scholarly journals Geblendet vom Feuerwerk – der Beitrag von Coase über Umweltnutzungskonflikte | Dazzled by fireworks – the contribution made by Coase in the case of conflicts in environmental use

2010 ◽  
Vol 161 (4) ◽  
pp. 135-146
Author(s):  
Martin Hostettler
Keyword(s):  
Property Rights ◽  
Transaction Costs ◽  
Environmental Problems ◽  
Coase Theorem ◽  
Forest Economics ◽  
Environmental Conflicts ◽  
Economic View ◽  
Way Of Thinking ◽  
Economics Research

The contributions of the economist Ronald Coase (1959, 1960) have radically changed the analysis and rectification of environmental problems. A subtly differentiated notion of property and the recognition of the double-sided nature of environmental conflicts enabled him to develop a new economic view on environmental problems. Property rights will be exchanged – provided that transaction costs make this possible. His insights led to several new fields of research, though misunderstandings about the Coase Theorem are still prevalent today. Forest economics research has followed more strongly the Coasean way of thinking in recent years; however, the potential is not yet exhausted by a long way.

The Insight and the Legacy of the Theory of Share Tenancy

2018 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Douglas W. Allen ◽  
Dean Lueck
Keyword(s):  
Property Rights ◽  
Transaction Costs ◽  
Contract Design ◽  
Coase Theorem ◽  
The Future ◽  
Economics Of Contracts ◽  
Share Tenancy ◽  
Phd Thesis

Abstract The Theory of Share Tenancy by Steven Cheung, first published as a PhD thesis 50 years ago, was an important watershed study on the economics of contracts. It contained the first formal demonstration of the Coase Theorem, linked the concepts of property rights and transaction costs, laid early foundations for the future economics of contracts, and can even lay claim to originating the idea of a risk/incentive tradeoff in contract design. This essay examines Cheung's key contributions in Share Tenancy, and considers reasons for its somewhat limited legacy outside of China.

scholarly journals The Coase theorem: coherent, logical, and not disproved

2014 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 379-390 ◽  
Author(s):  
DOUGLAS W. ALLEN
Keyword(s):  
Property Rights ◽  
Transaction Costs ◽  
Coase Theorem ◽  
The Other ◽  
Long Line ◽  
Adequate Definition ◽  
Definition Of

Abstract:There exists a long line of challengers to the ‘Coase Theorem’. All of these rest on fundamental misconceptions of property rights, transaction costs, and their interaction. Here I examine two attacks that have gone unchallenged: one by Halpin, the other by Usher. I argue that both, in failing to either use or understand an adequate definition of transaction costs, fail to deliver a fatal blow to Coase's famous idea.

scholarly journals Swiss land improvement syndicates: ‘Impure’ Coasian solutions?

2020 ◽  
pp. 147309522092362 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sina Shahab ◽  
François-Xavier Viallon
Keyword(s):  
Property Rights ◽  
Transaction Costs ◽  
Policy Instrument ◽  
Coase Theorem ◽  
Theory And Practice ◽  
Planning Theory ◽  
Local Authorities ◽  
Correct Information ◽  
Development Processes ◽  
Land Improvement

An increasing number of planners have explored the implication of Coase theorem for planning theory and practice. As there are often a large and dispersed number of actors involved in planning issues, the application of ‘Pure’ Coasian solutions has proved to be limited. However, some studies argue that when the conditions for a ‘Pure’ Coasian solution do not exist, ‘Impure’ Coasian solutions may still be achievable. This article examines how, when conditions of ‘Impure’ Coasian solutions are available, local authorities in Switzerland use land improvement syndicates as a policy instrument in order to achieve negotiated solutions in relation to development processes involving multiple landowners. With a syndicate in the commune of Cheseaux as an illustrative example, the article analyses how this policy instrument has been utilised to reduce transaction costs, correct information asymmetries and clarify property rights. The focus has been on an interpretation of the Coasian theorem that identifies attempts to reduce transaction costs and clarify property rights as the main roles of governments or local authorities.

Post-Soviet Privatization in the Light of the Coase Theorem (Transaction Costs and Governance Costs)

2003 ◽  
pp. 120-136 ◽  
Author(s):  
V. Andreff
Keyword(s):  
Property Rights ◽  
Transaction Costs ◽  
Theoretical Perspective ◽  
Transition Process ◽  
Initial Distribution ◽  
Coase Theorem ◽  
Early Years ◽  
Firm Boundaries ◽  
Governance Costs ◽  
The Relationship

A Coasian theoretical perspective is assumed to be in the background of most post-Soviet economies' privatization drives. The assumption of zero transaction costs underlying the Coase theorem guarantees an efficient reallocation of property rights whatever is their initial distribution. Once this assumption is relaxed, the result predicted by the Coase theorem is less certain and clashes with the nature of the firm as it has been analyzed earlier by Coase himself. This preliminary presentation is used as a critical driver to provide a non-mainstream assessment of privatization objectives in Russia that became so obviously high in the early years of the transition process. A Coasian analysis also helps to figure out the post-privatization firm boundaries and to design in-house restructuring as well as industrial restructuring - between industrial branches. The issue of the firm boundaries is crucial in the relationship between privatization and restructuring. Finally, we come to terms with the analysis of post-privatization property rights and corporate governance and their possible (governance) costs for in-house restructuring. The last section is devoted to an evaluation of standard and non-standard methods of privatization.

From transaction costs to transaction value: Overcoming the frictional paradigm

2020 ◽  
pp. 51-81
Author(s):  
D. P. Frolov
Keyword(s):  
Transaction Costs ◽  
Transaction Cost ◽  
Path Dependence ◽  
Transaction Cost Economics ◽  
Cost Minimization ◽  
Low Cost ◽  
Coase Theorem ◽  
Transactional Analysis ◽  
Transaction Sector ◽  
Transaction Value

The transaction cost economics has accumulated a mass of dogmatic concepts and assertions that have acquired high stability under the influence of path dependence. These include the dogma about transaction costs as frictions, the dogma about the unproductiveness of transactions as a generator of losses, “Stigler—Coase” theorem and the logic of transaction cost minimization, and also the dogma about the priority of institutions providing low-cost transactions. The listed dogmas underlie the prevailing tradition of transactional analysis the frictional paradigm — which, in turn, is the foundation of neo-institutional theory. Therefore, the community of new institutionalists implicitly blocks attempts of a serious revision of this dogmatics. The purpose of the article is to substantiate a post-institutional (alternative to the dominant neo-institutional discourse) value-oriented perspective for the development of transactional studies based on rethinking and combining forgotten theoretical alternatives. Those are Commons’s theory of transactions, Wallis—North’s theory of transaction sector, theory of transaction benefits (T. Sandler, N. Komesar, T. Eggertsson) and Zajac—Olsen’s theory of transaction value. The article provides arguments and examples in favor of broader explanatory possibilities of value-oriented transactional analysis.

On a Fallacy in the Coase Theorem and the Theorem of Transaction Costs Substitution

2020 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Steven N. S. Cheung
Keyword(s):  
Transaction Costs ◽  
Transaction Cost ◽  
Coase Theorem ◽  
Economic Institutions ◽  
General Version ◽  
Historical Account ◽  
Rent Dissipation

AbstractThis paper first presents a historical account of the origin of the Coase Theorem. It then elaborates its significance in explaining the working of economic institutions. After expounding the concepts of transaction cost and rent dissipation, it points out an error in the Coase Theorem. Lastly, the paper propounds the Theorem of Transaction Costs Substitution as an extended and general version of the Coase Theorem.

The Effects of Transaction Costs, Landlord and Tenant Practices and Property Rights on Foreign Real Estate Investment

2013 ◽  
Vol 7 (3) ◽  
pp. 351-370 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hassan Gholipour Fereidouni ◽  
Usama Al-mulali ◽  
Miswan Abdul Hakim Bin Mohammed
Keyword(s):  
Real Estate ◽  
Property Rights ◽  
Transaction Costs ◽  
Real Estate Investment

scholarly journals How should we model property? Thinking with my critics

2017 ◽  
Vol 13 (4) ◽  
pp. 815-827 ◽  
Author(s):  
BENITO ARRUÑADA
Keyword(s):  
Property Rights ◽  
Transaction Costs ◽  
Main Argument ◽  
Model Property ◽  
Private Ordering ◽  
Single Exchange ◽  
Private And Public ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Physical Dimensions

AbstractInspired by comments made by Allen (2017), Lueck (2017), Ménard (2017) and Smith (2017), this response clarifies and deepens the analysis in Arruñada (2017a). Its main argument is that to deal with the complexity of property we must abstract secondary elements, such as the physical dimensions of some types of assets, and focus on the interaction between transactions. This sequential-exchange framework captures the main problem of property in the current environment of impersonal markets. It also provides criteria to compare private and public ordering, as well as to organize public solutions that enable new forms of private ordering. The analysis applies the lessons in Coase (1960) to property by not only comparing realities but also maintaining his separate definition of property rights and transaction costs. However, it replaces his contractual, single-exchange, framework for one in which contracts interact, causing exchange externalities.

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