Disciplining Role of Auditor Tenure and Mandatory Auditor Rotation

This study addresses the international debate over whether the rotation of audit firms should be mandatory. Mandatory rotation rules have been adopted by the European Union, but these rules have not been established in the United States. Proponents of the policy believe that a long-tenure auditor-client relationship leads to the auditor building an excessive economic bond with the client which may then erode auditor independence. Motivated by this claim, I build a theoretical model that compares auditor incentives to issue independent reports under regimes with and without mandatory rotation. The model demonstrates conditions under which mandatory rotation could actually impair auditor independence, contrary to the popular view.

Close auditor-client relationships: adverse effects and the potential mitigating role of partner rotation

PurposeThis paper aims to investigate whether close auditor-client relationships affect audit quality over the tenure of the audit partner and the potential role of partner rotation in mitigating this effect. Design/methodology/approachUsing the Chinese mandatory audit partner rotation setting, the authors identify the existence of a close auditor-client relationship if the audit partner tenure with a client is larger than the audit firm tenure with that client. The sample period (1998–2009) is divided into voluntary and mandatory rotation periods when examining the effects of audit partner tenure on audit quality for the normal and close auditor-client relationship subsamples, respectively. The authors also conduct a propensity score matching analysis to address a selection issue. FindingsThe paper finds that under the voluntary partner rotation regime, audit quality decreases with audit partner tenure for the subsample with close auditor-client relationships, whereas this effect is not shown in the normal relationship subsample. However, audit quality no longer declines with audit partner tenure under the mandatory partner rotation regime. Originality/valueThis is the first study that directly examines the effect of audit partner tenure on audit quality associated with close auditor-client relationships under the voluntary and mandatory partner rotation regimes.

The impact of audit rotation on the comparability of financial reports,

This study aims to assess the effect of the rotation and tenure of audit firm and audit partner on the comparability and consistency of financial reports. Several studies have addressed the effect of auditor rotation on the quality of financial reports, but none of them focused specifically on the impact on the comparability and consistency of financial reports. Around the world, the impact of mandatory rotation of audit partner and audit firm is being discussed in academia and regulatory bodies. The peculiarity of the Brazilian regulatory environment allows us to contribute to the discussions on the effects of implementing mandatory auditor rotation. Our sample included 50 companies for which we analyzed data from 2012 to 2018. To measure comparability, we used the similarity of the accounting function model by DeFranco, Kothari and Verdi (2011), and to measure consistency we used the adaptations to this model proposed by Ribeiro (2014). For data analysis, we used descriptive statistics and multivariate panel analysis. Our results suggest that the rotation (mandatory and voluntary) of audit firm and audit partner does not affect the comparability and consistency of financial reports. Results also suggest that auditor-client relationships of up to three years contribute to a significant increase in comparability and consistency, indicating that mandatory rotation does not impair investors’ ability to compare the information concerning their investments. In addition, regulators are shown that a possible reduction in the mandatory rotation term (from five to three years, as in Italy) would be in line with market practices and would imply an increase in the comparability and consistency of financial information.

Does Mandatory Audit Partner Rotation Influence Auditor Selection Strategies?

Under mandatory rotation, the switching cost may be the most influential factor to be considered for experienced mandatory audit rotations. This study attempts to explore the impacts of the mandatory rotation mechanism on company information disclosure and signaling strategies by examining the audit partner and audit firm switching activities of the mandatory rotation company. Are companies that experience mandatory audit rotation more likely to engage industry specialist auditors with better industry-specific knowledge and reputations to minimize the costs of mandatory rotations? Furthermore, in the case of being required to rotate audit partners, do companies rotate only audit partners, rather than changing both audit partners and audit firms at the same time, to minimize switching costs? To explore these problems, this study examined auditor rotations of listed companies in Taiwan from 2004 to 2016; and expected that, to minimize switching costs, mandatory rotation companies are more likely to select industry specialist auditors to be their successor auditors, and are less likely to rotate audit partners and audit firms at the same time. For the audit partner rotations, we find that, compared to voluntarily rotated companies, a higher percentage of companies choose industry specialist auditors to be their successor audit partners under mandatory rotation. Furthermore, the empirical results support our expectations that companies that experience mandatory audit partner rotation are significantly more likely to engage industry specialists to be their successor audit partners and are more likely to rotate only audit partners rather than rotating both audit partners and audit firms around mandatory audit rotation periods.

MANDATORY AUDITOR ROTATION: THE PERCEIVED BENEFITS AND DRAWBACKS (A CASE STUDY IN BPK)

After years of implementation of the policy, there is an inconclusive opinion of whether a mandatory auditor rotation could improve the independence of auditors, including those working within the public sector, such as BPK. This study intends to empirically test the impact of mandatory rotation towards auditors' independence in fact and in appearance. Additionally, the study examines how auditor satisfaction towards the policy affects their perceived benefits and drawbacks of the scheme. Following a statistical assessment of primary data using the independent-samples t-test, findings show that independence in appearance of auditors would be enhanced as a result of mandatory rotation. The rotation policy, however, could not by itself improve auditors’ independence in fact. Consequently, complementary schemes are needed to preserve the independence in fact of auditors. Further, auditors who have a favorable view of mandatory rotation would assume that the mechanism offers more advantages than disadvantages. On the other hand, unhappy employees would perceive that mandatory rotation brings more adverse effects than positive ones. The vast majority of respondents also believe that the rotation mechanism is necessary to be implemented in BPK. Lastly, a number of valuable respondent inputs aimed to improve the rotation scheme are elaborated in this study.

Are We Meeting the Demand for Pharmacist-Led Antimicrobial Stewardship Programs during Postgraduate Training-Year 1 (PGY1)?

In the United States of America, pharmacists play a pivotal role in antimicrobial stewardship; training from postgraduate residency may hone knowledge and skills gained from didactic pharmacy education. Specifically, the first year of postgraduate training, the learner may become an “everyday steward in training” and may go on to complete a second year in infectious diseases. However, there are a limited number of second year infectious diseases programs. The current demand for pharmacist to participate in and or lead stewardship is disproportionate to available specialized training. The first year of post-graduate training has to be setup to ensure appropriate preparation, so newly trained pharmacist may help meet the demand. Currently, no clear standards exist for training in the first year. The purpose of this study is to survey the nature of stewardship training performed by first year residents from the perspective of residency program directors and preceptors. A 13-question online survey was distributed to examine resident exposure to antimicrobial stewardship activities. Survey data from targeted residency directors and preceptors were analyzed. A third of the programs required it as a mandatory rotation. Resident’s stewardship activities ranged from program to program; there was not consensus of the training activities.

On the Economics of Mandatory Audit Partner Rotation and Tenure: Evidence from PCAOB Data

We analyze the effects of partner tenure and mandatory rotation on audit quality, pricing, and production for a large cross-section of U.S. public firms over the 2008 to 2014 period. On average, we find no evidence that audit quality declines over the tenure cycle and little support for "fresh-look" benefits provided by the new audit partner. Audit fees decline and audit hours increase after mandatory rotation, but then reverse over the tenure cycle. We also find evidence that audit firms use "shadowing" in preparation for a lead partner turnover. These effects differ by competitiveness of the local audit market, client size, and partner experience. When multiple members of the audit team commence at a new client, the transition appears to be more disruptive and more likely to exhibit audit quality effects. Our findings point to costly efforts by the audit firms to minimize disruptions and audit failures around mandatory rotations.

Mandatory Audit Partner Rotations and Audit Quality in the United States

SUMMARY This study uses a sample of mandatory partner rotation events hand collected from SEC filings to investigate the relation between mandatory audit partner rotation and audit quality in the United States. Across a variety of control groups and audit quality proxies, we do not find evidence consistent with rotation materially improving audit quality (i.e., “fresh look”). Although somewhat limited, the only statistically significant evidence we document suggests that audited financial statements may be more likely to contain a material misstatement (i.e., subsequently be restated) following a mandatory audit partner rotation, particularly when the audit firm tenure is short. We also provide evidence from client disclosures that mandatory rotation rules trigger auditor-client realignment. Together, our results provide important evidence on the merits of mandatory partner rotation rules in the United States. JEL Classifications: M40; M41; M42. Data Availability: Data are publicly available from sources identified in the article.

An Analysis of Mandatory Auditor Rotation Requirements in South Africa in light of International Legislative Trends

An independent and objective external audit of companies is an integral element of sound corporate governance and of functional financial markets. The issues relating to auditor independence and objectivity have attracted considerable regulatory and public scrutiny in many leading jurisdictions. This is partly due to a general decrease in audit quality over the years as evidenced by high-profile accounting scandals and audit failures, both locally and internationally, as well as the vital role that an external audit is expected to play in ensuring transparency, accuracy and efficiency in the financial markets. In an attempt to restore confidence in the audit profession and to strengthen the independence of the external audit function for companies, legislatures in some leading jurisdictions have introduced a variety of regulatory strategies, including mandatory rotation of auditors in the form of mandatory audit partner rotation (MAPR) and/or mandatory audit firm rotation (MAFR). In this article, the author examines the adequacy of the current provisions of section 92 of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 regarding MAPR and the recently promulgated rule of the Independent Regulatory Board for Auditors (IRBA) on MAFR (the MAFR rule) in addressing the issue of mandatory auditor rotation in South Africa. The author considers whether the provisions of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 regarding MAPR and the MAFR rule are adequate to promote an independent and objective external audit function for companies, as well as transparency, efficiency and accountability, while providing certainty for companies and auditors. The author first examines some of the key principles and policy considerations relating to the external audit of companies – namely, the significance of audits and auditors in the financial markets as well as the value of auditor independence and objectivity. This is followed by an examination of the provisions of section 92 of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 regarding MAPR and the recently promulgated MAFR rule in light of legislative developments in the United States, Canada, the European Union, Australia and India regarding mandatory rotation of auditors and audit partners. Based on the lessons to be drawn from the experiences of the above jurisdictions, the author then makes recommendations for appropriate reforms for South Africa in this important area of company law. This is followed by some concluding remarks.