scholarly journals The Coase Theorem, Private Information, and the Benefits of Not Assigning Property Rights

2001 ◽  
Author(s):  
Patrick W. Schmitz
Keyword(s):  
Property Rights ◽  
Private Information ◽  
Coase Theorem

scholarly journals Information and the Coase Theorem

1987 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 113-129 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph Farrell
Keyword(s):  
Property Rights ◽  
Mechanism Design ◽  
Private Information ◽  
Government Intervention ◽  
Coase Theorem ◽  
Second Best ◽  
Reasonable Alternative ◽  
Welfare Consequences ◽  
Laissez Faire ◽  
Do So

Some economists think the Coase theorem implies a lot about the proper scope of government intervention in the economy and about the welfare consequences of laissez-faire. Others see it as a mere tautology: that if people negotiate efficiently then every outcome will be efficient. The Coase theorem is important only if we believe that efficient negotiation is likely. Of course we can attribute inefficiencies to “bargaining imperfection,” but it may not be useful to do so. Such attitudes sometimes seem to depend more on ideology than on reason. This article gives one economist's reasoned view. It discusses the Coase Theorem as a decentralization result and why decentralization results are interesting. It considers mechanism design for revealing private information, and describes the problems of centralization. Should the Coase theorem should be viewed as a second-best result—property rights are more efficient than some reasonable alternative? Does the Coase theorem recommend an institution or make institutions unnecessary?

The Insight and the Legacy of the Theory of Share Tenancy

2018 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Douglas W. Allen ◽  
Dean Lueck
Keyword(s):  
Property Rights ◽  
Transaction Costs ◽  
Contract Design ◽  
Coase Theorem ◽  
The Future ◽  
Economics Of Contracts ◽  
Share Tenancy ◽  
Phd Thesis

Abstract The Theory of Share Tenancy by Steven Cheung, first published as a PhD thesis 50 years ago, was an important watershed study on the economics of contracts. It contained the first formal demonstration of the Coase Theorem, linked the concepts of property rights and transaction costs, laid early foundations for the future economics of contracts, and can even lay claim to originating the idea of a risk/incentive tradeoff in contract design. This essay examines Cheung's key contributions in Share Tenancy, and considers reasons for its somewhat limited legacy outside of China.

Uncertain Property Rights and the Coase Theorem

1995 ◽  
Vol 7 (3) ◽  
pp. 321-327 ◽  
Author(s):  
MAURICE SCHIFF
Keyword(s):  
Property Rights ◽  
Coase Theorem

scholarly journals Geblendet vom Feuerwerk – der Beitrag von Coase über Umweltnutzungskonflikte | Dazzled by fireworks – the contribution made by Coase in the case of conflicts in environmental use

2010 ◽  
Vol 161 (4) ◽  
pp. 135-146
Author(s):  
Martin Hostettler
Keyword(s):  
Property Rights ◽  
Transaction Costs ◽  
Environmental Problems ◽  
Coase Theorem ◽  
Forest Economics ◽  
Environmental Conflicts ◽  
Economic View ◽  
Way Of Thinking ◽  
Economics Research

The contributions of the economist Ronald Coase (1959, 1960) have radically changed the analysis and rectification of environmental problems. A subtly differentiated notion of property and the recognition of the double-sided nature of environmental conflicts enabled him to develop a new economic view on environmental problems. Property rights will be exchanged – provided that transaction costs make this possible. His insights led to several new fields of research, though misunderstandings about the Coase Theorem are still prevalent today. Forest economics research has followed more strongly the Coasean way of thinking in recent years; however, the potential is not yet exhausted by a long way.

Information Gathering, Transaction Costs, and the Property Rights Approach

2006 ◽  
Vol 96 (1) ◽  
pp. 422-434 ◽  
Author(s):  
Patrick W Schmitz
Keyword(s):  
Property Rights ◽  
Private Information ◽  
Transaction Cost Economics ◽  
Investment Decision ◽  
Theory Of The Firm ◽  
Rent Seeking ◽  
Information Gathering ◽  
Investment Incentives ◽  
Ownership Structures ◽  
Ex Post

The property rights approach to the theory of the firm suggests that ownership structures are chosen in order to provide ex ante investment incentives, while bargaining is ex post efficient. In contrast, transaction cost economics emphasizes ex post inefficiencies. In the present paper, a party may invest and acquire private information about the default payoff that it can realize on its own. Inefficient rent seeking can overturn prominent implications of the property rights theory. In particular, ownership by party B may be optimal, even though only the indispensable party A makes an investment decision.

The Coase Theorem and Core Theory

2017 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Varouj A. Aivazian ◽  
Jeffrey L. Callen
Keyword(s):  
Property Rights ◽  
Transaction Cost ◽  
Social Cost ◽  
Transaction Cost Economics ◽  
Coase Theorem ◽  
Seminal Paper ◽  
Core Theory ◽  
Economics Of Institutions

AbstractThe writings of Ronald Coase, along with those of Armen Alchian and Harold Demsetz, on the theory of property rights, transaction cost economics, and the economics of institutions have yielded powerful insights and transformed many areas of economics. The seminal paper of Ronald Coase (Coase 1960, “The Problem of Social Cost,”

scholarly journals The Coase theorem: coherent, logical, and not disproved

2014 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 379-390 ◽  
Author(s):  
DOUGLAS W. ALLEN
Keyword(s):  
Property Rights ◽  
Transaction Costs ◽  
Coase Theorem ◽  
The Other ◽  
Long Line ◽  
Adequate Definition ◽  
Definition Of

Abstract:There exists a long line of challengers to the ‘Coase Theorem’. All of these rest on fundamental misconceptions of property rights, transaction costs, and their interaction. Here I examine two attacks that have gone unchallenged: one by Halpin, the other by Usher. I argue that both, in failing to either use or understand an adequate definition of transaction costs, fail to deliver a fatal blow to Coase's famous idea.

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