1) inspections contain high (low) severity deficiencies; (2) firms respond to the reports with concessions (denials); and (3) for small (large) firms. Further, investors’ assessment of the credibility of the firm’s response to the PCAOB report is higher for concessions than denials; response credibility fully mediates the effect of response type (concession or denial) on the perceived improvement in the credibility of future opinions. Therefore, the inspections may be a useful tool for improving the perceived credibility of audit opinions under certain conditions. Implications include the possibility that firms should consider carefully the nature of their responses and the PCAOB should consider establishing outreach programs to investors to educate them about its regulatory role.

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